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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis takes as its starting point claims that practices of financial 
speculation in commodity derivative markets were instrumental in the causation of the 
global food crisis in 2007-08. Adopting an approach informed by critical legal studies, 
I seek to challenge dominant conceptions about the role that law has played in this 
context. Campaigners concerned about these practices place great faith in financial 
regulation as means of restraining ‘excessive’ speculation. Equally, those concerned 
with the vulnerability of poor communities to its effects — their condition of ‘food 
insecurity’, as it is designated in the prevailing discourse — turn to human rights, in 
particular, the right to adequate food, as a means of response. In both instances, law is 
positioned as the solution to fix malfunctioning markets. Examining the significance 
of law in the creation of the two global markets in question — one for a trade in 
financial instruments linked to food commodities, the other for tangible food 
commodities — I will consider whether this way of positioning law is accurate. I will 
explore the possibility that a preoccupation with regulatory solutions obscures other 
roles that law might play in global commodity markets. Focusing on the role law plays 
in enabling market behaviours, such as speculation, and in entrenching market 
entitlements that prevent equitable access to food, I will suggest that a body of law 
that is constituting and entrenching the market might stand in the way of regulatory 
ambition.  The call for financial regulation to tackle food price volatility and for the 
strengthening of domestic legal regimes to protect against vulnerability is a call on the 
state to use law to constrain the excesses of the market in the interests of society. Is 
this a promising strategy, however, when the constitutive role of law and the state in 
facilitating the operations of the market is taken into account? 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In March 2008, the price of rice on international commodity markets increased 
by 31 per cent in a single day.
1
 This statistic is but one of a litany of facts and figures 
that seeks to convey the magnitude of the volatility that swept commodity markets 
between 2007 and 2008. Although the prices of many commodities were affected,
2
 the 
most prodigious inflation occurred in markets for grain.
3
 Between 2006 and the 
second quarter of 2008, the prices of maize, rice, and wheat had more than doubled, in 
some cases in a matter of months.
4
 ‘We have never seen anything like this before’, 
Jeff Voge, Chairman of the Kansas City Board of Trade reported in April that year.
5
 
These events were a catalyst for what unfurled into a global food crisis. 
Approximately half of the calories consumed by the world’s poor are accounted for by 
these three staple grains,
6
 and food price inflation was typically far greater in poorer 
countries in the Global South than in many richer ones in Europe, or in the US.
7
 The 
rising cost of food triggered food riots in more than 25 countries worldwide.
8
 
Widespread panic ensued, with journalists proclaiming ‘the end of cheap food’9 and 
the World Food Programme struggling to maintain emergency provision for the 
                                                          
1
 Blas, Javier and Daniel Ten Kate, “Jump in rice price fuels fears of unrest,” The Financial Times, 28
th
 March 
2008.   
2
 Dairy products, meat, palm oil and cassava all underwent significant inflation. See Von Braun, Joachim, “Food 
and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington DC, 2008, p. 3. 
3
 Mitchell, Donald, “A Note on Rising Food Prices,” World Bank, Working Paper WPS 4682, 2008, p. 3. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Faiola, Anthony, “The New Economics of Hunger,” The Washington Post, 27
th
 April 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp0151dyn/content/story/2008/04/26/ST2008042602333.html  
Last accessed 5
th
 May 2015.  
6
 Lobell, David et al, “Prioritizing climate change adaption needs for food security in 2030,” Science, 319 no. 
5863 (2008): 607-610, p. 608. 
7
 Ivanic, Maros and Will Martin, “Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income 
countries,” World Bank, Working Paper WPS 4594, 2008. 
8
 Bush, Ray, “Food riots: Poverty, Power and Protest,” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 1 (2010), p. 121. 
9
 “Food Prices: The End of Cheap Food,” The Economist, 6
th
 December 2007.  
18 
communities it had pledged to assist.
10
 Then, as suddenly as they rose, food prices 
plummeted again towards the end of 2008, generating another kind of havoc for 
farmers and labourers worldwide who depend on agricultural revenue for their 
livelihoods. 
 
Like many people living in wealthier parts of the world, I didn’t experience the 
global food crisis first-hand. As a consumer living in the UK, I typically eat grain that 
is processed and further removed from raw commodities than it is for many people 
living in rural Africa, Asia, or South America where domestic prices rose 
dramatically. Wheat is a fairly small component in the cost of a loaf of bread 
purchased in a supermarket.
11
 Much of the food I buy is produced, manufactured, and 
traded by large agribusiness companies, which were able to absorb much of the impact 
of rising prices and still make a profit.
12
 In contrast to many of the world’s poor, I 
have the luxury of a varied diet and can easily switch to other nutritious alternatives. 
My awareness of these events came from reading newspapers and watching reports on 
television. Images of grasping hands, rural poverty, and aid workers handing out bags 
of rice reminded me of some of the first televised images I recall seeing as a child: 
dying mothers still holding dead babies, too weak to bat away the flies; images of 
children with painfully distended stomachs protruding from their tiny bodies of skin 
and bone. This was footage of the famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea, at its peak between 
1983 and 1985.
13
 The questions I had for my parents then, ‘why do they look like 
that?’, ‘why can’t we feed them? Isn’t there enough food?’, ‘but why are they poor?’, 
and the unsatisfying answers they gave me have bothered me since. They cropped up 
again when I attended an event in London called ‘Gambling on Food: The bankers' 
                                                          
10
 Popham, Peter, “Threat to Millions as Food Aid Scheme Runs Out of Money,” The Independent, 25
th
 March 
2008. 
11
 Anderson, Richard, “The global food crisis: what crisis?” BBC News, 16
th
 October 2012. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business015119715504 Last accessed 5
th
 May 2015. 
12
 Neate, Richard, “How £50m in UN food aid for starving went to buy wheat from Glencore,” The Guardian, 6
th
 
February 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/06/un-food-aid-glencore-xstrata  
Last accessed 6
th
 May 2015. 
13
 De Waal, Alex, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New York & London: Human Rights 
Watch, 1991.  
19 
addiction that's starving the world's poorest people’,14 in October 2010. The previous 
week I had met with one of my current doctoral supervisors, Susan Marks, to discuss a 
topic for a thesis. I said that I wanted to write about ‘economic injustice’, as I termed 
it, and she suggested I might be interested in joining her at an event she was planning 
to attend.   
 
 
i. Thesis topic 
The event was organised by the World Development Movement.
15
 Over the 
course of the evening, I listened to a number of speakers, including economist Jayati 
Ghosh, explaining how a surge of financial investment in commodity futures markets 
was largely responsible for the extreme price volatility that had led to the global food 
crisis.
16
 I learned that due to the development of financial instruments linked to the 
price of agricultural commodities — commodity derivatives — financial speculators 
seeking to profit from changes in underlying commodity prices had been able to enter 
the market. Over the past decade, speculation in derivatives instruments had 
developed into a monumental global market which, due to pressure from the financial 
services industry, had been deregulated by governments in the UK and in the US in 
the late 1990s. Ghosh and the other panellists were calling for new regulations to be 
implemented to tackle ‘food commodity speculation’, to prevent greedy speculators 
from gambling with the lives of the poor.  
 
Two things quickly became apparent when — PhD proposal accepted — I 
began to research the topic further. The first, obvious to anyone taking an interest in 
the subject, was that the causal claim articulated by the speakers at the event was the 
subject of a fraught debate amongst economists. While some claimed that speculation 
                                                          
14
 “Gambling on Food: The bankers' addiction that's starving the world's poorest people,” Event hosted by the 
World Development Movement, Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, London, 26
th
 October 2010. 
15
 The World Development Movement changed its name to Global Justice Now in January 2015. Owing to the 
fact that most of the reports I cite are published under ‘World Development Movement’, I will use this 
designation throughout the thesis. 
16
 Ghosh, Jayati, “The unnatural coupling: Food and global finance,” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 1 
(2010): 72-86. 
20 
was a principal cause of the price volatility in 2007-08,
17
 others refuted this, arguing 
that practices of speculation in financial markets could have no impact whatsoever on 
the price of tangible food commodities.
18
 The second, apparent to me, at least, was 
that the call for regulation as the solution to these practices was problematic. The 
literature on food commodity speculation, much of it written by campaigning groups, 
such as the World Development Movement,
19
 SOMO,
20
 and Oxfam,
21
 continually 
referred to the activities of speculators as ‘unregulated’,22 described derivatives as 
‘invisible’,23 and the markets they were sold in as ‘dark’.24 Financial speculators were 
operating, or so it was argued, in a ‘regulatory black hole’.25 These characterisations 
seemed to jar with the lists of prestigious banks that traded commodity derivatives, 
advertising them in investment brochures as a sound investment choice.
26
 What those 
descriptions did evoke for me was an article I had read during my LLM about 
something else described as a ‘legal black hole’ — Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.27 
Drawing on critical literatures to challenge the common characterisation of this 
military prison as a legal vacuum, Fleur Johns had demonstrated in this article that 
                                                          
17
 Wahl, Peter, “Food Speculation: The Main Factor of the Price Bubble in 2008,” Briefing Paper, World 
Economy, Ecology and Development, Berlin, 2009. 
18
 Krugman, Paul, “Speculative nonsense once again,” New York Times, 23
rd
 June 2008. 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/speculative-nonsense-once-again/?_r=0  
Last accessed 9
th
 July 2015. 
19
 Jones, Tim, The great hunger lottery: How banking speculation causes food crises, World Development 
Movement, 2010; Worthy, Murray, Broken markets: how financial market regulation can help prevent another 
global food crisis, World Development Movement, 2011, p. 16. 
20
 SOMO, “Financing Food: Financialisation and Financial Actors in Agriculture Commodity Markets,” SOMO 
Paper, April 2010. 
21
 Herman, Marc-Olivier, Ruth Kelly, and Robert Nash. "Not a Game, Speculation vs Food Security: Regulating 
financial markets to grow a better future," Oxfam Policy and Practice: Agriculture, Food and Land 11, no. 7 
(2011). 
22
 Worthy, Murray, Broken markets: how financial market regulation can help prevent another global food 
crisis, World Development Movement, 2011, p. 16. 
23
 Baker, Colleen M., “Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives,” Notre Dame Law 
Review 85 (2009): 1287. 
24
 D'Souza, Frank, Nan S. Ellis, and Lisa M. Fairchild, “Illuminating The Need For Regulation In Dark Markets: 
Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12 
(2009): 473.  
25
 Greenberger, Michael, “Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-
Frank's Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives 
Market,” Journal of Business & Technology Law 6, no. 1 (2011). 
26
 “Understanding Commodities: Products & Solutions – Alternative Investments,” ABN AMRO Private Banking, 
Brochure, https://www.abnamroprivatebanking.com/en/images/000_PBI_Global/Brochure/Commodities/ 
Commodities.pdf Last accessed 6
th
 May 2015. 
27
 Johns, Fleur, “Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception,” European Journal of International 
Law 16, no. 4 (2005): 613-635. 
21 
Guantánamo Bay was, in fact, a space ‘filled to the brim with expertise, procedure, 
scrutiny and analysis’ — a work of legal representation and classification.28  The legal 
black hole, it turned out, was full of law.  
 
 
ii. Research question 
In this thesis, I explore claims that the activities of financial traders investing in 
grain via derivative instruments contributed to the causation of the global food crisis. I 
also explore the role that law is playing, or might be understood to be playing, in this 
context. Campaigners concerned about food commodity speculation place great faith 
in financial regulation as a means of restraining ‘excessive’ speculation and 
preventing future price volatility. Equally, those concerned with the vulnerability of 
poor communities to the effects of the price volatility — their condition of ‘food 
insecurity’, as it is designated in prevailing discourses — turn to human rights law and 
place emphasis on strengthening of the rule of law domestically. In both instances, 
law is positioned as the solution to fix malfunctioning markets. Examining the 
significance of law in the creation of the two global markets in question — the market 
in financial instruments linked to food commodities, and the market in food 
commodities themselves — I will consider whether this way of positioning law is 
accurate. Specifically, I will ask to what extent it captures the important constitutive 
role which law has played in enabling market behaviours, such as speculation, and in 
entrenching entitlements that underpin market structures, preventing equitable access 
to food. The call for financial regulation to tackle food price volatility and for the 
strengthening of domestic legal regimes to protect against vulnerability is a call on the 
state to use law to constrain the excesses of the market in the interests of society. Is 
this a promising strategy, however, when the constitutive role of law and the state in 
facilitating the operations of the market is taken into account? This is the overall 
research question that I will try to answer in this thesis.  
 
                                                          
28
 Ibid, p. 618. 
22 
 
iii. Argument overview 
My approach in answering this question involves putting practices of food 
commodity speculation and efforts to respond to vulnerability in historical and 
political context. It involves identifying underlying systemic tendencies, explaining 
trends in economic theory, and linking these to law. The law that I am linking them to 
cannot be conceptualised as one thing; rather, it is a collection of ideas, principles, 
practices, and institutions. It is iterated in texts ranging from treaties to contracts; it is 
legislated, regulated, negotiated, and challenged; it is performed by people — 
sometimes consciously, other times not. I will be talking about many kinds of law 
throughout a number of different historical periods and in a diverse range of countries. 
Some of this law is international law, and some of it is domestic; some of it is both. 
Increasingly, much of it is described as ‘global’ or ‘transnational’. Operating on all of 
these disparate levels and throughout these diverse terrains, however, almost all of this 
law can be found to be regulating just one thing — the relationship between the 
market and society. 
 
The law in the ‘regulatory black hole’ of the over-the-counter derivative market 
comes, mainly, in the form of contracts. However, there are also legal devices, such as 
collateral, and a body of soft law — guiding principle and standards. The market it 
creates is, like Guantánamo Bay, largely a work of legal representation and 
classification. It does not exist as a place; the financial instruments sold within it may 
never take physical form. Through law, however, it is real. Through law, this ‘virtual’ 
trading space conditions real-world effects, both in terms of producing prices and in 
terms of structuring behaviours, which, in turn, structure society. While it is 
understood as a global market, it remains tethered to domestic legal institutions. 
Domestic law is constitutive of this market. This is a stark contrast with the law as it is 
conceptualised in the context of vulnerability to commodity price volatility. Law is 
absent here too, or so it is suggested. What is needed to improve the rightlessness and 
to counter poverty and hunger within ‘developing’ country populations is law to 
23 
strengthen their access to markets;
29
 domestic legal systems have failed them. With 
the guidance of international institutions towards an enabling environment in which 
international human rights law is respected, protected, and fulfilled, this can be 
remedied. Yet the coming of international law to these contexts forgets a history in 
which it is deeply implicated. International law, its institutions, practices of 
knowledge, principles, promises, and conditions, had very real effects in terms of 
contributing to the conditions it now seeks to remedy in developing countries. This 
law too, structured behaviours and structured society. 
 
In both instances, I will suggest, law — originating, mostly in Europe, and 
projected through the international, creating the global — has been instrumental in 
erecting global markets and creating a market society. Moving away from a focus on 
regulation as the fix for failing markets to the role of law as a market enabler brings to 
light a critical challenge for current regulatory ambitions. Law constitutes the market 
facilitating economic interactions based on a mode of exchange that is, as Karl 
Polanyi has argued, intrinsically dependent on the commodification of social life: 
land, labour, and money.
30
 Facilitating this mode of exchange operates to replicate it, 
requiring further commodification. Increasingly, it anticipates and produces a 
particular kind of legal and economic actor: homo economicus.
31
 Assigning him rights 
and regulating his relationships with others, law empowers a subjectivity that thinks 
individually, in the pursuit of self-interest and profit, but acts in society. Thus, in 
constituting the market and empowering homo economicus, law is creating a market 
society.  As Polanyi demonstrated in The Great Transformation, this had insidious 
effects historically on many people trying to live and thrive in that society, prompting 
                                                          
29
 I agree with the criticism directed at the use of the label ‘developing’ to refer to low-income countries in the 
Global South. I use it throughout the thesis in order to refer to those countries subject to practices of 
international development. 
30
 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2002, Chapter 6: “The Self-Regulating Market and Fictitious Commodities: Labor, Land, and Money”. 
31
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them to rebel, and to seek law’s protection, demanding social regulation that would 
shield them from the excesses of the market. This oscillation between market 
entrenchment and market mitigation is designated by Polanyi as the ‘double 
movement’.32 What I will seek to show in this thesis, via an exploration of the role of 
law in the context of food commodity speculation, price volatility, and vulnerability, 
is that this pendulous swinging — this hinge of the relationship between market and 
society — is seizing up. Its direction is ever more singular. A political stance taken to 
the market is crystallised into constitutive law that hinders the ability of the state to 
regulate the market in the interests of society. The proliferations of laws that 
‘economize the social’,33 to borrow from Wendy Brown; or that ‘regulate society by 
the market’,34 prevents, or at any rate inhibits, a shift towards another kind of politics. 
This occurs because the law isn’t just structuring a market, it is structuring mindsets. It 
is conditioning agencies predisposed to act as homo economicus: to calculate, 
speculate, and, in pursuit of the maximisation of their own utility, to circumvent or 
otherwise resist regulation. As I will seek to demonstrate, this sets critical limits to the 
ambitions of those seeking to use regulation to tackle hunger. 
 
 
iv. Research parameters 
To arrive at this argument I had to navigate through a range of literatures a long 
way from my starting point as a student of public international law with an interest in 
human rights. The question of the impact of speculative practice on food prices 
required engagement with traditional economic theories of value formation, and the 
dominant school of thought on that subject, neoclassical economics. The stalemate 
between economists attempting to assess the causal impact of speculation through this 
framework necessitated a sideways move towards behavioural economics, the 
psychology of investment, and sociological literature on institutions. The attempt to 
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position economic explanations in their political context led to literature on 
‘neoliberalism’ — the unwieldy term typically invoked in critical work to characterise 
the political climate since the 1970s. Understanding the evolution of commodity 
derivatives demanded exploration of the history of commodity futures trading. 
Examining efforts to regulate derivatives markets called for consideration of the 
global financial crisis, literature on regulatory reforms pursued in the US and Europe, 
along with broader scholarship on financial regulation. Consideration of the 
constitutive role of law in the creation of derivative markets entailed a leap back in 
time, to the origins of capitalism, then forward again, to trace the trajectory of 
financial markets, ending up in modern scholarship on specific concepts such as 
‘collateral’,35 and, more broadly, the ‘legal theory of finance’.36 Moving on from the 
contemplation of the volatility dimension of the global food crisis to the question of 
vulnerability opened up another library of histories, theories, and critiques: texts on 
the political economy of hunger, scholarship on food security, critical literature on 
international development and international economic law. Exploring these avenues, I 
eventually ended up on more familiar territory once again — that relating to public 
international law, the legacy of colonialism, and the international protection of human 
rights.  
 
I don’t claim to have the same degree of intimacy with all of these different 
literatures. Some of them I have engaged with in depth and can claim to know well. 
Others I have been introduced to, gotten a sense of, and hope to get to know better. 
There have been times when I have felt myself over-stretched by the effort to get to 
grips with this vast body of work — conscious of deeper undercurrents and islands of 
intrigue that I have been unable to fully explore. There are aspects of my work that I 
think would benefit from a more in-depth, circumspect, and precise study. Three such 
aspects are a study on the dynamics of the trade in financialised commodity 
derivatives as a discrete category; an investigation into the legal and policy structures 
that influence levels of price transmission from international commodity markets into 
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domestic food prices; and a comparative study on the position of two different 
economies with respect to grain price volatility on international markets, one having 
followed prescriptions on international development geared towards market openness, 
and the other having pursued a more insular stance. I hope that in the future I or others 
will have the opportunity to explore these aspects in further detail. 
 
In this thesis, my intention is to convey a sense of the big picture. I do, 
however, confine my ambitions to a project of explaining existing dynamics 
significant in practices of speculation, commodity derivative markets, the production 
of food price volatility and food insecurity, and the limits of existing approaches to 
their re-conditioning. I am not, at present, suggesting alternatives. Although much of 
my analysis concerns regulation, I do not engage in depth with broader debates in 
financial regulation as to how financial markets might be fixed, speculative practices 
curbed, or product innovation tackled.
37
 Another vital caveat to foreground relates to 
what I am claiming for the causal significance of food commodity speculation. I am 
not an economist and I do not claim to be able to ‘prove’ a role of speculation in the 
causation of the price spikes, or to quantify it. However, as I will go on to argue, 
dominant tools of economic analysis are unable to explain the causal connection 
between food commodity speculation and price volatility. I will elaborate on this in 
Chapter Two. What I will say is that there seems to be an overwhelming body of 
evidence that corroborates claims that the trade in commodity derivatives has 
impacted on pricing dynamics within underlying commodity markets. On the question 
of what measure of the volatility in 2007-08 is attributable to activity in commodity 
derivative markets, I offer no answer. Asked if activity in commodity derivative 
markets was significant to the causation of these events, I would answer definitely 
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yes. I would further suggest that there is an urgent need for economists to address a 
different question. Dominant tools of economic analysis are unable to account for the 
full measure of volatility in food prices, or to explain the significance of speculation. 
Why does that operate, predominantly, to produce doubt about the role of speculation 
and not doubt about the tools used to analyse it? 
 
 
v. Thesis structure 
I begin my analysis by looking at the broader background of hunger and 
deprivation against which the events of the global food crisis took place. Chapter One 
will provide an overview of the phenomenon of world hunger, as it is known and 
understood. After relating key theories and core responses, I offer some thoughts on 
the limitations of dominant approaches to addressing hunger. Drawing on critical 
literature on the global food system, I suggest that a sense of this system as a producer 
of hunger and poverty is the absent diagnosis preventing solutions to world hunger 
from taking their desired effect. I then seek to characterise the contemporary global 
food system, and discuss its relevance in the context of the global food crisis.  
 
Chapter Two engages in analysis of the significance of food commodity 
speculation to the causation of the global food crisis. Seeking to develop an 
understanding of what practices of speculation consist of, and how they could have 
been causally relevant, I challenge prevailing characterisations common to both those 
claiming these practices caused the crisis and those denying this possibility. Agreeing 
with campaigners that dominant modes of causal economic analysis are inadequate, I 
nonetheless suggest that campaigners err in attributing responsibility for volatility-
inducing speculation to a class of risk-taking, greed-driven financial speculators. The 
problem is both more structural and more societal. Speculators are but an extreme case 
of a broader social inclination towards this manner of market behaviour — a market 
logic oriented towards speculation that is not a natural human characteristic, but is the 
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result of a broader political context and enabling institutional environment that has 
legitimated speculation as an economic practice.    
 
In Chapter Three, I focus on the drive to regulate ‘excessive’ levels of 
speculation in commodity derivatives markets. I evaluate the likely efficacy of new 
regulations introduced in the US and in Europe in the wake of the global financial 
crisis in 2007, some of which are designed to tackle speculative activity. 
Demonstrating a number of key limitations to these regulatory ambitions, I proceed 
with a critical analysis of the reforms arguing that their regulations fail to address the 
underlying market logic of speculation that I identified in Chapter Two. Instead, I 
suggest, the regulations predominantly serve to displace this logic, driving further 
product innovation and financial market complexity that is counterproductive to the 
aims of the regulatory endeavour.  
 
The work I begin in Chapter Four and continue in Chapter Five seeks to expose 
key assumptions about law animating much of the literature on practices of food 
commodity speculation and the vulnerability to which they are alleged to have 
contributed. Overwhelmingly, law is the solution in these scenarios. Financial 
regulation is the fix for global financial markets; human rights are required to improve 
access and to make markets in developing countries operate more equitably. I aim to 
shift the focus on law as remedy to one on law as market enabler. In doing so, I move 
to engage directly with my central research question: to what extent is regulation the 
best strategy when the role of law and the state in constituting markets for food 
commodities is taken into account?  
 
In Chapter Four, I examine the portrayal of the market in over-the-counter 
derivatives as a ‘regulatory black hole’. Taking issue with the presentation of this 
market as ‘self-regulating’, or ‘unregulated’ — the product of processes of 
deregulation — I trace the origins of the market to a legal device known as ‘offshore’ 
finance. I explore the possibility that the label ‘over-the-counter’ functions in a similar 
vein — as a legal fiction that blinds people to the true mode of this market’s operation 
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and, critically, the role of the state and domestic legal institutions in supporting it. I 
then move on to critically examine designations of derivatives as ‘financial’ 
technologies, countering that they might more accurately be understood as legal ones. 
Contrary to the presentation of speculative behaviours and their impact on food prices 
as being ‘natural’ or ‘exceptional’ economic behaviours, I seek to demonstrate that 
they are structurally produced. Law helps to condition the speculative market logic I 
identified in Chapter Two, the logic that demands regulatory evasion, as suggested in 
Chapter Three.  
 
In Chapter Five, I move on to consider the disparate impact of the ‘global’ food 
crisis. I begin by challenging narratives that present the particular vulnerability of 
poor people living in Southern economies as natural, or attribute it to failures of 
governance — domestic or international. My next move is to recall the (widely made) 
argument that international law has been a pivotal part of a power-complex that has, 
since the period of European colonialism, enabled wealthier nations in the Global 
North to maintain ongoing influence over the economic affairs of those in the South. I 
examine something of the shifting guises of development discourse, its relationship 
with economic theory, and its relationship with law. I demonstrate that both food 
insecurity and food price volatility are produced and sustained, in part, by an 
international legal order that systematically disadvantages populations in the Global 
South in their ability to command access to food. Moving on to contemplate 
international legal solutions to the ‘challenges’ of food insecurity and food price 
volatility, and in particular, the promotion of the rule of law and human rights, my 
analysis brings into focus significant limitations to these projects as a means of 
tackling hunger.  
 
Drawing together some of the central insights of my research, in a final 
concluding chapter I argue that regulatory strategies aimed at tackling food 
commodity speculation and responding to food insecurity are fundamentally 
insensitive to the ramifications of another body of law that is actively contributing to 
the production of these very phenomena. For over two decades, law has been a means 
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by which a political agenda that assumes that the needs of human beings are best met 
by allowing markets to operate ‘unhindered’ by government interference has been put 
into practice. The events of the global food crisis in 2007-8, and those of the global 
financial crisis (just) preceding it, present a radical challenge to the veracity of this 
assumption. Yet, the responses to these social catastrophic events have been far from 
radical. Regulatory measures purporting to broker a ‘New Deal’38 for populations still 
suffering in their aftermath have left many of the foundational structures, market 
logics, financial instruments, and economic assumptions of the pre-crisis socio-
economic order in place. As regulations purporting to tackle ‘excessive’ volumes of 
financial speculation in food commodity markets would testify, it is assumed that it is 
possible to retain the benefits of a profitable market in commodity derivatives while 
adjusting them to better meet the needs of the food insecure. The possibility that food 
prices may not be able to serve as both a tradable asset for financial traders and as a 
mechanism of distribution for human beings to access sufficient food to eat is not 
entertained.  
 
As Robin Yates has argued, ‘food is not just fuel for human machines but a 
“condensed symbol of society” binding us together in spirit’.39 Increasingly, the value 
of food and the ability of human beings to access it is also determined by a single 
condensed symbol of its worth — its price. What then happens to society when that 
price becomes a tradable financial asset, bought and sold by those who have no 
interest, or even awareness, that what they are trading is food at all?     
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Chapter One 
 
World Hunger and the Global Food Crisis  
 
 
 
 
Hunger is a problem which long pre-dates the extraordinary volatility that 
swept global commodity markets in 2007-08. According to estimates by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), there were 852 million 
undernourished people worldwide in 2000-02, 815 million of them living in 
developing countries.
1
 That figure rose to 1.02 billion after the first price spike which, 
according to one data set published by the FAO, pushed an additional 100 million 
people into chronic hunger and poverty.
2
 A revised methodology
3
 has recently put the 
number of chronically undernourished people down to 805 million people for 2012-
14.
4
 It is now thought that Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1C — which aims 
to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people in developing countries 
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th
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who suffer from hunger — will be achieved.5 While this represents some measure of 
progress, the fact remains that approximately one person every four seconds dies of 
starvation.
6
 Under-nutrition continues to be the cause of almost half of the deaths of 
those children who die under the age of 5 — 3.1 million children every year.7 
 
Before focusing on the global food crisis, I want to critically engage with 
debates on this broader background of hunger and deprivation. In the 21
st
 century, it is 
recognised that people do not go hungry because the world doesn’t produce enough 
food. Food of a sufficient quantity to feed the entire world population an adequate diet 
has been produced for some decades.
8
 Hunger is now understood to result from an 
inability of certain people to command access to food. Consequently the dominant 
discourse adopted today to describe the situation of the hungry is that of ‘food 
insecurity’, defined by the FAO as ‘[a] situation that exists when people lack secure 
access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and 
development and an active and healthy life’.9 A great deal of work is being carried out 
to address world hunger via what many consider to be three interrelated goals: 
working in accordance with MDG 1C and the ‘Zero Hunger Challenge’10 to reduce 
the numbers of people suffering from hunger worldwide; helping populations to 
achieve food security in the longer term; and strengthening legal entitlements via the 
human right to adequate food. Hunger reduction, as the FAO has recently underlined, 
requires an integrated approach.
11
  
 
Many of the recommendations put forward on how to achieve food security are 
highly persuasive. Nonetheless, I align myself with those scholars who have suggested 
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that this dominant framework and the responses generated through it are inadequate. 
Drawing on the work of scholars including Susan George,
12
 Raj Patel,
13
 Fred Magdoff 
and Brian Tokar,
14
 and Jennifer Clapp,
15
 I will argue that the lens of food security and 
many of the measures designed to achieve it, including the strengthening of the human 
right to adequate food, comprise a sophisticated tool kit to analyse and respond to the 
symptoms of what is largely an absent diagnosis. Often, the factors compromising 
populations understood to be ‘food insecure’ — lack of access to land and resources, 
insufficient investment in agriculture, natural disasters conditioned by climate change, 
poor transport links — are linked only by what they conspire to produce: poverty and 
hunger. The possibility that they might share more than a common consequence — 
that they are, in fact, consequences of a broader systemic phenomenon — is rarely 
considered. I will end this chapter by beginning the work that I will continue 
throughout the thesis: exploring the possibility that one of the main causes of hunger 
in the 21
st
 century is the contemporary global food system itself.  
 
 The chapter will be structured as follows: Part I will present a portrait of 
modern hunger drawing on the investigations carried out into its contemporary 
manifestation. Part II will consider the evolution of explanations on the persistence of 
hunger, explaining the contributions of two famous scholars who have written theories 
on the subject: Thomas Malthus and Amartya Sen. In Part III I will move on to 
elaborate the current foundations of the anti-hunger response architecture: food 
security, MDG 1C, and the right to adequate food, before offering a critique of these 
initiatives. In Part IV I will explore the possibility that what is missing in these 
dominant conceptions of hunger is recognition of the role of the global food system as 
a producer of hunger and poverty, particularly in the Global South. Finally, in Part V, 
I will relate in more detail the events of the global food crisis and its implications for 
contemporary efforts to understand and respond to hunger as a problem in the world.  
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I. INVESTIGATION 
 
In recent decades the work of the principal international institutions tasked with 
responding to hunger, the FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP), has been 
supplemented by a range of other international and regional bodies, including 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), third sector NGOs, and 
charities such as Oxfam and Action Aid. Over time, the activities of these 
organisations have evolved into a highly sophisticated system dedicated to the study 
and resolution of hunger. Focused investigation, monitoring, and reporting are carried 
out culminating in annual publications, like the FAO’s State of Food Insecurity in the 
Word (SOFI), and more specialised reports on thematic issues. Tools such as the 
Global Hunger Index (GHI) have been developed to ‘comprehensively measure and 
track hunger globally and by country and region’.16 A growing body of experts has 
emerged, encompassing development specialists, agriculturalists, agronomists, 
fisheries and livestock specialists, and nutritionists.
17
 Their findings are published in a 
growing literature on topics ranging from hunger in history
18
 to texts on the political 
economy of hunger
19
 and theories of famine.
20
 The study of hunger has given rise to 
centres of research,
21
 and new specialisms and journals on subjects such as 
agricultural economics
22
 and peasant studies.
23
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A new vocabulary has been developed in order to facilitate a more nuanced 
understanding of hunger. Hunger is ‘acute’ when it comprises a sudden or drastic 
reduction in the nutritional intake of a population,
24
 often resulting in a situation of 
famine or food crisis. This is differentiated from ‘chronic’ hunger, connoting the 
longer term sufferance of hunger likely to result in undernourishment and 
malnutrition.  While poverty is typically the proximate cause in cases of chronic 
hunger, episodes of acute hunger are more likely to have been generated from events 
— such as the outbreak of war or a natural disaster.25 They are often accompanied by 
significant increases in mortality, and social disturbances such as food riots, 
displacement, and a turn to illegal or immoral activities to procure food.
26
 Although 
the victims of acute hunger may exhibit more visible symptoms, such as wasting or 
oedema, and in turn be more visible as victims of hunger, the vast majority of hunger-
related deaths are mediated through a period of disease conditioned by chronic 
hunger.
27
 Those who are undernourished, in the sense of having an inadequate daily 
intake of calories,
28
 are likely to suffer from lethargy, frailty, impaired concentration, 
and a susceptibility to disease.
29
 Similar symptoms result from malnourishment, which 
indicates an absence or deficiency of particular nutritional requirements.
30
 A lack of 
critical vitamins or minerals such as vitamin A, iron, thymine, or zinc can result in 
specific conditions: anaemia, beriberi, and pellagra.
31
  
 
As a result of ongoing investigation, more is known about who goes hungry 
than ever before. The vast majority of the world's hungry people live in developing 
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countries, where 13.5 per cent of the population is classified as undernourished.
32
 Sub-
Saharan Africa has the highest prevalence of people suffering from hunger, with 
around one in four people undernourished. Asia, the most populous region in the 
world, has the highest number of undernourished.
33
 Within these regions, it has been 
discovered that persons living in rural areas, often those directly involved in the 
production of food, are most vulnerable to hunger.
34
 The FAO calculates that around 
half of the world's hungry people are from smallholder farming communities, 
surviving off marginal lands.
35
 However, the numbers of poor and hungry city 
dwellers are rising rapidly, along with the world's total urban population. A further 20 
per cent of the world’s hungry are classified as ‘urban poor’, living in shanty towns on 
the periphery of the biggest cities in developing countries.
36
  
 
Although natural disasters and conflict continue to be regarded as two 
important proximate causes of hunger,
37
 poverty is now recognised to be the 
preeminent factor conditioning hunger globally. The nature of this causal relationship 
has been subject to considerable research. No longer seen as merely the result of 
poverty, hunger is now recognised to be its cause. Often too weak from lack of food to 
be able to work, hungry people are condemned to further poverty, a fact which 
conditions further hunger. The hungry are caught in a trap — a hunger-poverty trap, as 
this vicious cycle is often termed.
38
 Climate change is another major contributor, with 
experts in agreement that changes in temperature, precipitation, and rising sea levels 
will increase both the frequency and severity of weather disasters such as floods and 
droughts worldwide.
39
 Taken together, these factors are understood to place poorer 
nations in the Global South in an especially precarious position. Many of these 
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countries are geographically ‘on the frontline’40 and will be impacted most severely by 
shifting weather patterns. Lacking in revenue and infrastructure, they are also more 
economically vulnerable.
41
 Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be the region worst 
affected. It is estimated that in some countries in the region, yields from rain-fed 
agriculture could fall by 50 per cent by 2020.
42
 Other countries that will be severely 
impacted are small island developing states, particularly those in the Pacific, such as 
Kiribati and Nauru, likely to become uninhabitable in the near future as sea levels 
continue to rise.
43
 
 
In spite of an ongoing rhetorical tendency to express a desire to ‘win the war’ 
against hunger,
44
  or to ‘eliminate it’,45 there is a growing recognition that its cause 
can no longer be convincingly explained as hostile or extraneous to human society. 
Extant social, economic, and political arrangements are implicated. This is evident in 
the call for a ‘sustained political commitment’ to end hunger, issued again recently by 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon.
46
 It is also apparent in the 
immense and increasing inequality between the rich and the poor, and the food that 
they are able to command access to. Whilst some starve, others are stuffed,
47
 over-
feeding their bodies and developing infirmities induced by too much food, or too 
many unhealthy calories. Vast quantities of food are wasted in wealthier parts of the 
world.
48
 Some are surviving on barely a bowl of rice a day; yet many people living in 
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cosmopolitan cities dine out on infinite varieties: risotto, sushi and paella. Expressing 
what would seem to be a common feeling on the matter, as Amartya Sen has 
observed, ‘[h]unger in the modern world is more intolerable than past hunger not 
because it is typically more intense, but because it is now so unnecessary’.49 
 
 
II. EXPLANATION 
 
Broadly speaking, theories on the causation of hunger have evolved through 
three distinct phases. The initial focus was on the relationship between food supply 
and population growth, the second between hunger and development, and the third on 
access to food as determined by social entitlements. 
 
 
i. Population 
 
The first theory that attempted to explain the dynamics of hunger as a 
phenomenon was developed in 1798 by Thomas Robert Malthus. In An Essay on the 
Principle of Population,
50
 Malthus argued that population growth was an inherent 
impediment to the realisation of the society envisaged by the proponents of 
Enlightenment thinking. In his view, rising productivity rates would inevitably lead to 
further hunger and deprivation as they would not be able to sustain the rate of 
population expansion encouraged by the march towards progress.  Demand would 
always outstrip supply. Identifying what he called ‘positive’ checks on population 
growth, which raised the death rate; and ‘preventive’ ones, which lowered the birth 
rate, hunger, for Malthus, was a necessary evil.
51
 In his words, ‘[t]he power of 
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population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that 
premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race’.52  
 
Now known as the population-subsistence dynamic, Malthus’s theory still 
exerts considerable influence today. Paul Ehrlich, who has written several books 
including The Population Bomb,
53
 draws on Malthus to predict famine as a result of 
population increase.  Malthusian questions — Can the world continue to support a 
steady increase in population? Are there enough food-lands available to feed the world 
a Western diet?
54
 — continue to feature frequently in both scholarly and journalistic 
texts. The dominant focus on supply-side solutions to hunger that endured for the 
entirety of the 19
th
 century and much of the 20
th could also be regarded as Malthus’s 
legacy. However, a growing body of research has sought to challenge some of the 
founding assumptions of his theory. Contrary to Malthus’s predictions, population 
growth has yet to exceed food supply.
55
 In contravention of the thesis that population 
growth conditions hunger, it has been argued that hunger and deprivation, in fact, 
condition population growth. As Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo demonstrate in 
their work, Poor Economics, the poor have an economic incentive to have children 
because, although they are another mouth to feed, children make a vast contribution to 
the lot of the family and can look after their parents in old age.
56
 Challenging the 
assumption that poor families have large numbers of children out of ignorance, such 
studies demonstrate that these decisions can be economically enlightened.    
 
Combined with other factors, particularly climate change, however, a number 
of analysts have suggested that the population-subsistence dynamic could result in the 
catastrophic scenario conjured by Malthus in 1798. The population of the least 
developed countries of the Sahel region in Africa is estimated to more than triple from 
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100 million to 340 million by 2050.
57
 With extreme temperatures impacting on food 
production likely to become the norm by 2050, the Sahel could become the first part 
of planet earth that suffers large-scale starvation and escalating conflict as a growing 
human population outruns diminishing natural resources.
58
 
 
 
ii. Development 
 
Although Malthusianism has, in the last decade, been making a come-back, 
conceptions of hunger underwent a discernible shift in the 20
th
 century away from 
Malthusian pessimism. Inextricably linked with decolonisation and the birth of a new 
international order — points that will be explored later in Chapter Five — in the 
decades after World War Two, a largely optimistic view that hunger and poverty 
could be resolved by process of economic development became mainstream. 
 
In the post-war era, the United States occupied a new position of power and 
proposed to use its expertise to improve the position of peoples in the newly liberated 
‘Third World’. Initially, in the 1950s, the solution was seen to lie in the establishment 
of mechanisms for making use of surpluses of grain produced in the US available for 
the benefit of food-deficient people in other countries.
59
 The Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480) 1954 established a program of 
food assistance to poor countries. Vast amounts of grain were shipped overseas, 
particularly to Africa. The provision of food aid was widely perceived as being 
mutually beneficial. Farmers in the US were struggling on account of chronic 
surpluses amassed as a consequence of government subsidies, and many ‘Third 
World’ states welcomed the initiatives.60 During the 1960s, however, critics began to 
argue that the aid cultivated a dependency that was counterproductive to the needs of 
                                                          
57
 Potts, Malcolm, Courtney Henderson, Martha Campbell, “The Sahel: A Malthusian Challenge?” 
Environmental and Resource Economics 55, no. 4 (2013): 501-512, p. 501. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Friedmann, Harriet, “The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food 
Order,” American Journal of Sociology 88 (1982), p. 267. 
41 
hungry communities.
61
 A new solution was promulgated: fostering technological 
development and the transfer of expertise that would enable hungry peoples to feed 
themselves. An initiative known as the ‘Green Revolution’ formed a critical part of 
this endeavour. International agencies, notably the FAO, began an active programme 
of technical assistance comprised of projects designed to improve the agricultural 
productivity in many countries in the Global South.
62
 A key feature was the 
development of new varieties of cereal grains manipulated to give a higher yield. One 
such example was the IR8 rice strain — a semi-dwarf rice variety developed by the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) — that could produce almost ten times 
the yield of traditional rice.
63
 During the 1950s and the 1960s the world food 
production increased by more than 50 per cent and the production per capita increased 
by more than 20 per cent.
64
 
 
Though many still regard these developments as progress, studies have 
emerged that suggest that the Green Revolution actually produced as many hungry 
people as it fed.
65
 As Annie Shattuck and Eric Holt-Giménez have argued, the spread 
of these ‘green’ technologies led to the monopolisation of seed and chemical inputs by 
Northern companies, resulted in the loss of 90 per cent of the South's agricultural 
biodiversity, and exacerbated social inequalities.
66
 While these insidious effects were 
not widely appreciated at the time, events in the early 1980s, notably the famine in 
Ethiopia in 1983-85, provided a stark counter-weight to the progress narrative of the 
Green Revolution. Documented by the BBC, the reports of Michael Buerk and his 
colleagues brought graphic images of starving people into the living rooms of people 
across the planet. The reaction culminated in the Live Aid concert held in July 1985, 
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watched by some 1,500 million people, and resulted in the tripling of aid.
67
 However, 
in the years following this burst of activism, it became clear that the collective desire 
to ‘feed the world’68 had fallen short. In spite of record levels of food production and 
concerted international aid for hunger victims, widespread hunger and deprivation 
persisted. It was in this climate of a renewed search for answers that a new theory on 
the causes of hunger came to the attention of the international community, the work of 
development economist, Amartya Sen. 
 
 
iii. Entitlement 
 
In 1981 Amartya Sen published a book which had a profound impact upon 
perceptions of how famine occurs, and chronic hunger persists, in conditions of 
plenty. The central argument in Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation is that famine is the result not solely of a lack of food, but of an inability 
to command access to adequate food. As Sen emphasises: ‘[S]tarvation is the 
characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of 
there not being enough food to eat’.69 Using the Bengal Famine of 1943 as his 
principal case study, Sen demonstrated that Bengal was in fact producing more than 
enough food to feed its people when the famine struck. The 3 million people that 
perished, he argued, did so due to a failure of what he termed ‘entitlements’.  
 
Entitlements can be defined as the socially determined rights and opportunities 
which enable people to legally command access to food. According to Sen’s analysis, 
each individual is endowed with certain assets and resources, including labour power, 
which can, through ‘exchange entitlement mappings’ be converted into their 
entitlement set.
70
 These entitlements can be reduced to four principal categories: 
                                                          
67
 De Waal, Alex, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New York & London: Human Rights 
Watch, 1991, p. 178. 
68
 Geldof, Bob and Midge Ure, “Do they know it’s Christmas?” Band Aid, © 1984, by Phonogram.  
69
 Sen, Amartya, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981, p. 1.  
70
 Ibid, Chapter 1, 1:2, “Exchange entitlement”. 
43 
‘production-based entitlements’ (growing food); ‘trade-based entitlements’ (buying 
food); ‘own-labour entitlements’ (working for food); and ‘inheritance-and-transfer 
entitlements’ (being given food by others).71 A person will be vulnerable to hunger if 
there is some change either in his endowment (e.g. alienation of land, or loss of labour 
power due to ill health), or in his exchange entitlement mapping (e.g. fall in wages, 
rise in food prices, loss of employment, drop in the price of the good he produces and 
sells).
72
 Under this lens of analysis, famines are the result of entitlement failures of 
large groups, often belonging to a specific occupation, who as a result of changing 
conditions often suffer a simultaneous drop in their exchange entitlements.
73
  
 
It is important to note that the entitlement theory was developed as a 
framework for analysis of famines and not as a broader theory on the causation of 
hunger.
74
 However, many scholars, Sen included, have used the entitlement theory to 
this effect. While famine and episodes of acute hunger are related to disastrous 
declines of entitlements, he writes, chronic hunger and regular undernourishment are 
associated with inadequate entitlements on a sustained basis.
75
 Sen’s key intervention 
was to break down the mass of the ‘hungry-poor’, often lumped together in prior 
studies, and to demonstrate why some groups suffered famine whilst others did not. In 
doing so, he exposed the socially determined nature of food deprivation, illustrating 
that the problem of hunger needs to be understood in terms of an increasingly complex 
and specialist division of labour, and in the context of chain relationships between 
producers and markets, markets and purchasers, and purchasers and consumers.
76
 As 
Stephen Devereux and others have acknowledged, perhaps his most valuable 
contribution has been to shift analytical focus away from a fixation on food supplies.
77
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Much of the response to Sen’s theory has been favourable.78 However, some 
critics have argued that the entitlement approach is ‘defective’,79  and others consider 
it to be a failure.
80
 Many of those criticising Sen are responding to his arguments 
strictly within a literature concerned with the causation of famine. Nevertheless, their 
critiques also speak to the broader context of how the entitlement thesis has shifted 
perceptions of the causation of hunger. With a degree of generalisation, it is possible 
to characterise much of the critical concern advanced about Sen’s thesis as falling into 
three categories: those who argue that his analysis privileges an economic 
understanding of the causes of hunger to the neglect of other potentially more relevant 
ones; those who argue that his analysis is inapplicable outside of societies in which 
commodity exchange is the primary means of accessing food; and those concerned 
with the naturalising effect of his empiricist ambitions. 
 
In the first category, some have pointed out that many of the most recent 
famines and food crises, particularly in the Horn of Africa, have been triggered either 
by political instability or civil war,
81
 are perpetuated intentionally for political 
reasons,
82
 and produce beneficiaries as well as victims.
83
 The entitlement approach 
which, in De Waal’s estimation has ‘no place for violence’,84 ignores the fact that food 
deprivation can occur in ‘conditions which are deliberately and socially engineered to 
undermine entitlement’.85 Falling into the second camp, a number of scholars have 
                                                          
78
 Osmani, S., “The entitlement approach to famine: an assessment,” in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura 
(Eds), Choice, Welfare and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
79
 Edkins, J., “Legality with a vengeance: famines and humanitarian relief in ‘complex emergencies,’” Journal of 
International Studies 25 (1996): 547-575. 
80
 Fine, B., “Entitlement failure?” Development and Change 28 (1995): 617-647. 
81
 Devereux, Stephen, “Sen’s Entitlement Approach: Critiques and Counter-critiques”, p. 256. 
82
 To give one example, raids on Dinka agro-pastoralists in the 1980s and 1990s were either tacitly condoned 
or actively sponsored by the government in Khartoum, Sudan. See Deng, L., “The 1998 famine in the Sudan: 
causes, preparedness and response,” IDS Discussion Paper 369, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 
1999. Furthermore, as Susan George has argued, food has been used as a weapon by other governments. 
Former Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz described the role of food in the ‘negotiating kit’ of the US when they 
were battling the OPEC states who were using oil as a weapon. See George, Susan, How The Other Half Dies,  
p. 209. 
83
 Rangasami, A., “Failure of exchange entitlements’ theory of famine: A response,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 20 (1985): 1797-1801. 
84
 De Waal, A., “A re-assessment of entitlement theory in the light of the recent famines in Africa,” 
Development and Change 21 (1990), p. 473. 
85
 Fine, B., “Entitlement failure?” p. 627. 
45 
demonstrated that access to resources in many parts of rural Africa
86
 and India
87
 — 
two  places in which food crises frequently occur — are not enforceable by formal 
legal systems, but instead are validated by community-level institutions on the basis of 
social membership, rather than private ownership.
88
 As Devereux argues, ‘[r]ights or 
claims over resources that are held collectively (by groups of people, or institutions) 
are incompatible with the entitlement approach’,89 making it effectively inapplicable 
in contexts where the relationship between individuals and resources is mediated by 
non-market institutions.
90
 In the third category are those concerned not so much with 
the inadequacy of the entitlement approach as an explanatory tool, but with its effects. 
Both Edkins
91
 and Fine
92
 have intimated that the failure to interrogate the concept of 
entitlement operates to naturalise and depoliticise what they consider to be a 
politically contingent set of arrangements governing how people command access to 
food. Sen does acknowledge that ‘the exchange entitlements faced by a person 
depend, naturally, on his position in the economic class structures as well as the 
modes of production in the country’.93 However, as Fine argues, this broader macro 
context is not an analytical priority. There is, he contends, a ‘yawning analytical gap’ 
between the elaborate treatment of immediate reasons for lack of entitlement and the 
deeper explanations for that lack.
94
 Sen makes it very clear that his ambitions are 
descriptive and empirical, not normative. Nonetheless his focus on the individual and 
his failure to address the broader context in which entitlements are determined makes 
that context appear natural, even inevitable.  
 
This speaks to what is, perhaps, the unifying trend in scholarship that is critical 
of Sen’s framework, which is that it is ‘too apolitical and ahistorical’ to tell us much 
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about the structural causes of hunger.
95
 This has been a central concern for Edkins, 
who has been highly critical of Sen, arguing that his use of the word ‘entitlement’ 
‘does not reflect in any sense a concept of the right to food or a concept of what 
people might be entitled to as a human right or as a question of justice’.96 While this 
may be the case in terms of what is explicit in Sen’s analysis, his work can also be 
read as a very subtle but nonetheless powerful critique of a society in which famine 
‘reflects legality with a vengeance’97 — the final sentence of his book. What his work 
demonstrates is that hunger and famine are, more often than not, products of the legal 
system. It is not just Sen’s use of the word ‘entitlement’ that is insensitive to the 
human right to food or questions of justice — it is the legal system itself that is 
unresponsive. At least, this would appear to be the case in the type of legal system that 
typically underpins a market society — a legal system in which food is a commodity 
to be bought and sold for profit by those able to claim ownership of it. Illustrating this, 
Sen describes how, in the Bengal famine of 1943, guarding ownership rights against 
the demands of the hungry, the legal forces upheld entitlements leaving people to die 
in front of ‘well-stocked food shops protected by the state’.98 I would venture to 
suggest that these passages evidence Sen’s implicit critique of the legal arrangements 
governing access to food — a subtlety that Edkins appears to have overlooked. 
 
 
 
III. RESPONSE 
 
Strategies for tackling hunger in the 21
st
 century are directed at the 
achievement of three main goals: helping populations to achieving food security; 
reducing the numbers of the hungry by tackling poverty; and protecting the human 
right to adequate food.  
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i. Food security 
 
The concept of food security first emerged in the 1970s, and was focused on 
international and national initiatives which would ensure that countries in need would 
have access to adequate flows of staple foods. Since the 1980s, under the influence of 
entitlement theory, greater attention has been focused on ‘the needs of people rather 
than countries’.99 Considerable emphasis is now placed on the ability of individuals 
and marginalised groups to access food that is culturally appropriate. The concept of 
food security is now typically defined as including both physical and economic access 
to food that meets people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences.
100
 At the 
World Summit of Food Security in 2009, this concept was extended and specified by 
adding four pillars of food security: availability, access, utilisation, and stability.
101
 
The complex interplay of entitlements influencing access to food is now reflected in 
the disaggregated study of hunger carried out under the lens of food security. This has 
resulted in the specification of a diverse range of ‘food security indicators’ ranging 
from levels of political stability to the percentage of arable land equipped for 
irrigation.
102
 Measuring food security across its different dimensions, the FAO 
maintains, provides a more comprehensive picture, and can also help in the design and 
delivery of targeted food security and nutrition policies.
103
  
 
In the 2014 edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the World, the FAO 
emphasised that food insecurity is a complex problem that required coordinated action 
by all stakeholders, necessitating action at the national and local levels as well as 
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between regions and on a global level.
104
 There is no single prescription, however, 
depending on the context and the specific situation, actions may be required in 
agricultural production and productivity, rural development, fisheries, forestry, social 
protection, public works, trade and markets, resilience to shocks, education and health, 
and other areas.
105
 Overall, the FAO recommends a twin-track approach, comprising 
immediate hunger relief interventions combined with long-term actions to foster 
sustainable growth, particularly in agriculture and the rural economy.
106
 Long term 
actions should include measures to boost investments that raise agricultural 
productivity; measures that facilitate better access to inputs, land, technologies and 
markets; social protection for the most vulnerable, including strengthening their 
resilience to conflicts and natural disasters; and specific nutrition programmes, 
particularly to address micronutrient deficiencies in mothers and children under 
five.
107
 While there is widespread consensus on the measures needed to improve food 
security, there is considerable disagreement on the best means to do so.
108
 While some 
consider investment in public institutions to be vital, other actors such as the Gates 
Foundation have sought to introduce new approaches involving the private sector, 
promoting methods such as social entrepreneurship and impact investing.
109
 The long-
term ambitions of the FAO and other agencies involved in promoting food security 
have recently been supplemented by what could be considered a fast-track approach in 
the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 
 
ii. Millennium Development Goal 1C 
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The MDGs derive from the Millennium Declaration, a statement adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 2000 at a special meeting attended by 147 heads of state 
or government.
110
 Target 1C is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger. This is explicitly linked to the goal of halving the 
numbers of people suffering from poverty — Target 1A. Many have welcomed the 
priority assigned to tackling hunger and poverty and the time-bound goal that the 
MDGs have set, suggesting that this has both stimulated engagement and provided a 
basis for accountability.
111
 Some analysts regard the goals as highly complementary 
with the broader ambition of achieving food security, particularly as the goals are 
aimed at correcting previous trends in development which exhibited a single-minded 
focus on economic growth as the solution to problems such as poverty and hunger.
112
 
The new focus advanced under the goals is on achieving ‘sustained and equitable 
growth’ based on dynamic structural economic change.113  
 
In spite of this, others have argued that the hunger target represents a step 
backwards in terms of how hunger and its causes are conceptualised. Thomas Pogge 
posits that the MDG 1C does not go ‘nearly far enough’114 and actually constitutes a 
lowering of goals previously endorsed in United Nations fora, such as the 1996 Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security.
115
 The target announced in 1996 was to halve 
the number of people undernourished, revised by MDG 1C to one aiming to halve the 
proportion of people in that predicament.
116
 While MDG 1C is now thought to be 
within reach, it is agreed that the more ambitious goal of the World Food Summit is 
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not likely to be met. Other critics, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Amy Orr, have argued that 
defining outcomes based on caloric consumption and underweight children has 
marginalised the need for long-term solutions requiring social and political change.
117
 
They consider the MDG framework to be a step back from emphasis on qualitative 
outcomes, such as the realisation of the right to food, and qualitative processes, such 
as participation, encouraging policies that rely on short-term solutions and a focus on 
measurable results.
118
 
 
While sympathetic to these concerns, others, notably Philip Alston, have 
argued that effective complementarity between human rights and the MDGs is 
possible and should be pursued.
119
 Since 2012 this is now the case, as the ‘Zero 
Hunger Challenge’ launched by Ban Ki-moon has explicitly linked the goal of ending 
hunger in our lifetimes with comprehensive efforts to ensure that every man, woman 
and child enjoy their right to adequate food.
120
 
 
 
iii. The Right to Adequate Food 
 
A major development in efforts to tackle hunger in recent decades has been the 
elaboration of a human right to adequate food.  First recognised in article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as part of the right to an adequate standard of 
living,  the ‘right to adequate food’ was made legally binding in signatories to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966. 
Articulated as a universal and inalienable right belonging to all human beings, this act 
of codification was the first step in attempting to advance efforts to combat hunger as 
being beyond a moral duty, or a policy choice, and to make it a legally binding human 
rights obligation. The right was reaffirmed and refined in General Comment 12 by the 
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United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
121
 
General Comment 12 mandated that the right to adequate food should not be 
interpreted in a ‘narrow or restrictive sense’ — equated with a minimum package of 
calories — but must be ‘realized progressively’ with states taking steps to ‘respect, 
protect, and fulfil’ the right.122 Explicit reference was made to the link between the 
requirement of ‘adequacy’ and the longer term availability and sustainability of food 
supplies connoting food security.
123
 A Special Rapporteur was appointed in 2000, 
tasked with examining means of overcoming obstacles to the realisation of the right, 
monitoring states’ progress via country visits, producing annual reports for the Human 
Rights Committee, and responding to individual complaints.
124
 An additional set of 
voluntary guidelines on the ‘progressive realisation of the right to food in the context 
of national food security’ was negotiated by member States of the FAO in 2004.125 
Seeking to provide ‘practical guidance’ to states in their implementation of the right, 
these guidelines also linked the realisation of the right to adequate food with the 
achievement of MDG 1C.
126
   
 
The elaboration of a legally enforceable human right to adequate food is 
positioned as a step beyond moral duty or policy. Nonetheless, many would consider 
its strength to lie in a move beyond technical prescription of how to achieve food 
security towards a normative vision of what a rights-respecting food system should 
look like. As well as bringing in the ethical dimension, another strength of a rights-
based approach is the emphasis on the duty of identifiable actors — states — to 
provide the right equally, without discrimination, for the benefit of every individual. 
Articulating the need for food as a legally-binding human right makes an already 
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powerful moral claim into a key with the potential to open the doors to the legal 
system, enrolling new actors with considerable experience, expertise, and instruments 
in the delivery of justice in the project of tackling hunger. As well as placing duties on 
politicians, some nations have recognised the justiciability of the right to food, or 
certain aspects of it, through legislative efforts ranging from social security 
guarantees, through food safety regulations, to land tenure legislation.
127
 
 
In spite of ongoing efforts to make the right to food justiciable, numerous 
critics have contended that the provisions, as with many social, economic and cultural 
rights, are bereft of hard law.
128
 It has been argued that inviting states to ‘consider’, or 
‘urging’ them to address potential violations, is insufficient. There is growing support 
for an International Food Security Treaty (IFST) which would require states to adopt 
national legislation granting individuals access to state structures, such as 
administrative tribunals and courts, to enforce the rights arising out of the right to 
adequate food.
129
 Some states have already advanced in this direction. Countries 
including Belarus, Colombia, South Africa, India, Fiji, and Kenya have incorporated 
provisions in their constitutions which explicitly recognise the right to adequate 
food.
130
 A large number of countries do this implicitly, via provisions that protect the 
right to an adequate standard of living as per the ICESCR.
131
 The constitutional 
protection of the right to food has produced some interesting jurisprudence. After a 
lengthy court case, PUCL vs Union of India & Ors,
132
 the Indian parliament adopted 
the National Food Security Act 2013.  The legislation creates entitlements to food-
related assistance and also establishes grievance mechanisms.
133
 Other countries such 
as Brazil have adopted school feeding legislation founded on a human rights-based 
                                                          
127
 For an overview of the question of justiciability, see “Justiciability of the Right to Food,” FAO website 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0511e/a0511e03.pdf Last accessed 29
th 
April 2015.  
128
 Wiles, Ellen, “Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights – The Future for Socio-Economic Rights in 
National Law,” American University Law Review 22 (2006), p. 35. 
129
 “International Food Security Treaty”, www.treaty.org Last accessed 10
th 
July 2015.
 
130
 Vidar, Margret, Yoon Jee Kim and Luisa Cruz, “Legal Developments in the Progressive Realization of the 
Right to Adequate Food," FAO Development Law Branch: Thematic Study 3, Rome: FAO, 2014, p. 2-3. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs Union of India & Ors. Writ Petition (Civil) no. 196 of 2001 and 
Interim Order of 2
nd
 May 2003. 
133
 Ibid.  
53 
approach.
134
 A considerable literature has emerged that questions the merits of 
‘judicialising’ such rights.135 In the main however, the work of the Special Rapporteur 
has focused on how food systems might be reformed to ensure a fuller realisation of 
the right to adequate food.
136
 His recommendations largely correspond with those of 
bodies such as the FAO and their determinations on the need to provide an ‘enabling 
environment’ for the achievement of food security.137  
 
Institutional responses to hunger continue to be dominated by approaches 
focused on achieving food security and securing the right to adequate food in 
accordance with targeted goals. However, in spite of considerable progress in 
developing institutions that promote food security and in securing the right to 
adequate food on a formal level, overwhelmingly, the realisation of the right has not 
sufficiently been reflected in practice.
138
 Some critics, including Edkins
139
 and De 
Waal,
140
 have gone so far as to suggest that the elaboration of technical regimes of 
assistance may have done more to benefit the anti-hunger community — the 
‘humanitarian international’,141 to use De Waal’s terminology — than those 
communities suffering from hunger. 
 
I will now move on to clarify the critical limitations of these dominant 
approaches to tackling hunger and to consider what I would argue is the ‘absent 
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diagnosis’ undermining contemporary ambitions to cure world hunger: the role of the 
global food system. 
 
 
iv. Limitations 
 
As the FAO argues in its 2014 edition of The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World, a major task of food security governance is to foster an ‘enabling 
environment’.142 Nowhere in the pages of empirical analysis that follow is there a 
cohesive explanation of how it came to be that the ‘food insecure’ ended up in a 
disabling environment in the first place. It is acknowledged that food security results 
from ‘multiple causes’143 and that many countries have made little or no progress in 
improving food security, often because of ‘a combination of adverse factors’, such as 
‘natural disasters’,144 a ‘limited and fragile natural resource base’,145 and ‘conflicts, 
price hikes, weak institutions and poor governance’.146 Yet there is no attempt to link 
these free-floating variables. For all of the apparent progress beyond attributing 
hunger to the ‘vagaries of nature’,147 a tendency identified by Susan George in the 
1980s, this is the assumption upon which much of the modern analysis of hunger still 
comes to rest. While not as simple as droughts, floods and earthquakes, food 
insecurity is largely attributed to domestic environments in which the food insecure 
are blighted by a lack of resources (natural and financial), inundated with diseases, 
uprooted by conflict, racked by economic crises, and destabilised by volatile food 
prices. In much of the literature, described without being explained, these read as 
natural characteristics of their surroundings. Equally, while policy and the 
strengthening of legal entitlements are repeatedly prescribed as the solution to the 
problem of food insecurity, there is little mention, much less characterisation, of the 
policy context or legal environment in which people became food insecure in the first 
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place. Where the political apparatus is acknowledged, that acknowledgement often 
takes the form of judgement. Institutions are characterised as being ‘weak’ and 
governance ‘poor’148 without an explication of the criteria that have warranted such an 
assessment.  
 
Taken together, this conspires to mean that people suffering from hunger 
appear in the literature on hunger as ready-made victims, defined by lack. Their 
poverty, vulnerability, insecurity and rightlessness — ever more precisely located, 
profiled, and defined — is calculated as the sum of the possessions, claims, and social 
entitlements that they don’t have, rather than the lot assigned to them under current 
social, political, and economic structures. The cure — prescribed in the absence of a 
clear diagnosis on how they ended up in their predicament — is a combination of 
‘more’ and ‘better’. What is needed is more political commitment, more participation, 
more economic growth, more harmonisation, and more information.
149
 This is to be 
supplemented with better access to inputs, land, services, technologies and markets,
150
 
and better coordination and governance mechanisms.
151
 Where suggestions become 
more concrete, overwhelmingly, solutions are focused on stimulating economic 
growth, fostering market access for local communities and small farmers, and making 
markets more inclusive.
152
 This is to be supplemented by the work of a human rights 
community that ‘does its part’ and ‘updates instruments, documents the abuses of 
powerful economic actors as multinational companies and demands governments to 
regulate their global and national activities’.153  
 
Having skated over the ‘why’ of food insecurity, spent an enormous amount of 
resources specifying the ‘who’ and the ‘what’, and stressing the significance of the 
‘when’ — now, urgently, and preferably by the end of the year — ‘integrated’ 
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approaches to achieving food security have come full circle, annunciating a ‘how’ that 
is as analytically impoverished as the ‘why’ with which they started. What are missing 
are not only the deeper connections but also the deeper contradictions underlying the 
recommendations advanced. The dominant solution prescribes access to resources — 
inputs, land, technologies — that are already owned, often exclusively via private 
property rights — by others. It argues for stronger access to markets for the food 
insecure, when access to markets largely depends on the prior ownership of resources, 
which the food insecure don’t have. It suggests the need for more economic growth, 
when this tends to strengthen the position of the already economically strong,
154
 
leading to the strengthening of their entitlements and private property rights over the 
same resources that the food insecure need better access to.  It positions states as the 
primary actors responsible for implementing this agenda, when, as a growing body of 
scholarship has noted,
155
 states appear to be increasingly powerless to control flows of 
commodities — physical, monetary, and intangible — that determine the amount of 
food within their borders, its quality, or its price.  
 
In spite of recognition that dependence on international commodity markets has 
been prejudicial for many poorer countries and their populations, particularly in terms 
of dependency on imports, the overall recommendation is in strengthening access to 
markets. Although greater emphasis is now placed on the importance of local markets 
and domestic production, there is little recognition of the fact that these markets and 
methods have, over recent decades, become embedded within a broader global food 
system and are inextricably influenced by this broader market mechanism. 
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IV. THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 
 
An international trade in food and agriculture dates back centuries. It is 
difficult to pinpoint a precise moment in which this international trade morphed into a 
global market for food, or, equally, into something that can accurately be described as 
a global food system. Critical steps were made during the period of European 
colonialism, when enterprises such as the Dutch East India and Imperial British East 
Africa trading companies established plantations in soon-to-be colonies to meet 
burgeoning demand at home for exotic products grown in tropical climes.
156
 However, 
it is generally agreed that the shift from trade in cash crops and tropical commodities 
conducted between nations to something more global began with the rise of the post-
war ‘food regime’, as it is described by Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael.157 
The path to a global system was pioneered via the policies of one state in particular: 
the US. The leading economic and political power in the post-war era, the mercantilist 
policies pursued by US administrations were instrumental in exporting first physical 
grain — food aid, as described above — and subsequently the industrialised model of 
agriculture that had produced that surplus grain to countries around the world.
158
 First 
through the technological transfer pursued under the Green Revolution and later 
through industrialisation policies promoted as instigators of economic growth, 
countries worldwide implemented the same industrial model of agricultural 
production as that originating in the US.
159
  
 
Since that era, agricultural production worldwide has increasingly conformed 
to the same model characterised by export-oriented mechanised production, mono-
cropping, reliance on fossil fuels, pesticides, and fertilisers, and a growing role for 
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technological innovations, such as genetically modified crops and hybrid seeds.
160
 
Through the lowering of barriers to import and export and the promotion of 
specialisation in products in which countries have a ‘comparative advantage’, beyond 
symmetry in how food is produced, the international market has developed into an 
interdependent system for the production and consumption of food. Nations are reliant 
on raw materials, fuels, other inputs, finance, and, crucially, demand from other 
countries in order to both produce food domestically and to sell it, providing their 
populations with enough revenue to consume it. States have become specialist 
producers or manufacturers — cogs in a larger machine. The US has emerged as the 
dominant player in the global grain trade exporting 60 per cent of maize, 25 per cent 
of the world’s wheat, and is the third largest soybean exporter.161 Many countries in 
the Global South are specialists in tropical products and agro-fuels. A new leader in 
the soybean market, Brazil is also a specialist sugar exporter, accounting for nearly 40 
per cent of world sugar exports.
162
 Ecuador specialises in bananas,
163
 Ethiopia in tea, 
coffee, and spices.
164
 Other countries, notably in Asia, including China and Japan, 
specialise in manufacturing electronic goods and cars.
165
 Some economies are entirely 
reliant on the fossil fuels upon which the broader global economy, and food system, in 
turn relies: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait supplying oil, Russia 
oil and natural gas, along with other leading exporters Qatar and Norway.
166
 
 
Currently, the food of almost 1 billion people is produced outside their own 
countries.
167
 A significant factor influencing this specialisation is natural endowment 
— particularly in those countries rich in particular resources or whose climates are 
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adept to the production of some crops and not others. However, as recent studies into 
national self-sufficiency have underlined, there are surprisingly few countries — a 
total of 66, most of them in Africa — that could not maintain the same diet that they 
have today and still be food self-sufficient.
168
 Reliance on food imports is, at present, 
a policy choice for many countries which are pursuing the opportunities it affords, 
focusing on more profitable sectors, consuming 'exotic' or seasonal goods year-round, 
and profiting from lower production costs (and thus prices) in other countries.
169
 The 
advantages of this system are, however, distributed highly unevenly. Many poorer 
countries in the Global South — countries whose elective participation in the system 
is highly debatable — suffer disproportionately from the effects of its disadvantages. 
These points will be elaborated further in Chapter Five, where I will also be 
considering the significance of international law in mediating the dynamics of the 
post-war food order. At present, it is sufficient to point out that the number of 
countries estimated to be food self-sufficient in future decades will change radically. 
Even without taking account of the effects of climate change, figures suggest that over 
half the world's population could depend on imported food by 2050 due to constraints 
of water and land impacting on agricultural production.
170
 The consequence of 
countries attempting to maintain the same diet they do today, via industrial modes of 
agricultural production, is that a condition of elective dependency is morphing into 
one increasingly akin to requisite dependency.  
 
 
i. Systematised vulnerability 
 
According to those who have studied the dynamics of the global food system, 
exploring it in historical perspective,
171
 and looking at relations of dependency within 
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it,
172
 it is precisely the linking of countries in the Global South to international 
markets that has exacerbated conditions of poverty and hunger. Being forced to 
compete with wealthier market actors operates to their profound disadvantage. Mike 
Davis has demonstrated that famines across parts of Asia, South America, and Africa 
in the late nineteenth century, which were commonly attributed to variations in 
temperature caused by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, were, to a significant extent, 
produced by the incorporation of those countries into global market structures. In the 
case of India, the elaboration of railways and transport systems linking rural 
communities to a unitary global market had the perverse consequence of exporting 
famine, via price inflation, to the rural poor in grain-surplus districts.
173
 ‘Londoners 
were in fact eating India’s bread’,174 he concludes. Similar dynamics have been 
evidenced in the context of the Irish Potato famine in the 1840s, and Bengal famine in 
1943.
175
  
 
The expansion of the industrial agricultural model has only served to intensify 
this damaging competition. The promotion of mono-cropping has wiped out local 
crops in many countries, exacerbating homogenisation of diets whereby populations in 
the Global South are consuming foods characteristic of diets in the North. This has 
intensified their reliance on grains such as maize, rice, and wheat, subjecting them not 
only to competition from wealthier Northern consumers but also to competition in the 
form of fuel and feed grains.
176
  People in rich, industrialised countries eat high 
protein, meat-based diets that depend on tonnes of grain per year in feed for livestock 
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such as cattle.
177
 During the world food crisis in the 1970s, in which prices for staple 
grains soared and people were starving from want of food, one billion people in the 
rich world were consuming meat that used as much cereal as the two billion people in 
the poor countries consumed directly in the form of grain.
178
  
 
The shift towards an industrial mode of agricultural production — which 
requires substantial capital to instigate, necessitates access to significant stretches of 
land, and depends on fossil fuels and other expensive inputs to function — favours 
large, wealthy, commercially experienced actors over small farmers with few 
resources. This has resulted in the displacement of rural populations throughout the 
Global South who, unable to compete, have been driven into urban slums, or onto 
marginalised land that is less fertile and apt for growing food.
179
 Many of them 
continue to work in agricultural production, only as landless labourers — often paid a 
small wage in return for many hours of work in poor conditions that goes towards 
producing food to export to the global market.
180
 They are increasingly reliant on food 
imports for their own dietary needs and on revenue from agricultural exports produced 
via the industrialised mode of production in their own countries. As Harriet 
Friedmann has argued, peoples of the ‘Third World’ have been both incorporated and 
marginalised, often simultaneously, in a global food system that is largely insensitive 
to their needs, traditional diets, and economic situation.
181
  
 
In spite of research that suggests that small farms are much more productive 
than large farms if total output, rather than yield from a single crop, is considered,
182
 a 
drive towards mono-cropping and industrialised production has been pursued at the 
expense of local populations, ecologies and the global climate. In Paraguay, described 
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by sociologist Javiera Rulli as a ‘soy republic’183, a diverse rainforest that once 
covered 85 per cent of the Eastern region of the country has been transformed into a 
‘green desert’ devoted to the production of soy to be exported for animal feed 
worldwide.
184
 Over the past decade, almost 100,000 small farmers have been evicted 
from their homes and fields
185
 to make way for an industry that dumps 24 million 
litres of agri-chemicals classified as hazardous to human health in Paraguay ever 
year.
186
 A recent investigation in areas of high soy production found that 78 per cent 
of families in several of the communities examined had health problems as a result of 
the pesticides used in crop spraying.
187
 Similar statistics proliferate in countries 
dedicated to the production of agrofuels, such as palm oil for biodiesel in Indonesia 
and Malaysia, jatropha in India, and sugar cane for ethanol in Brazil.
188
   
 
Touted as an alternative to environmentally damaging fossil fuels, research has 
demonstrated that many biofuels require more fossil fuel energy to produce than they 
are able to displace.
189
 What is more, industrialised agricultural production remains 
highly dependent on fossil fuels. Between processing, distribution, and preparation, 
ten calories of energy are required to create just one calorie of food energy.
190
 The 
effects of this in terms of contributing to climate change are well documented. The 
production of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, the tillage, irrigation and 
fertilisation, and the transport, packaging and conservation of food require 
considerable amounts of energy, resulting in an additional 15 to 17 per cent of total 
man-made greenhouse gas emissions attributable to food systems.
191
 Industrial 
agriculture also results in the broader pollution of the air, the soil, the water supply, 
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resulting in ecological degradation that intensified competition for arable farmland.  
The model of agricultural production promoted under the global food system is, 
therefore, a major contributor to the natural disasters and conflicts typically 
foregrounded as proximate causes of hunger. It also plays a significant role in climate 
change, an immanent and critical threat to future food supplies in the Global South. 
 
As well as being industrialised, interdependent, and increasingly specialised, 
the global food system is also one that is monopolised by the power of transnational 
companies. Now occupying the centre of the global food system is what critics denote 
‘the industrial agrifoods complex’. Global companies dominate local markets and 
increasingly control the world's food-producing resources: land, labour, water, inputs, 
genes, and investments.
192
 Two companies, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and 
Cargill capture three-quarters of the world grain trade.
193
 This means that they have a 
huge influence over the methods of food production and its price. These companies 
are able to take advantage of what are designated ‘global value chains’ — referring to 
the disintegration and re-integration of production through inter-firm, inter-country 
trade in order to take advantage of the lowest possible price for a given input.
194
 Small 
farmers and agribusiness firms are unable to compete, and are driven out of the 
market, resulting in further monopolisation by large firms.
195
 Many of these 
companies are also buying up farmland — described by financier George Soros in 
2009 as ‘one of the best investments of our time’.196 The phenomenon commonly 
termed the ‘global land grab’ has resulted in private companies contracting for vast 
areas of land, estimated in 2012 to total an area eight times the size of the UK.
197
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Another facet of their monopolisation of the global food system related to intellectual 
resources. Multinational companies have been commodifying intellectual resources 
required for food production. Indian environmentalist Vandana Shiva has been at the 
forefront of a campaign that exposes the role of companies such as Monsanto in 
transforming the very seeds to grow crops into ‘costly packets of intellectual property’ 
that are unaffordable to local farmers.
198
 
 
A final, but definitive, feature of the global food system relates to the status of 
food within it. What is being produced by the methods of industrialised agricultural 
production is not strictly food, but food commodities. As something to be bought and 
sold for profit the overriding factor determining access to food for populations around 
the world is the ability to pay for it. Other ways in which food is of value to human 
beings  — as a necessity for survival, as a source of enjoyment, as part of cultural 
heritage — are only reflected in the global food system to the extent that those doing 
the valuing can express their need, or desire, in monetary terms. The vast networks 
and complexities of the modern global food system, the fortunes and fates of billions 
of people, and of billion dollar companies are reduced, determined, and put into 
relation by a single numerical measure of the value of food: its price. The 
consequence, as illustrated by the events of the global food crisis of the 1970s,
199
 
widespread food insecurity, and recurrent food crises and famines, is that large 
swathes of the global population have become vulnerable to the machinations of 
global commodity markets.
200
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ii. Demands for food sovereignty 
 
In recent years, a new approach to tackling hunger that seeks to address these 
issues of power imbalance has emerged. The movement for ‘food sovereignty’ — 
connoting people's democratic control of the food system — asserts that nothing less 
than the fundamental restructuring of the global food system will address the 
persistence of hunger.
201
 Originating with the peasant organisation La Via 
Campesina,
202
 proponents advocate restructuring control over land and food in order 
to restructure market power. As Amy Trauger has underlined, in contrast with the 
depoliticised discourse of food insecurity, food sovereignty identifies neoliberal state 
policies and global capital as the source of that insecurity.
203
 Tackling hunger, it is 
argued, requires ‘rethinking the neoliberal market as a mechanism for state-based food 
security initiatives’ and further implicates the state in the production of food insecurity 
for its policies that marginalise small producers in the interests of capital.
204
 
Advocates of food sovereignty make explicit what is implicit in Sen: modern notions  
of property rights and global capitalist markets are the source of the problems in the  
food system.
205
  
 
The overall goal of the food sovereignty movement is, therefore, to ‘re-
localise’ the production and consumption of food, de-linking, as far as possible, local 
producers from global markets. The ambition is to build a food system in which ‘food 
is for people, not for profit’.206 The movement faces a great number of challenges in 
the realisation of its goals. There is still a lot of imprecision about what ‘as far as 
possible’207 means with regard to de-linking from international markets. The extent to 
                                                          
201
 Patel, Raj, “What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like?” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (2009). 
202
 Shattuck, Annie and Eric Holt-Giménez, “Comment: Moving from Food Crisis to Food Sovereignty,” p. 422; 
“What is La Via Campesina?” http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php (follow ‘Organisation’ hyperlink). Last 
accessed 1
st
 February 2015. 
203
 Trauger, Amy, “Toward a political geography of food sovereignty: transforming territory, exchange and 
power in the liberal sovereign state,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 6 (2014), p. 1131. 
204
 Ibid, p. 1132. 
205
 Ibid, p. 1132. 
206
 Magdoff, Fred, and Brian Tokar, Agriculture and food in crisis: Conflict, resistance, and renewal, p. 30. 
207
 Edelman, Marc, et al, “Introduction: critical perspectives on food sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 41, no. 6 (2014) p. 915. 
66 
which this is a realisable vision for future food systems is questioned by those who 
point out that some food-deficit countries cannot produce enough food for current 
populations and appear to have no choice but to engage in long-distance trade.
208
 
These challenges aside, many within the food sovereignty movement were warning of 
the crisis-conditioning tendencies inherent in the global food system long before 
recent events in global markets unfolded — events which appear to have taken most 
economists and governments by surprise: the global food crisis of 2007-08. 
 
 
V. THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 2007-08 AND BEYOND 
 
Between 2007 and 2008, the prices of grain on international markets exhibited 
record levels of volatility. The FAO estimated in 2008 that the average world price for 
rice had risen by 217 per cent, wheat by 136 per cent, corn by 125 per cent and 
soybeans by 107 per cent since the onset of the inflation.
209
 The executive director of 
the WFP at the time, Josette Sheeren, warned of a ‘silent tsunami’ of rising food 
prices threatening to push more than 100 million people worldwide into hunger.
210
 
Although prices dropped again in 2009, it wasn’t long before another such ‘spike’ was 
in evidence: Grain prices moved in a strikingly similar trajectory between the second 
half of 2010 and late 2011, with wheat, corn and soybeans all reaching record heights 
by the summer of 2010.
211
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i. Impact 
 
Although the price volatility did have a global impact, the effects were 
particularly acute for poor communities in developing countries.
212
 Afghanistan and 
Haiti were two countries where the price spikes had a particularly devastating impact. 
The average Afghan household in 2008 was spending about 45 per cent of its income 
on food, up from 11 per cent in 2006.
213
 In Haiti — a country that was once self-
sufficient in rice prior to being encouraged to specialise in the export of apparel, oil, 
cocoa, coffee and mangoes
214
 — the price of imported rice increased by 50 per cent 
within a year in 2008.
215
  Poor Haitians were reported to be eating biscuits made of 
mud, or else risking their lives crossing the sea in search of illegal work in the US.
216
 
The rising price of food was instrumental in triggering an unprecedented number of 
food riots between 2007 and the end of 2008 in more than 25 countries in Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, the Americas and the Caribbean.
217
 The Haitian Prime 
Minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis, was forced to step down as a consequence of riots 
in his country,
218
 and many analysts have suggested that the spark that ignited the 
Arab Spring was a spike in the price of bread.
219
 
 
The impact of the price spikes within each country was complex. Seriously 
harming landless agricultural workers and the urban poor, high agricultural prices 
were anticipated to benefit poor farmers in some countries.
220
 However, recent 
analysis suggests that these gains were counteracted by the fact that input prices — 
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fertiliser and crude oil — increased more rapidly than food prices.221 Other analysts 
have argued that most of the profits were captured by powerful ‘middlemen’, with 
multinationals including Glencore and Cargill making record profits at this time.
222
 In 
any regard, the volatile nature of the price spikes meant that the relative situations of 
these different groups were soon reversed. While the rising cost of food is evidently 
problematic, equally damaging are the longer-term consequences. Unable to plan 
ahead and forced into selling vital resources and assets in order to survive, the poor 
are forced to gamble their future welfare to live today, making them even more 
vulnerable to future price shocks.
223
  
 
Although the general impression is that the ‘global’ food crisis is over, several 
regions in Africa and Asia — notably the Sahel224 — are still deemed to be in crisis.225 
What is more, the situation of high and rapidly fluctuating food prices is predicted to 
continue for years to come.
226
 Despite the ‘apocalyptic’ language used to describe the 
events of 2007-08, critics have argued that the ‘crisis’ was ‘not a blip, but creeping 
normality’.227 Philip McMichael, a food-regime theorist, argues that food crises are 
‘endemic to the modern world’, pointing to the prior global food crisis of 1972-74.228 
Others contend that decades of artificially low prices, procured through the use of 
subsidies in the Global North, have resulted in recurrent crisis for millions of peasant 
farmers in the South who, unable to compete, are driven off their land.
229
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ii. Causation 
 
The question of what was responsible for these extraordinary market 
movements has divided economists since the first spike emerged. The role of 
numerous supply and demand factors has been explored. One thing is agreed, which is 
that the price volatility was not caused by a critical shortage in the supply of the grains 
in question. As analysts at the UK Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) have emphasised, there was ‘comfortably enough food globally’ when 
prices skyrocketed in 2007-08.
230
 On the supply side, it has been suggested that a 
combination of unfavourable weather conditions, including droughts in Australia and 
floods in India and Pakistan,
231
 did contribute to shortfalls in the production of grain. 
Numerous analysts have countered this, however, pointing out that the world still 
produced more grain than ever before in the years leading up to the spike.
232
 
Nonetheless, the fact that existing global stock levels for these grains were also at 
historic lows at this time,
233
 that oil prices were exceptionally high,
234
 and that some 
countries imposed export-bans on key commodities such as rice, has led some 
economists to argue that markets were ‘tight’ in the months leading up to the food 
crisis.  
 
Other economists favour a demand-side explanation. The depreciation of the 
US dollar in the years preceding the spikes is one factor widely considered to have 
played a part. The US is a major exporter of grain and a weak dollar automatically 
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increases demand for US products abroad.
235
 Another demand-side explanation is that 
changing diets in developing countries — particularly an increased demand for meat 
consumers in emerging economies such as India and China — has created an 
additional source of demand for grain. It takes between seven and eight kilos of grain 
to produce one kilogramme of beef and five to seven kilogrammes of grain to produce 
one kilogramme of pork.
236
 While popular in the media,
237
 this explanation of the data 
has been revealed to be inaccurate.
238
 Perhaps the most convincing demand-side 
explanation for the spikes relates to the increased production of biofuels. Biofuel 
production has been heavily subsidised by governments in Europe and in the US in 
recent years.
239
 As Fred Magdoff and Brian Tokar note, almost one third of the entire 
2008 corn crop in the US was used to produce ethanol to fuel cars.
240
 As both a novel 
and substantial source of demand for crops like maize and soya, biofuels are widely 
agreed to have played a key role in generating the price spikes. 
 
  This same handful of supply and demand factors is consistently mentioned 
throughout the literature on the causation of the food crisis. However, the causal 
significance attributed to each factor differs significantly from one study to another. 
Isolating the precise contribution made by any factor has proven exceptionally 
difficult. No holistic explanation is able to command widespread allegiance. This has 
led to the widespread adoption of an analogy offered by Josette Sheeran that the crisis 
was brought on by a ‘perfect storm’ of factors.241 Others have challenged this, arguing 
that the suggestion of a confluence of seemingly uncontrollable forces disguises the 
reality that most of these factors are a product of policy decisions.
242
 Biofuels do not 
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produce themselves, nor do export bans impose themselves. Even ostensibly ‘natural’ 
causes, such as drought and flood, can be considered a consequence of failures to take 
adequate steps to tackle climate change and their damaging impact, or the result of a 
lack of investment in infrastructure and emergency services provision.   
  
While struggling to reach consensus on the precise causal cocktail, economists 
agree that the full measure of recent food price inflation cannot be explained by 
changes in supply and demand fundamentals alone. Analysts at the FAO have 
estimated that as of April 2008 corn volatility was 30 per cent, and soybean volatility 
40 per cent, beyond what could be accounted for by relevant supply and demand 
fundamentals during that period.
243
 Analysts at the World Bank made a similar 
diagnosis in 2010, concluding that ‘the apparent “divergence” between commodity 
prices and fundamentals deserves further attention’.244 As this divergence has come 
under further scrutiny, numerous analysts have pointed to a recent surge in speculative 
activity on global derivative commodity markets and suggested that this influx of 
financial investment could be responsible for conditioning the price spikes.  
 
The significance of this claim requires emphasis. The structure of the global 
market in food commodities and the role of profit within it are clearly at the centre of 
the crisis. These events strongly endorse the argument that the global food system is 
unstable and operates to produce vulnerability for disadvantaged populations in the 
Global South, prioritising the needs of consumers in the North — a dynamic which I 
will expand on in Chapter Five. However, the claim that financial investors have been 
able to distort commodity prices beyond the fundamentals of supply and demand by 
investing in derivatives implicates modern market structures in the production of 
hunger in a manner previously thought to be impossible. The global market in food 
commodities is constructed around a single scheme for the measurement of the value 
of food — its price. If this central ordering mechanism can be distorted by financial 
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traders speculating in markets via instruments linked to this measure of value, what, 
then, for world order in years and decades to come?  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have sought to move towards a systemic explanation for the 
persistence of hunger in a world of apparent plenty. I have suggested that 
contemporary approaches to tackling hunger are of limited value owing to the absence 
of a deeper diagnosis of what is producing food insecurity for vulnerable groups. 
Seeking to remedy this, I have begun to explore the possibility that the contemporary 
global food system — one which is increasingly commoditised, industrialised, 
specialised, inter-dependent and monopolised by a contingent of large multinational 
companies — is a producer of hunger and poverty worldwide. Often seen to have 
‘come out of nowhere’, taking the world by surprise, the global food crisis is the 
manifestation of longstanding warnings issued by those who have argued that the 
contemporary global food system is a threat to the lives of the most vulnerable 
members of global society.
245
 The possibility that these events could have been 
generated by financial investors treating food as they would any other asset has 
provoked an intense debate. It is to these matters that I now turn.  
 
                                                          
245
 Flavio, Luiz Schieck Valente, and Ana Maria Suárez Franco, “Human Rights and the Struggle Against Hunger: 
Laws, Institutions, and Instruments in the Fight to Realize the Right to Adequate Food,” Yale Human Rights and 
Development Journal 13, no. 2 (2010), p. 456. 
73 
Chapter Two 
 
Food Commodity Speculation 
 
 
 
 
Claims that practices of food commodity speculation were responsible for the 
extreme pattern of grain price volatility in 2007-08 are highly controversial. Bankers 
and financial actors involved in commodity derivatives trading have been condemned 
for ‘gambling on starvation’1 and profiting from hunger.2 A fierce debate has been 
ongoing since these claims were first tabled over the precise causal significance of 
speculative practices in the context of the recent food price volatility. A number of 
high profile economists and financial services insiders have rejected the possibility 
that food commodity speculation could have had anything to do with the price spikes 
in evidence in 2007-08 and 2010-11.
3
 This is because the argument that the prices of 
underlying food commodities have been driven away from fundamentals by 
investment in derivative markets contravenes prevailing economic theory on market 
pricing dynamics.  
 
According to mainstream economic theory, the prices at which food 
commodities are sold in the market bear a rational relationship to fundamentals of 
supply and demand.  Financial markets are widely thought to facilitate the 
transmission of more accurate information about supply and demand fundamentals 
through what is known as their ‘price discovery’ function. This, in addition to raising 
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and allocating capital and enabling risk management, is continually reiterated as being 
one of their central functions.
4
 The pricing of assets, including commodity derivatives, 
on financial markets sends signals about value and price to the broader economy. It is 
estimated that between $648 trillion
5
 to $1,200 trillion
6
 dollars — more than 20 times 
the global GDP — is invested in derivatives, many of which derive their value from 
underlying commodities such as food and fuel. If the prices of underlying 
commodities can be distorted by speculative activity within this monumental global 
market, it occasions the possibility that financial markets are broken, and no longer fit 
for purpose. The implications are staggering.  
 
The debate over the causal connection between practices of food commodity 
speculation and food price volatility is ongoing. This debate has been categorised by 
analysts at the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) as ‘one of the 
central controversies of economics’.7 Nevertheless, responding to public pressure, and 
catalysed by recognition of the role that derivatives played in the causation of the 
global financial crisis, G20 governments have moved to regulate the trade in these 
instruments. Some of the provisions are explicitly designed to target ‘excessive 
speculation’ in commodity derivative markets. This could, from the perspective of 
someone writing her PhD within a law department, be seen to speak to the balance of 
evidence on the matter of its causal significance. This is particularly so since a 
coalition of NGOs including World Development Movement (WDM), Oxfam, 
GRAIN, and SOMO, backed by economists, and supported by the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food, has produced a substantial body of evidence in support of this 
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account of the price volatility.
8
 However, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, persistent 
objections and uncertainty over the precise causal contribution of speculation has 
impeded efforts to implement the new regulations. It is difficult to proceed with an 
analysis of the significance of law in this context without addressing the spectre of 
doubt that continues to haunt these debates, and stubbornly manifests each time 
another influential figure reissues a denial that such a connection exists. Beyond 
questions of causation, there is a great deal of ambiguity over what ‘food commodity 
speculation’ actually consists of. What are ‘derivatives’ and how do they allow 
financial actors to invest in food? Who are ‘financial speculators’ and what does it 
mean to ‘speculate’? If derivatives are so problematic, why not just ban them?  
 
The aim of this chapter will be to develop a better understanding of the 
phenomenon of food commodity speculation, as well as to examine the competing 
claims over its role in the global food crisis. Against those who argue that there is an 
absence of sufficient proof of a causal connection, I will suggest that it is dominant 
economic conceptions of price formation that are to be found lacking. However, I will 
also take issue with the characterisations of those who are advancing the claim that 
speculation impacted on the price volatility, many of whom focus on the risky 
activities of class of greedy financial ‘speculators’. There is a tendency, common to 
both sides in this debate, to present practices of food commodity speculation as a 
departure from market normality. In the accounts of many campaigners, these 
practices are extraordinarily risky trading strategies that have provoked extraordinary 
price volatility. For many economists, speculative practice carried out in contravention 
of supply and demand fundamentals are a deviation from the norm — irrational 
traders distorting market rationality. What I will seek to demonstrate is that placing 
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speculative ‘bets’ on food prices, irrespective of whether those bets reflect 
fundamental values, ought not to be regarded as a departure from the norm — 
precisely the opposite. Under contemporary political arrangements and market 
structures, speculation is the norm. It is in its pervasive normality, rather than its 
exceptionality, I will suggest, that an explanation for how practices of commodity 
derivative speculation have impacted on underlying food prices might be located.  
 
The chapter will be divided into five parts. Part I will lend specificity to what is 
meant by ‘food commodity speculation’. Part II will seek to clarify the competing 
claims over the nature of the relationship between speculative practices and volatile 
food prices. Seeking to break the impasse that has emerged with attempts to establish 
causation, in Part III I turn to historical analysis to engage with the central assertion of 
NGOs that commodity futures markets have been ‘financialised’ in recent decades.  
Part IV will then engage in a critique of the dominant economic theory of price 
formation relied upon to refute a link between speculation in commodity derivatives 
and volatile food prices. In Part V I will seek to approach the significance of food 
commodity speculation from a broader framework of explanation. I will begin work 
that I will continue throughout the thesis by exploring the origins and identifying the 
hallmarks of a market logic oriented towards speculation. The emergence of this logic 
forms an integral part of my thesis, as does the idea that the ability of the state to 
regulate the market in the interests of the food insecure may be impeded by the law 
working to the opposite effect — by laws constituting and entrenching the market, and 
regulating society in the interests of the market.
9
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I. THE PHENOMENON OF FOOD COMMODITY SPECULATION 
 
Food commodity speculation refers to a set of practices whose purpose is to 
obtain a profit based on price fluctuations in markets for the sale of food commodities. 
Although this can be done by hoarding physical food commodities, the practices of 
speculation implicated in the global food crisis are typically carried out through the 
trading of financial instruments linked to the price of food: commodity derivative 
contracts. Speculation through commodity derivatives is but one variant of a broader 
market practice of financial speculation. In broad terms, this connotes a strategy for 
making money not by producing a commodity, providing a service, or establishing a 
company, but by predicting how the market values assigned to existing ‘assets’ — 
commodities, companies, and currencies — are going to change over time. 
 
 
i. Commodity derivatives trading 
 
Commodity derivative contracts form part of a broader class of financial 
instruments known collectively as ‘futures’ or ‘derivatives’, thus called as they derive 
their future value from an underlying asset. Some of these assets are tangible, like 
property and commodities; others are intangible, like stocks, currencies, and interest 
rates. These instruments have a reputation for being highly complex. This is 
exacerbated by the esoteric names under which they are traded, examples being 
‘exchange traded funds’10 and ‘collateralised debt obligations’.11 The range of parties 
and the webs of obligation involved in the trading of these instruments, as well as the 
mathematical formulas used to calculate their value, would support this perception of 
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their complex nature. Nevertheless, they are all just variations on a more basic 
instrument known as a futures contract.   
 
A futures contract is a standardised contract through which two parties agree to 
exchange a fixed amount of a given commodity at an agreed date in the future for a 
sum of money negotiated in the present. Used for centuries as a mechanism of 
agricultural insurance, in essence, these instruments enable contracting parties to lock 
in a price at which they can buy or sell a commodity helping them plan for their 
commercial future. Contrary to what the terms of these contracts would suggest, the 
vast majority of modern day futures transactions are not intended to result in the 
exchange of tangible physical commodities. The buyer, or seller, transacts as though 
they were dealing in the physical commodity despite not having the intention to ever 
handle it in person. In order to avoid having to take delivery of, say, 100 tonnes of 
wheat, the parties will have to ‘close out’ their agreement by settling the contract in 
cash, or, more typically, by entering into an equal but opposite market position to 
‘offset’ their liabilities. Depending on how this value has changed throughout the 
contracting period, one of the parties will have made a profit and the other a loss.  
 
Originally, futures contracts were only sold on regulated exchanges, known as 
‘futures exchanges’. These institutions, prominent examples being the Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT) and the London Metal Exchange, remain important in the trading of 
commodity futures contracts. However, in recent decades a new market known as the 
‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) market — also described as the ‘swaps’ market — has 
overtaken the trade in exchange traded futures.
12
 OTC transactions are carried out 
bilaterally, between private parties, outside of regulated exchanges. It is within this 
market that a plethora of financially ‘engineered’ futures contracts — derivatives — 
has been developed. These instruments are principally traded by large banks and 
hedge funds — ‘swaps’ dealers. Such institutions have elaborated an increasingly 
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sophisticated range of financial instruments linked to food prices. Notably examples 
include commodity ‘options’,13 commodity ‘swaps,’ and commodity ‘index funds’. 
Perhaps the most significant of these are the index funds, which are designed to give 
investors a return based on a mathematical formula aggregated from the values 
assigned to a specified basket of commodities including non-food commodities such 
as fuels and metals. The first such index was created by Goldman Sachs in 1991.
14
 As 
researchers at WDM have underlined, commodity index funds have since become the 
primary vehicle for speculative capital involvement in food commodity markets.
15
 The 
largest commodity swap dealers are Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan. These dealers have recorded 
record profits from the trade in commodity derivatives over the past decade. Goldman 
Sachs made around $5 billion from commodities trading in 2009,
16
 and JP Morgan 
made $2.8 billion from commodity transactions, which made up more than a quarter 
of the bank’s principal transactions in 2011.17  
 
The market in commodity derivatives has grown substantially over the past 
decade. As the FSA reported in 2007, on-exchange volumes have increased greatly in 
the past five to ten years with a rapid growth in the number of contracts traded on 
exchanges such as LIFFE (soft commodities) and ICE Futures (energy).
18
 Equally, as 
data from the Bank of International Settlements evidences, levels of investment in 
OTC commodity derivatives have expanded rapidly since 2004.
19
 This surge in levels 
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of investment is central to the claim of those arguing that ‘banking speculation causes 
food crises’ — to employ the characterisation of the WDM.20 Yet, the sheer volume of 
investment is not the only issue. Overwhelmingly, the emphasis of those arguing that 
investment in commodity derivatives was linked to the price volatility in 2007-08 and 
2010-11 is on the speculative character of these investments.  
 
‘Take the highest stakes, riskiest economic behaviour ever devised, and marry 
it to the most fundamental basic need of humankind, and you have the subject of this 
report.’21 This is the line with which WDM opens its report, ‘The Great Hunger 
Lottery’ on the role of food commodity speculation in the global food crisis. There is, 
however, much about this characterisation of the behaviours of financial speculators 
and the practice of derivatives trading that is questionable. Before moving on to 
consider the question of a causal connection, I will first draw attention to some of the 
pervasive ambiguity that surrounds the concept of financial speculation and by whom 
and how it is practised in commodity derivative markets.  
 
 
ii. Ambiguity 
 
a. What counts as speculation? 
 
As Edward Szado has explained, there is a great deal of uncertainty over what 
amounts to speculation, whether a practice is or isn’t ‘speculative’, and who can be 
accurately described as a ‘speculator’.22 In a sense, all economic activity carried out to 
make a profit is ‘speculative’ as it involves a calculation about the future market value 
of a good or service. What is typically thought to distinguish financial speculation 
from other types of productive economic activity is that, in the latter case, something 
of value to broader society is produced. This distinction might be easy to grasp in 
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contemplation of the production of physical goods or the provision of a service which 
a person is able to use or enjoy. It is less straightforward when considering the 
distinction between financial speculation and other types of financial activity, such as 
investment. As Szado queries, ‘[a]t what level does investment become 
speculation?’23 One possible answer is given by John Bogle, who has argued that, 
unlike speculation, investment is about long-term ownership of businesses and the 
creation of ‘intrinsic value’ over time.24 The short-term selling of financial 
instruments — how he characterises financial speculation — on the other hand, 
derives profit from ‘increased prices rather than increased intrinsic value’.25  
 
Speculation as a market activity is commonly aligned with short-term trading 
activity as opposed to longer-term investment strategies. However, in modern 
discourse these categories have collapsed. It is as common to read about ‘speculative 
investment’ and descriptions of people ‘investing speculatively’, as to hear references 
to ‘speculative trading’. Used in this way, as an adjective, ‘speculative’ increasingly 
denotes a particular kind of trading or investment. Analysts agree that speculative 
market practices typically involve taking higher levels of risk than the average market 
participant, often by investing in markets that are more volatile, and in anticipation of 
a high rate of return. In popular discourse, the label ‘speculative’ is increasingly used 
in a pejorative sense, translating to ‘risky’, ‘reckless’, and ‘socially destructive’ 
financial practices.  Countering this, others maintain that speculation does have an 
intrinsic social value. As Bharat Kulkarni argues, ‘[b]y assuming risk, providing 
liquidity and capital the speculator brings stability to the market’.26 Speculation is also 
seen to provide benefits in terms of aiding price discovery. 
 
Since the global food and financial crises, the negative perception of 
speculation has become more pronounced. Numerous analysts have argued that 
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speculation is no better than gambling, but with much higher social stakes.
27
 While 
some continue to maintain that there is an important difference — that speculation is 
‘calculated’ and ‘rational’, whilst gambling is ‘reckless’ and ‘based on emotion’28 — 
many are of the view that this distinction has always been tenuous.
29
 Others have 
suggested that it is hard to convincingly differentiate practices of speculation from 
market manipulation.
30
 Essentially, both modern day financial speculators and market 
manipulators stand accused of the same wrongdoing: creating a condition in which 
prices no longer reflect fair market values in order to make a profit. However, whilst 
manipulators are acting illegally to distort the market away from its proper 
functioning, speculators are seen to be merely taking advantage of existing legal 
opportunities within the proper functioning of markets.  
 
Two points bear further emphasis. Firstly, in spite of the vocabulary used by 
NGOs and in journalistic accounts, it is not at all clear that the riskiest or most short-
term speculative trading practices were the ones most relevant in the causation of the 
price volatility. Secondly, it is important to note that these understandings of 
speculation have not remained stable over time. Perspectives on the social utility of 
speculation, particularly amongst economists, policy-makers, as well amongst the 
judiciary, changed significantly over the course of the 20
th
 century. In fact, as I will 
argue in the concluding section of this chapter, this shift in the social tolerance of 
speculation may be of greater causal significance to the mechanisms whereby activity 
in commodity derivative markets came to impact on underlying food prices than the 
risky or short-term nature of ‘speculative’ trades.  
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b. Who is a speculator and when are they speculating? 
 
Financial speculators have been widely condemned within the literature on food 
commodity speculation. ‘Ruthless’, ‘risk-loving’, and ‘greedy’ are common words 
used to characterise them and their behaviour. Disparaging views on financial 
speculators have been aired at other junctures in history. It has been suggested that 
Adam Smith, writing in 1776, had speculators in mind when he described the 
activities of ‘projectors and prodigals’ who, given access to capital, ‘were most likely 
to waste and destroy it.’31 Speculators were also denounced — this time explicitly in 
connection with their activities in commodity futures markets — by US President 
Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. Roosevelt condemned, ‘those reckless speculators 
with their own or other people's money whose operations have injured the values of 
the farmers' crops and the savings of the poor’.32 As with the definition of speculation, 
however, there is considerably ambiguity as to precisely who within modern financial 
markets can accurately be labelled a speculator and when they can be said to be 
speculating.   
 
It is critical to underline that not all of those involved in the trading of 
commodity derivatives, agricultural or otherwise, are speculating. In fact, a substantial 
proportion of the participants in commodity futures markets are not financial investors 
or traders. Many are what are termed ‘commercial participants’, seeking to hedge 
against risk in order to ensure that their commercial practices — farming, 
manufacturing, distributing — remain profitable. The risk-management function of 
futures markets for commercial participants is widely acknowledged within the 
literature on food commodity speculation. What is less commonly emphasised is that 
many ‘financial’ participants, both via the regulated exchanges and through OTC 
transactions, are also using these instruments to hedge against risk. As the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) observed in 1994, ‘[d]erivative instruments have 
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become increasingly important to the overall risk profile and profitability of banking 
organisations throughout the world’.33  
 
Upon closer inspection, one learns that the range of actors involved in the trade 
in these instruments, as well as the purposes for which they are bought and sold, is far 
more diverse than commonly represented. As Chris Sutton has noted, this range 
encompasses ‘very short-term speculation by high velocity traders, and active trading 
by hedge funds and other financial players, to longer and more passive engagement by 
institutional investors looking for exposure to commodities via complex financial 
products such as commodity index funds’.34 Many banks in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis engaged in what is known as proprietary trading, which is widely 
regarded as purely speculative in nature.
35
 However, while banks and hedge funds are 
major dealers of commodity derivatives, this does not mean that they are always 
taking a speculative position in the market. Many of these institutions sell products 
which offer exposure to commodities to other investors, like pension funds,
36
 and seek 
to mitigate the risk of their own exposure by purchasing a standardised futures 
contract to off-set the risk of that transaction. In effect, they are selling the speculative 
position — the position that seeks to capitalise on changing values of the commodity 
— and hedging against a risk commensurate with their commercial activity — that of 
retailing financial instruments.  
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In response to this transactional complexity, some analysts — both industry 
insiders and critical commentators — have begun using terminology such as ‘pure 
speculation’ and ‘partial hedging’ to differentiate these positions.37 Yet, there is 
another layer of complication beyond the characterisation of the position in the instant 
transaction. Many financial institutions claim to be using OTC commodity derivatives 
and exchange-traded commodity futures to hedge against risks taken in other financial 
markets.
38
 These macro-portfolio hedging strategies make it more difficult to 
distinguish which traders, or institutions, are acting as financial speculators or when 
they are doing it. As analysts at GRAIN have underlined, there is a ‘porous barrier 
between the two motivations’.39 
 
Alongside financial traders using derivatives to hedge against risk, thereby 
eschewing the role of the speculator, many commercial actors use these instruments 
for speculative purposes. Large corporate traders of physical food commodities — 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus — sell 
commodity derivative products to farmers and food processing companies.
40
 As 
Cargill advertises on its website, its investment department has over 10 years’ 
experience of replicating commodity indices in the OTC markets.
41
 As well as selling 
these instruments to third parties, large grain traders also engage in proprietary trading 
— i.e. taking speculative positions in the market with their own capital.42 Some of 
these agricultural conglomerates own hedge funds that specialise in trading 
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commodity derivatives such as Black River Asset Management LLC, a subsidiary of 
Cargill, which was estimated to have $6 billion in assets in October 2011.
43
 Analysts 
at SOMO have suggested that these inter-connections ‘raise issue of manipulation’, 
suggesting that their activities could lead to the distortion of price for underlying food 
commodities.
44
 Similar concerns have been raised by researchers at GRAIN, who 
have emphasised these companies made record gains at the peak of the price inflation 
during the global food crisis. Cargill reported an approximate 70 per cent increase in 
its profits compared with 2007 and an increase of 157 per cent compared with 2006.
45
  
 
These definitional dilemmas have significantly complicated the efforts to 
regulate the trade in commodity derivatives. Equally, the centrality of derivatives to 
strategies of risk-management throughout both the commercial and financial sectors 
poses a challenge. It is not conceivable, under extant market arrangements, that such 
products could be banned outright. These dilemmas will be addressed in the 
discussion of the regulatory reforms in Chapter Three. For now, the ambiguity with 
which this chapter is concerned is that pervading over the role that food commodity 
speculation played in the global food crisis.  
 
 
II. COMPETING CAUSAL CLAIMS 
 
At one end of the spectrum, NGOs and anti-speculation campaigners argue that 
financial speculation ‘caused’ the food crisis and that ‘only financial speculation can 
explain the extent of the wild swings in the price of food’.46 At the other, banks and 
hedge funds involved in speculative activity deny that speculation played any role 
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whatsoever.
47
 I will now address these competing conceptions of the relationship 
between speculative financial investment and rising food prices in turn. 
 
 
i. Claiming a causal connection 
 
Those arguing speculation was to blame for recent food price volatility place 
great emphasis on the scale and timing of a phenomenal surge in financial investment 
in commodity derivatives in recent years, reinforcing that levels of investment have 
quadrupled from less than $100 billion in 2005 to over $400 billion in 2009.
48
 A 
focus on excessive volumes of speculative activity is perhaps the unifying trend in the 
literature seeking to make the case for a causal connection. It is also the lynchpin of 
the regulatory reforms since introduced to tackle this problem and which aim 
explicitly to target ‘excessive’ levels of speculative investment in these markets. 
What remains unclear, however, is precisely how this surge in levels of investment 
has translated into rising and volatile food prices.  
 
A common suggestion is that the sheer volume of activity in commodity 
derivatives markets has unbalanced them. Quoting a hedge fund manager who was 
interviewed by the Financial Times, WDM foregrounds his assertion that there has 
been a ‘substantial increase in fund flow into these markets, which are not big enough 
to withstand the increase in funds without pushing up prices’.49 Other industry 
insiders, including George Soros,
50
 have invoked the existence of a ‘speculative 
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bubble’, arguing that investors’ ‘expectations’ and their ‘gambling on futures help 
drive up prices.’51 What Soros is suggesting is that it is not so much a question of the 
amount of commodity derivatives instruments being bought or sold — an increase in 
demand for them per se — but that the price at which these instruments are being 
bought and sold is inflated beyond ‘what an objective analysis of intrinsic value 
would suggest’.52 A speculative bubble is typically understood to emerge when the 
values assigned to an asset by market actors exceed their ‘real’ or their intrinsic 
worth.
53
 Some place considerable emphasis on the role of certain instruments, such as 
commodity index funds, and others tend towards a focus on the risky nature of 
speculative trading. The general consensus appears to be centred around a set of four 
core claims: first, that there has been a phenomenal surge in levels of investment in 
commodity futures markets over the past decade; second, that these markets have 
come to be dominated by financial speculators who now outnumber commercial 
hedgers in these markets by as many as four to one;
54
 third, that commodity futures 
markets have been progressively ‘financialised’ as a result of this influx of financial 
investors (though there is considerable ambiguity over what this actually means); and, 
fourth, that this has enabled financial speculators to profit from volatile food prices 
that are being artificially distorted beyond supply and demand fundamentals.  
Frederick Kaufman has summarised it thus, ‘investment bankers have engineered an 
artificial upward pull on the price of grain futures... The result: Imaginary wheat 
dominates the price of real wheat’.55   
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ii. Rejecting a causal connection 
 
The somewhat nebulous claims evinced by campaigners and NGOs contrast 
dramatically with the categorical denial by the financial services industry that such a 
causal connection exists.
56
 The objections to the claim that speculation in commodity 
derivatives could have impacted on prices are two-fold. Firstly, according to 
prevailing economic theory, prices in a market economy bear a rational relationship 
to their ‘true’ values as determined by fundamentals of supply and demand. This is 
thought to be particularly true of asset prices in financial markets. Even if a group of 
speculators were driving futures prices away from fundamentals, it is argued, ‘the 
market’ would correct this. Secondly, a futures price is only supposed to be a 
prediction about how the value of a commodity is going to change. It is therefore 
argued that it can have no direct bearing on the underlying ‘spot’ price — the price of 
the tangible food commodity.
57
 As Paul Krugman has put it, ‘a futures contract is a 
bet about the future price. It has no, zero, nada direct effect on the spot price’.58  
 
The particulars of this counter-claim require further elaboration. The 
mainstream economic theory upon which these arguments are based derives from 
neoclassical perspectives on price formation. Neoclassical economic theory posits that 
prices in a competitive market economy are formed by the interaction of forces of 
supply and demand. These ‘forces’ are composed of individual economic agents — 
people — whose hypothesised drive to maximise their own individual utility in 
accordance with a rational order of preferences has enabled economists to develop an 
increasingly scientific approach to modelling consumer choice and price formation.
59
 
Confusingly, however, it is through futures markets that prices of underlying 
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commodities are now thought to be ‘discovered’. In contemporary global markets, it is 
financial actors that are seen to be best placed to obtain all the available information 
about supply and demand for commodities and transform it into a market price. The 
theory that financial markets are ‘informationally efficient’ is known as the ‘efficient 
markets hypothesis’.60 In its strongest form, this theory suggests that all relevant 
market information, both public and private, will be reflected in prices on financial 
markets, futures prices, making these prices the most reliable indicators of the ‘real’ 
value of underlying commodities.
61
  While Krugman may be correct that a bet about a 
futures price has no direct effect on a spot price, it has a very well-established indirect 
effect: it is a miniscule contribution — a claim to information — that goes towards the 
formation of a futures price that is used as a benchmark to set the underlying spot 
price.  
 
The fact that futures prices function as ‘benchmark prices’ and are influential in 
the calculation of spot prices is beyond dispute. As Charles Carey, the Chairman of 
the preeminent futures exchange, the CBOT, confirmed in 2007, ‘[T]he whole world 
sees our prices, and the whole world reacts to our prices’.62 There are applications for 
mobile phones that are marketed to farmers and grain commodity sellers to allow 
them to check futures prices for precisely this purpose.
63
 Krugman is no doubt aware 
of this. His comments appear to have been widely misunderstood and taken out of 
context by those making the case for the causal significance of speculation. What 
Krugman is trying to dispute is the ‘mysticism’ over how speculation is supposed to 
drive prices higher.
64
 He is countering the kinds of assertions made by NGOs who, as 
discussed above, suggest that the sheer volume of investment in commodity 
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derivatives can impact on underlying food prices by acting as a source of demand for 
physical food commodities. As he makes plain, even if there are 10 million 
speculators taking positions in the commodity derivatives market, this does not 
translate into actual demand for physical food commodities.
65
  
 
The crux of the counter-claim, then, falls on the assertion not that futures prices 
have nothing whatsoever to do with spot prices, but that the information assimilated 
and produced into futures prices on financial markets is the most reliable information 
about the ‘real’ value underlying commodities. This counter-claim rests on a subset of 
claims about how people behave in markets. First, is it is posited that most financial 
traders are trading based on information about supply and demand fundamentals. 
Second, it is argued that even if a contingent of unruly ‘speculators’ were driving 
futures prices away from fundamental values, this would be corrected by another 
contingent of market actors known as arbitrageurs who would act to restore prices to 
equilibrium.
66
 As Milton Friedman argued in the context of currency market, when 
futures prices move away from ‘fair’ or ‘equilibrium’ value, an arbitrage opportunity 
is created.
67
 This means that there is an incentive to buy up the undervalued assets, or 
sell the overvalued ones. In each case, it is assumed that arbitrageurs will take 
advantage of a risk-free profit opportunity, and in so doing move prices back to 
equilibrium levels. While it is widely acknowledged that prices between futures and 
spots diverge during the life-cycle of a futures contract, through arbitrage, prices are 
understood to converge as the contracts near maturity, thereby ‘discovering’ the 
correct price of the asset or commodity. 
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iii. Establishing causation 
 
Parties on both sides of the debate have sought to provide evidence 
corroborating their view of the causal significance of speculation in the context of the 
price volatility. Sceptical economists have pointed to a number of economic 
indicators which would refute a connection and NGOs have sought to counter them. 
This has produced a substantial body of literature.
68
 I will now seek to provide a sense 
of these debates. 
 
a. Proving a link 
 
One indicator used to refute a causal connection between speculation and the 
price volatility is that the prices of some agricultural commodities remained stable 
during this period, despite being traded on futures exchanges. Another is that one of 
the biggest price spikes was in evidence in rice; yet very little of it is traded on 
international commodity exchanges.
69
 In reply to this, analysts at WDM have stressed 
that their claim is that financial speculators capitalised on and exacerbated an already 
tight and volatile market for grain. Markets for other commodities whose prices 
remained more stable, notably sugar and cotton, were just that, they argue — they 
were more stable and therefore less attractive and vulnerable to speculation.
70
 In 
terms of rice, while acknowledging that it remained largely inaccessible to financial 
speculators, Timmer has presented evidence suggesting that the spike in the price of 
rice was caused by the preceding spike in the price of wheat.
71
 He claims that 
consumers who suddenly found themselves unable to afford wheat switched to rice, 
creating a surge in demand and triggering export restrictions in key rice-exporting 
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countries that then led to a spike. This explanation is considered to be persuasive by 
economists at both the World Bank
72
 and the FAO.
73
 Analysts at GRAIN have 
inverted traditional ways of looking at this causal relationship, arguing that this 
actually draws attention to the systemic effects of speculation, in that speculative 
practices in one market were able to have an indirect but no less real influence on the 
price of a foodstuff which is widely sold in futures markets.
74
 
 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the credibility of the argument that speculation 
was causally significant extends from the principal counter-claim about the role of 
arbitrage in restoring futures prices to fundamental values. As Krugman has argued, if 
futures prices had been distorted beyond fundamental values by speculation, 
arbitrageurs would have been buying up and hoarding physical grain to profit from the 
price divergence. ‘[A]ll of this involves keeping stuff off the market and storing it. So 
where is the surge in inventories?’,75 he asks. Since no inventory accumulation could 
be observed during the price spikes, Krugman has claimed that this negates the claims 
that speculation was causally significant in the volatility in underlying markets.
76
 
Krugman’s objections are undermined by analysis produced by economists at the 
FAO. As they have pointed out, stock inventory levels as referenced by Krugman are 
calculated based on data supplied by governments which does not include information 
on stocks held by private actors.
77
 Not only do the five corporations that account for 
approximately three-quarters of the international grain trade — Cargill, ADM, Bunge, 
Dreyfuss and Glencore — keep information about the stocks in their global network 
of storage facilities confidential, but large investment banks like Goldman Sachs, 
Barclays, JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank have been buying off-quota storage 
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facilities.
78
 The building of private grain silos is said to have gone through ‘an 
incredible boom’ in the last six years.79 This occasions the possibility that arbitrageurs 
were buying up stocks of physical grain and hoarding to profit from what they 
perceived to be inflated futures prices.   
 
As for how this could have impact on underlying spot prices, it is assumed that 
arbitrageurs would continue selling the inflated futures — shorting the market — 
thereby gaining profit, and, after purchasing underlying physical commodities at a 
cheaper price, would then begin selling it. According to Albert Phung at Investopedia, 
in terms of supply and demand the effect of this is to create an increase in the supply 
of futures contracts, thereby lowering the price, and to increase the overall demand 
for the spot price of the underlying asset.
80
 As arbitrageurs continue to do this, he 
explains, ‘the futures prices and spot prices will slowly converge until they are more 
or less equal’.81 What is not clear, at least from this account, is whether this occurs 
because the futures prices decrease or because spot prices increase. At least in the 
short term, Phung suggests it is because spot prices increase, thereby testifying to the 
role that futures prices inflated by speculation could condition inflation in underlying 
commodity markets. Importantly, as many analysts have noted, futures prices 
‘systematically failed’ to converge with spot prices on US markets in the sale of 
certain contracts, notably for wheat, during the time of the crisis.
82
 This has spawned 
a separate debate amongst economists known as the ‘non-convergence debate’83 
which centres on exploring the limitations of arbitrage — the very mechanism in 
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which Krugman and other sceptics place such faith.
84
 The core argument of 
speculation sceptics — that market mechanisms would have restored speculative 
exaggeration to fundamental values — is weakened by the fact that this is 
demonstrably not the case. As discussed at the end of the last chapter, there is a clear 
gap of up to 30-40 per cent between the measure of the price inflation in 2007-08 that 
can be accounted for by fundamentals and the actual prices recorded at the time.
85
 
Economists rejecting a role for speculation have also failed to provide a convincing 
explanation for this gap.  
 
The causal claims articulated by NGOs appear vague when contrasted with the 
flat denial and theoretical insistence of mainstream economic perspectives. Yet, on an 
evidential level, the NGOs have a more compelling case. WDM, SOMO, GRAIN, 
and Oxfam have presented convincing statistical evidence indicating the scale of 
speculative activity in commodity derivatives in recent years and how this maps onto 
the movements of commodity prices during the crisis.
86
 Another persuasive body of 
research concerns new correlations between the movements of previously distinct 
commodities, and between commodities and other financial assets. Economists at 
UNCTAD have highlighted that the prices of many commodities including metals, 
agriculture and energy commodities are ‘clearly moving today in tandem’, when, 
prior to the development of derivative products such as commodity index funds, this 
was not the case.
87
 Furthermore, they add, there is evidence of ‘a strong correlation of 
the prices in several commodity markets with prices in other speculative financial 
markets’.88   
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b. Proving causation 
 
In spite of the body of evidence supplied by NGOs, this cannot, under 
accepted economic standards, be equated with established proof of causation.
89
 
Economists on both sides of the debate have undertaken causal economic analysis to 
try and establish whether or not speculative activity in futures market was cause of 
the price volatility. Many have relied on Granger causality testing — a test developed 
by Nobel prize winning econometrician, Clive Granger, which has been acclaimed for 
developing a rigorous way of establishing when correlations might have a causal 
link.
90
 Yet, studies relying on this test have reached disparate conclusions. A number 
of analysts claim to have established that there is a positive causal relationship 
between speculation and rising food prices, including Cooke and Robles,
91
 and 
Hernandez and Torero,
92
 however others found evidence that refuted a direct causal 
connection, notably OECD analysts Irwin and Sanders.
93
 All in all, as Windawi 
concludes, attempts to model the pricing movements have produced ‘an unconvincing 
mix of results’.94 David Frenk at Better Markets has since criticised the application 
and use of Granger causality testing, particularly as it was employed by Irwin and 
Sanders. He contends that the use of this model is inapplicable in the context of 
highly volatile markets, such as those for the commodities during the crisis.
95
 Others 
have suggested that existing models of causal economic analysis are simply unable to 
explain the complex inter-linkages between contemporary global financial and global 
commodity markets. One such group, a coalition of researchers at NECSI, has 
                                                          
89
 Ghosh, J., J. Heintz, and R. Pollin, “Speculation on commodities futures markets and destabilization of global 
food prices: exploring the connections,” International Journal of Health Services 42, no. 3 (2012): 465-483. 
90
 See Granger, Clive W. J., “Investigating causal relations by econometric models and crossspectral methods,” 
Econometrica 37, (1969): 424-438. 
91
 Cooke, B., and M. Robles, Recent food prices movements: A time series analysis, Discussion Paper 942, 
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2009. 
92
 Hernandez, M., M. Torero, “Examining the dynamic relationship between spot and future prices of 
agricultural commodities,” no. 988, International Food Policy Research Institute, 2010. 
93
 Irwin, S. H. and D. R. Sanders, “The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on Commodity Futures Markets: 
Preliminary Results,” OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, no. 27. 
94
 Windawi, A. Jason, “Speculation, Embedding and Food Prices: A Cointegration Analysis,” Institute for Social 
and Economic Research Policy, Working Paper Series no. 2 (2012), Available at SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159945 Last accessed 11
th
 July 2015.  
95
 Frenk, David, et al, “Review of Irwin and Sanders 2010 OECD Reports,” in Ben Lilliston and Andrew Ranallo 
(Eds), “Excessive Speculation in Agriculture Commodities: Selected Writings From 2008-2011,” Institute For 
Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2011. 
97 
developed what they describe as a ‘dynamic mathematical model’ that ‘overcomes 
the limitations of earlier studies’ and establishes a significant causal role for 
speculation. This model, they claim, proves that ‘the two sharp peaks in 2007-08 and 
2010-11 were specifically due to investor speculation, while an underlying upward 
trend is due to increasing demand from ethanol conversion’.96  
 
A joint report on food price volatility written for the G20 by a number of 
agencies including the FAO, IMF, UNCTAD and the World Bank illustrates the 
difficulty in forming a conclusive recommendation on this issue. The report concludes 
that increased financial sector involvement in food commodity markets ‘probably 
acted to amplify short-term price swings and could have contributed to the formation 
of price bubbles in certain circumstances’.97 This appears to be the most authoritative 
estimation of the contribution of speculative practices to the price volatility in 2007-08 
and 2010-11. This has persuaded G20 governments to adopt a precautionary approach 
and to introduce regulations to tackle ‘excessive’ levels of speculation, as I will go on 
to discuss. However, these efforts have been beleaguered by unresolved doubts about 
the nature and extent of the role played by speculation in the causation of the price 
volatility. What is more, journalists at The Economist and the Financial Times 
continue to minimise the possible price impacts of speculation, arguing that there is 
‘almost no evidence’ to connect commodity speculators with commodity price 
spikes.
98
 
 
Chris Sutton, a researcher at the Food Ethics Council, has made some 
important points concerning who bears the burden of proof in this context.
99
 As he 
emphasises, those arguing that speculation is having a significant negative impact 
come from a broad variety of backgrounds and include economists, hedge fund 
managers, prominent financiers and businessmen, alongside campaigning 
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organisations.
100
 They have made a persuasive case for a causal link between 
practices of speculation and volatility food prices, albeit without being able to ‘prove 
causation’. Should not, he suggests, the onus then be on those benefiting from 
financial investments in food commodity markets to prove that they are not causing 
harm, rather than on the critics of speculation?
101
  
 
A further question concerns why it is that the assertions of the financial 
services industry and those economists maintaining the neoclassical position on price 
formation seem to carry so much more weight than the claims and corroborating 
evidence of this significant network of NGOs and campaigners. The answer, I would 
venture to suggest, is that, in the public consciousness, the financial services industry 
and the mainstream economists are established as ‘the experts’. Scholarship 
pioneered by Bruno Latour
102
 and Sheila Jasanoff,
103
 has demonstrated the 
contingency and subjectivity involved in the production of such ‘expert 
knowledge’.104 What their work helps to remind us of is that even in the so-called 
‘hard’ sciences, facts, and claims to truth and knowledge, are produced by people, 
embedded in particular institutional and cultural contexts. The subjectivity and 
contingency of knowledge about economic phenomena is, perhaps, even greater, as 
what is being studied are not material objects, geographic terrains, or other tangible 
matter, but social relationships. For all of its sophistication, economic theory and the 
mathematical formulas used to produce prices in contemporary financial markets are, 
at root, based on assumptions about how people behave in markets.  
 
In Part IV I will engage in a critique of the dominant theory of price formation 
that aims to take a small step towards breaking the hold that expert financial 
knowledge and privileged economic theory has on conceptions of causation. The first 
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movement in this direction, however, requires going backwards, to history, in order to 
make sense of the broader claim that unifies disparate assertions on the causal impact 
of speculation, which is that commodity futures market have been ‘financialised’ in 
recent decades, and that this has overwhelmed the traditional relationship between 
futures prices and spot prices in modern commodity markets.
105
 With that in mind, I 
will now provide an overview of the history of the futures contract, charting its 
evolution from a form of agricultural insurance to its present-day incarnation as a new 
variety of financial asset. 
 
 
 
III. THE FINANCIALISATION OF FUTURES TRADING 
 
Today, the trade in commodity derivatives is a global enterprise. However, the 
development of commodity futures into more sophisticated financial derivatives owes 
much to a series of events within the US. A great deal of the literature on the history 
of futures trading reflects this, and this account will also evince this geographical bias.  
 
 
i. Commodification 
 
The original futures contract — then termed a ‘forward’ — was widely adopted 
in the US in the 18
th
 century as a mechanism of agricultural insurance. Such contracts 
were typically negotiated between a farmer and a grain merchant, and operated so as 
to ‘lock in’ a price for the crop in question, preventing a change in market conditions 
from impacting too drastically on their profits. Using a forward contract to mitigate 
the risk involved in one’s business in this way became known as ‘hedging.’ While 
forward contracts did reduce some of the hazards involved in agricultural production, 
the bilateral nature of the arrangements meant that one party could always go bankrupt 
and end up forfeiting on their commitments. Moreover, as the US economy expanded, 
                                                          
105
 Herman, M. O., R. Kelly, and R. Nash, “Not a game: speculation vs. food security,” p. 5. 
100 
the need arose for a centralised marketplace for the trading of commodities, and the 
transferring of risk. For these reasons, agricultural entrepreneurs in the city of 
Chicago, the preeminent city for commodities trading at that time, founded the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848.
106
 
 
The CBOT took control of the mountains of grain arriving in Chicago from the 
increasingly productive farms of the American mid-West, creating better storage 
facilities, grading supplies, and taking on the role of an intermediary guaranteeing 
both sides of forward contracts.
107
 The CBOT would pay the purchase price of the 
grain to the seller, and deliver the merchandise to the buyer, meaning that 
entrepreneurs on opposite sides of America could trade without having to travel to 
Chicago. In order to do business in this way, one had to be a member of the CBOT, 
pay a membership fee, and demonstrate one’s financial solvency. Thus the 
outstanding risks inherent in the formerly bilateral arrangements were resolved. 
 
The development of a centralised exchange was the first step towards making 
these contracts a commodity in their own right. The second step in this transition was 
taken in 1865. The trading of individualised contracts had proved both inefficient and 
time-consuming and so it was that the CBOT began mandating the use of standardised 
contracts that were identical in terms of the quantity, quality, delivery month and 
terms of the trades being made.
108
 The most significant difference between the new 
standardised futures contracts and the former forward contracts was that futures were 
exchangeable. In short, ‘a new market was created’,109 and these contractual 
documents were transformed into articles of monetary value. They became paper 
claims to wealth that functioned like a form of currency and could be exchanged to 
make profit.  
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ii. Globalisation 
 
The globalisation of commodity futures markets first began in the mid-19
th
 
century, on account of several new developments in transport and communication — 
most notably the installation of the transatlantic cable in 1865.
110
 By the end of the 
19
th
 century, futures exchanges based on the Chicago model had been established 
across the world: in Liverpool, Frankfurt, New York, and Vienna, and later in India 
and Argentina.
111
 However, whilst the success of the Chicago model had propelled the 
world towards a globalised system of agricultural production, back in the US there 
was trouble on the home front. Government subsidies and mechanised production 
methods had led to the chronic overproduction of many staple crops. After World War 
One, agricultural commodity prices in the US collapsed. Wages were falling, and 
consumption levels no longer accommodated supply. Vast quantities of grain were left 
rotting in the warehouses of Chicago. This led to an epidemic of price manipulation as 
farmers, manufacturers and grain handlers began to hoard physical commodities and 
to trade in futures contracts in an attempt to drive prices back up.
112
 The volatility of 
US agricultural futures markets during this period and the activities of the hoarders 
created the perfect conditions for a new breed of participant to colonise the domain of 
futures trading: enter the financial speculator.  
 
During the 1920s, a new trade in grain futures by parties who had nothing 
whatsoever to do with agricultural production emerged, and the prices of many staple 
grains inflated dramatically. Common law courts began to employ what was known as 
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‘the rule against difference contracts’ to discourage speculative transactions in futures 
contracts outside of regulated exchanges.
113
 Whether the parties to a futures contract 
‘intended’ or could have ‘reasonably intended’ to take physical delivery was the test 
used by judges to differentiate legitimate hedging from what was then characterised as 
‘simple gambling’ on the future price of a commodity.114 However, even if neither 
party to a difference contract expected to take delivery, courts would nonetheless 
enforce the contract if one party had some pre-existing economic interest in the 
underlying good that would be damaged by the occurrence of the same event that 
would allow it to profit under the contract.
115
 They aimed to afford commercial actors 
the opportunity to hedge against risk.   
 
A critical development in the 20
th
 century provoked a legislative clamp-down 
on speculation.  ‘Shadow’ exchanges known as ‘bucket-shops’ were set up and began 
to rival the fee-paying members-only exchanges.
116
 Bucket-shops allowed anyone 
who walked in the door to buy or sell futures, without paying for a membership or 
acting through a broker. The spate of speculation that ensued led to widespread 
condemnation of bucket-shops as gambling dens, and many states in the US moved to 
declare bucket-shop wagers legally void, in some instances making running a bucket-
shop criminal. Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and propelled by a wave of 
hostile public sentiment towards the banks, the Roosevelt government introduced 
regulations to prevent manipulation of prices through hoarding and to curtail 
speculative activity by the agriculturally unaffiliated. Three separate pieces of 
legislation were passed by Congress to prevent what was seen to be an undesirable 
interference in commodity markets by financial investors: namely, the Securities Act 
of 1933,
117
 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
118
 and the Commodity Exchange Act 
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of 1936 (CEA).
119
 The CEA created the Commodity Exchange Authority — a 
regulatory body that had the power to limit the size of speculative positions by 
individual traders or those acting in concert with each other. The trading of 
commodity options was also banned because such instruments were viewed to be 
highly speculative.  The effect was to rope off these commodities from financial 
investors as they were considered to be too important to the lives of ordinary people. 
 
 Although the trade in commodity futures contracts continued to boom during 
the early 20
th
 century, this was interrupted by the advent of World War Two. On 
account of government intervention schemes such as those administered in the US 
under the Commodity Credit Corporation, the pricing function of futures remained 
suspended in the decades after the war.
120
 It wasn’t until the 1970s that the trade in 
commodity futures was resurrected, as a result of the liberalisation policies that 
fundamentally restructured global economic relations.     
 
 
iii. Liberalisation 
 
It is well known that, at the behest of a new political allegiance intent on giving 
effect to the free market philosophies of economists such as Fredrich Hayek and 
Milton Friedman, a wave of liberalisation and deregulation swept the world 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The watershed moment was the decision to abandon 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s. Under Bretton 
Woods, all international currencies had been pegged to the US Dollar, and the 
international flow of capital was tightly controlled.
121
 When US economic interests 
became compromised by these arrangements, leading the US to affect a unilateral 
withdrawal in 1971, a new system of floating exchange rates was devised.
122
 To 
enable trade between the United States Dollar and foreign currencies, the Chicago 
                                                          
119
 P.L. 74-765, 49 Stat. 149. 
120
 Berg, Ann, “The rise of commodity speculation: from villainous to venerable,” p. 252. 
121
 Singh, Kavaljit, Taming Global Financial Flows: Challenges and Alternatives in the Era of Financial 
Globalisation: A Citizen’s Guide, Zed Books Ltd, 2000, p. 1. 
122
 Ibid. 
104 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) — formerly the Chicago Butter and Egg Board — 
introduced the first currency futures contracts in 1972. It became possible to exploit 
price fluctuations between the British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, 
French Franc, Japanese Yen, and Mexican Peso.
123
 Currencies began to be bought and 
sold on a market that would soon dwarf the markets for all other asset classes put 
together. 
 
By the 1980s, new exchanges for the trading of these instruments were created 
in Europe. The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) was 
established in 1982, followed by Paris’s Marché à Terme International de France 
(MATIF) in 1986, and Frankfurt’s Deutsche Börse in 1990. Alongside New York, 
these new hubs of financial trading became the cornerstones of a new financial world 
order, and signified the transition in the world economy from a structure based on 
productive activity divided along national borders to a structure based on financial 
activity concentrated in a small handful of global financial centres.
124
 With the advent 
of increased liberalisation, producers, manufacturers and retailers were forced to 
compete in an increasingly globalised world economy. Their incomes became newly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in global interest and exchange rates. A new breed of 
financial derivatives was developed by the financial services industry, ostensibly to 
assist in hedging against these market movements.  
 
By the late 1980s, futures trading had taken on a very different character from 
the traditional open outcry trading first established in Chicago. Previously dominated 
by traders in company-designed suits, communicating through elaborate hand signals, 
these traditions were gradually replaced by screens, mobile phones, and television 
channels.
125
 Along with the advent of electronic trading, a new trade in OTC 
instruments or ‘swaps’, as they are called in the US, began to emerge. Concerns about 
the legality of these transactions led to the financial services industry in the US 
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pressuring the government to officially exempt derivatives from the mechanisms of 
regulatory oversight for other stocks and securities. Doubts about the safety of the 
proposals were raised at congressional hearings; however, pressure from powerful 
financial lobbyists, began to build.
126
 By the late 1990s, the resistance to deregulation 
collapsed. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), signed into law by 
President Clinton in 2000, amended the CEA to enable the trading of OTC derivative 
instruments outside of the regulatory remit of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission.
127
  
 
As well as legitimating a market in OTC derivative instruments, the CFMA 
also removed the restrictions set up under the CEA that had placed limits on the 
numbers of ‘financial’ participants able to transact in the exchange-traded arena. A 
provision known as the ‘swap-dealer’ loophole benefited financial institutions selling 
OTC derivatives by treating them as commercial hedgers for the purposes of investing 
in exchange-traded futures contracts. This critical re-characterisation allowed financial 
institutions dealing in swaps to take long‐ term positions in commodity futures 
markets — a change in trading practice that was to have significant repercussions. 
Coupled with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 — which had repealed the Glass-
Steagall Act mandating a separation between retail and investment banking — the 
CFMA legitimated the growing market in OTC derivatives traded outside of regulated 
exchanges.
128
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iv. Financialisation 
 
Though the CFMA opened the gates, other developments during the 1990s 
established food commodities as the ‘next generation asset-class’,129 as Jim Rogers, 
bestselling author of Adventure Capitalist
130
 and Hot Commodities,
131
 termed them in 
2004. Following the collapse of the ‘dot.com bubble’ in the 1990s, a new haven for 
capital was located in the market for property. However, when the real estate boom 
began to unravel, the consequences were beyond what many had imagined possible. A 
combination of subprime mortgage lending practices and a complex web of 
securitised debt created via complex derivatives mortgage-backed debt securities and 
collateralised debt obligations had distributed ‘toxic’ assets to banks and financial 
institutions all over the world. When the housing bubble burst, people defaulted on 
their loans, and the web of treacherous securities embroiled the world in a situation of 
unprecedented financial mayhem and global insecurity — the global financial crisis of 
2007.   
 
In the post-crisis economic climate, commodity futures markets were cast in 
the role that the dot.com and real estate markets had played before them — they 
became an attractive haven for financial investment.
132
 In light of the financial 
climate, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs began to tout commodity 
investment as a ‘portfolio enhancer’133 that would enable investors to ‘diversify’ their 
investment portfolios and protect their assets in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
New products were created by financial institutions in London and New York that 
sought to ‘redefine’ the commodities market place for financial investors.134 The 
appeal of commodity futures was further advanced by the CBOT, which ‘embraced 
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the deregulatory spirit’ and relaxed position limits put in place since the 1930s to 
restrict financial participation in futures markets. From a limit of up to 600 contracts 
per commodity, financial actors and institutions were allowed up to 22, 000, 10, 000 
and 6, 500 contracts for maize, soybeans and wheat respectively.
135
 Levels of financial 
investment skyrocketed, both on the exchanges, and in the OTC market, which 
ballooned to around $9 trillion by the end of 2007.
136
 From the humble forward 
contracts of the 19
th
 century, commodity futures had evolved into an established asset 
class in the market for global capital.  
 
This critical transition is no better illustrated than by the merger of the CBOT 
with the several key financial and stock trading institutions in 2007. The exchange 
was bought by the CME Group — a corporation that now not only owns the CBOT, 
but also the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the New York Mercantile and 
Commodity Exchanges (NYMEX and COMEX), as well as a majority share in the 
Dow Jones Indexes (one of the major stock market indexes).
137
 Its range of derivatives 
include futures and options based on interest rates, equity indexes, foreign exchange, 
energy, agricultural commodities, weather and real estate.
138
 Food and financial 
futures are now traded under the auspices of a single multinational trading 
corporation, indistinguishable in their form and purpose to the traders who move vast 
sums of money between stocks, currencies, and grain commodities and back again 
with the click of a mouse. A $300 million dollar tunnel has been dug through the 
earth’s crust from Chicago to New York in order to shave three milliseconds off 
communication times between the two locations in order to create profitable 
opportunities to be exploited by automated trading algorithms.
139
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 Zooming out from Chicago, the bigger picture is one of a global economy 
dramatically altered over the course of the past century, from an arena in which 
production was paramount to one in which finance finances finance, and the real 
economy is left ‘dancing to the rhythms’ of financial markets.140 Banks and 
institutional investors like Citibank and JP Morgan deal in currencies the way General 
Motors and Ford used to deal in cars, and a culture of speculating on how all of these 
simultaneously distinct but increasingly interlinked markets will move has caused 
numerous analysts to dub the new economic era with the label ‘casino capitalism’.141  
 
By turning to history, it is possible to see the conditions of possibility under 
which food commodity speculation became a phenomenon in the years leading up to 
the global food crisis. As well as demonstrating how financial speculative actors came 
to dominate commodity futures markets in numerical terms, it speaks to fundamental 
shifts in the character of these markets — or, in other words, the claim that they have 
been ‘financialised’. According to Epstein, financialisation can be described in its 
broadest sense as ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies’.142 Herein lies the major challenge to the adequacy of the neoclassical 
theory on price formation used to contravene claims on the causal contribution of food 
commodity speculation in 2007-08. As mentioned above, at root, this theory rests on a 
set of assumptions about how people behave in markets. What this theory fails to 
account for is that processes of financialisation may have altered this market 
behaviour.  
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IV. CRITIQUE OF NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF PRICE FORMATION 
 
Neoclassical economic theory is predicated on a number of core assumptions 
about how people behave in markets. First, they are assumed to act a) rationally and b) 
as individuals in the maximization of their own utility. Assumptions are also made 
about c) the quality of information that these actors are able to obtain and how they act 
on it and d) the competitive nature of the markets in which they are transacting. In 
some cases, they are assumed to have perfect information and be operating in 
conditions of optimal competitiveness, although increasingly it is recognised that this 
is not always the case. In the context of the specific debate over food commodity 
speculation, three further assumptions pertain, namely that e) their actions in terms of 
taking a position in these markets are ‘bets’ that do not act to determine the ‘real’ 
prices of underlying assets or commodities, f) that financial traders do not 
systematically trade against market fundamentals,
143
 and g) that arbitrageurs will act 
to exploit risk-free arbitrage opportunities and will purchase and store physical 
commodities in the event that futures prices are inflated beyond fundamental values.  
 
I will now move through a number of arguments that contravene dominant 
neoclassical wisdom on pricing dynamics. In doing so, I intend to work towards 
developing a more precise understanding of how the financialisation of commodity 
futures markets could have impacted on underlying food prices, and what the role of 
speculative practices may be in that causal relationship.  
 
 
i. Market conditions  
 
Taking assumption c) first, there have, as the previous section has 
demonstrated, been considerable shifts in the scale and operation of commodity 
markets as they have been globalised. This poses a challenge to the ability of financial 
traders to gauge accurate information on market fundamentals. Analysts at UNCTAD, 
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who have carried out an extensive study on the dynamics of commodity price 
formation, have noted that while ample information on supply and demand 
fundamentals is available, it is ‘not easy to obtain in a systematic way’.144 Much of it 
is only available via secondary sources, such as FAO data. It also comes in a variety 
of different formats, meaning that it ‘takes time and expertise to find out which are the 
most useful, relevant and reliable sources’.145 Consequently, as their report surmises, 
price discovery in contemporary global commodity markets tends to be based on 
information related to ‘a few commonly observable events, or even on mathematical 
models that mainly use past — rather than just current — information for price 
forecasts’.146 Trading decisions are taken in an environment of considerable 
uncertainty.
147
 
 
 This uncertainty also speaks to the accuracy of assumptions on the behaviour of 
market actors. In a liberalised climate of fluctuating exchange and interest rates, the 
assertion that arbitrage opportunities are ‘risk-free’ is highly debatable as the value of 
the purchased goods could be affected by shifts in economic conditions. Furthermore, 
as Van Huellen has argued, in global markets there have been changes in delivery 
instruments and a high financial carry which has ‘discouraged arbitrage traders’ in 
recent years.
148
 As well as disincentives, opportunities to profit without handling 
physical grains have expanded significantly with the development of commodity 
derivative instruments. The ability of institutions that act in a hybrid capacity — as 
retailers and traders of commodity derivatives and traders of physical food 
commodities — presents further challenges to assumption d), the notion that these 
markets are competitive. These institutions effectively monopolise the market for food 
commodities, particularly for grain. They can now engage with ease in both 
speculative proprietary trades and the storage and trading of physical grain. There is 
good reason to think that this could all have impacted on the capacity and motivations 
of financial traders, as have those of commercial actors and those who have 
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traditionally engaged in arbitrage. While perhaps not altering their practices beyond 
all recognition, new incentives have been introduced as to the timeframe under which 
either set of actors would be motivated to act on fundamentals. Why burst the bubble 
if profit can be made from pushing it higher?  
 
ii. Market practice 
 
A weight of market practice contravenes assumption f), that financial traders 
do not systematically trade against market fundamentals. An important point in this 
regard relates to the development of commodity index funds, which are premised on 
the expectation that prices for commodities can only go up. Index investors 
automatically roll their expiring contracts over into new ‘long’ positions.149 Vast 
sums of money are channeled into indexes by large institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, irrespective of the day-to-day movements of each individual 
commodity. In effect, the investment is ‘on autopilot’.150 For this reason, commodity 
index investors are known as ‘massive passives’ or the ‘brontosauruses of the 
investment world’.151 As of March 2008, commodity index funds were estimated to 
control an amount of corn, wheat and soybeans equivalent to half of total US stocks 
for such grains.
152
  
 
Another common market practice known as ‘herding’ negates both the 
assumption that traders follow fundamentals, and assumption b), that they act as 
individuals. Since it is more efficient and requires less time and investment for traders 
to trade by watching the markets — that is to say, each other — market movements 
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generated by other actors can be interpreted by other traders as incorporating new 
market information.
153
 Some describe this as ‘uninformed trading’, resulting in the 
accidental transmission of a ‘false’ signal that disturbs the rationality of the market. 
As Avery and Zemsky have observed, uninformed herd behaviour can have dramatic 
effects on prices and can lead to bubbles and excessive volatility.
154
 Other 
economists, including John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky, have argued that it 
can become irrational for traders to persist in trying to trade on fundamentals when 
so-called uninformed — also called ‘technical’ or ‘noise’ — traders are driving asset 
prices upwards of fundamentals.
155
 Termed ‘intentional herding’ by researchers who 
have studied this phenomenon, their arguments would suggest that this is not 
accident, but strategy.
156
   
 
These trends away from fundamentals are exacerbated by new market 
technologies. Many of the new participants in commodity futures markets delegate 
all of the decision-making about investments to cutting-edge computers that engage 
in ‘high frequency trading’ (HFT) to execute thousands of trades in a matter of 
seconds. Far from being executed by rational traders acting as individuals to 
faithfully interpret data on fundamentals, many of these trades are not executed by 
human actors at all — at least not directly. In March 2011 cocoa futures crashed 
down 12 per cent in under a minute during a ‘flash crash’ associated with this form 
of trading
157
 — something that could hardly have reflected fundamental shifts in 
supply and demand. More than 95 per cent of futures are bought and sold today 
through computer networks,
158
 many of which operate to exploit a twitch in market 
movement or value irrespective of what informed it. Economists at UNCTAD have 
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concluded that innovations in trading technology such as high frequency trading, 
algorithmic trading and herding behavior may have given way to an endogenous — 
or reflexive — dynamic in financial markets.159 Testing this theory, they point to an 
overall increase of the level of endogeneity since the mid-2000s to October 2012, 
implying that at least 60-70 per cent of commodity price changes are now due to self-
generated activities rather than novel information.
160
  
 
 
iii. Market rationality 
 
Another key insight gleaned from the history of futures trading is that activity 
in food commodity markets has become ‘increasingly embedded’ in broader 
speculative trading activity across financial markets.
161
 Coupled with developments in 
market practice, this presents a notable challenge to assumption a), that people 
transact ‘rationally’ in markets. Challenges to the hypothesized rationality of homo 
economicus are not novel. Scholars in the fields of behavioural economics, cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience have produced a plethora of studies in contravention of 
this representation of market behaviour.
162
 As practitioner Jim Rogers has argued, 
‘anyone with any experience in the stock market already knows how important 
psychology is to successful investing. Emotion can drive the markets up or down, and 
the mind-set of individual investors drives these emotions’.163 Previously labelled 
‘speculative mania’, the common term today to denote the collective consequences of 
such ‘irrational’ market behaviours is ‘irrational exuberance’, a term coined by Alan 
Greenspan and popularised by Robert Shiller. Shiller won a Nobel Prize for his work 
on speculative bubbles in financial markets in the 1990s in which he demonstrated 
                                                          
159
 UNCATD, “Price formation in financialized commodity markets: The role of information”. 
160
 Arezki, Rabah, et al, “Understanding international commodity price fluctuations,” Journal of International 
Money and Finance 42 (2014): 1-8, p. 4. 
161
 Windawi, A. Jason, “Speculation, Embedding and Food Prices,” p. 2. 
162
 Simon, Herbert A., “A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1955): 99-
118; Simon, Herbert A., Models of Man: Social and Rational, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957;  
Lindblom, C., “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (1959): 79-88; 
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky, “Subjective Probability: A Judgement of Representativeness,” Cognitive 
Psychology 3 (1972). 
163
 Rogers, Jim, Hot Commodities, p. 42. 
114 
how ‘feedback loops’ created by traders adopting positions informed by the behaviour 
of other traders could drive prices away from fundamentals and result in market 
volatility.
164
  
 
This work lends powerful support to the argument that speculation was 
significant in the causation of the price volatility. However, though Shiller’s work 
does explain how a bubble could have emerged in commodity futures, debate remains 
petrified over the question of how this can translate into volatility in underlying 
commodity markets.
165
 While the precise causal linkages remain poorly understood, 
industry insiders have persistently acknowledged that price contagion between futures 
prices and spots can and does occur. As George Soros has remarked, ‘[s]peculators 
create the bubble that lies above everything. Their expectations, their gambling on 
futures help drive up prices, and their business distorts prices, which is especially true 
for commodities’.166 One contributory mechanism is the use of futures prices as 
benchmarks for the setting of spot prices, as discussed earlier. However, neoclassicists 
remain adamant that it is fundamental values which ultimately determine futures 
prices by the end of the contract cycle. This is based on assumption g), that 
arbitrageurs will act to exploit risk-free arbitrage opportunities and will purchase and 
store physical commodities in the event that futures prices are inflated beyond 
fundamental values. Now embedded in a broader speculative trading culture, however, 
what is to prevent these actors getting caught up in the speculative frenzy? 
Considerable faith is put in the ability of rational arbitrageurs to cut through market 
exuberance and make accurate predictions on where the market will go and, more 
importantly, to discern what ‘real’ fundamentals of supply and demand even are.  
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In spite of the suggestion in the title of seminal work — Irrational 
Exuberance
167
 — Shiller has since argued that he does not consider speculative 
bubbles to be ‘a wild orgy of delusions’ but ‘a natural consequence of the principles of 
social psychology coupled with imperfect news media and information channels’.168 
Speculative bubbles, he reinforces, are about their ‘epidemic nature’ not the 
‘craziness’ of the investors. In fact, as he says, we might argue that the activities of so-
called ‘uninformed’ traders are ‘in some sense rational, since there is a cost to 
collecting information’.169 Is it possible that what has changed within commodity 
futures markets as they have been progressively financialised is what is perceived as 
the rational thing to do? 
 
 
iv. Market value 
 
Further evidence that contravenes the veracity of the neoclassical conception 
of price formation can be found in a significant body of alternative theories on how 
prices are produced and what values they reflect. For over a century, classical 
economists and Marxist economists were embroiled in a debate over the cost of 
production versus labour theories of value. Early neoclassicists were considered 
revolutionary when, at the end of the 19
th
 century, they introduced the notion of 
supply and demand — based on consumer perceptions of value. Furthermore, though 
supply and demand fundamentals and the grounding concept of utility remain central 
to neoclassical theory, there have been important refinements and developments 
since.
170
 Nonetheless, a critical limitation of neoclassical perspectives on price 
formation is that they are unable to reckon with other theories of value.  
 
Scholars in other disciplines have contested dominant conceptions of price 
formation and value. Emile Durkheim argued that prices are not produced by an 
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aggregation of individual preferences but result from social norms — that they reflect 
public opinion on the just allocation of goods.
171
 In his view, this cannot be 
determined mathematically by extrapolating from conceptions of individual utility as 
neoclassical theory would suggest.
172
 Other sociologists, notably Pierre Bourdieu 
have developed these insights, arguing that prices are the product of social and 
political forces of the market ‘field’.173 On this view, price ‘depends on the structure 
of relationships in the market’.174 Different theorists have foregrounded different 
influences on these relationships. Some focus on social networks,
175
 others on power 
dynamics within institutions,
176
 and more on the role of market technologies.
177
 What 
all of this analysis does is to destabilise the notion of a ‘correct’ price and to show the 
plurality of ways that prices can be produced and how this relates to broader notions 
of value — both social and economic. On this view, there is no such thing as an 
objectively and determinably ‘real’, ‘true’, or ‘equilibrium’ price for the fundamental 
value of a commodity. This negates the very possibility that any trader, no matter how 
well informed, could trade on the basis of ‘fundamentals’.  
 
The significance of this scholarship will be explored throughout the thesis. At 
the present moment, I wish to concentrate on two critical points about the role of a 
particular ‘market technology’178 which upset the critical neoclassical assumption e), 
that the actions of financial traders in terms of taking a position in these markets are 
‘bets’ that do not act to determine the ‘real’ prices of underlying assets or 
commodities.   As well as apparent blindness to the contestability of the ‘correct’ 
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price or value, neoclassical theory overlooks the contribution to the formation of that 
value made by the very instruments being traded in financial markets. As Donatella 
Alessandrini has argued, derivatives ‘do something to the value that they are 
supposed to measure’.179 As she further underlines, ‘[w]e are dealing with contracts in 
which to anticipate or speculate on the value of an asset is also to intervene in, 
influence or make that very value’.180  
 
Although mainstream theories of price formation do appear, on close scrutiny, 
to acknowledge that traders taking a position in a futures market make an incremental 
contribution to price formation, this is presented in terms of price ‘discovery’. This 
language grossly underplays the extent to which, by trading futures and derivatives, 
financial actors are producing the very values that they claim to be ‘discovering’ or 
‘recording’. A number of studies have been carried out by academics in the field of 
Social Studies of Finance that suggest that financial actors, financial institutions, 
financial formulas, and financial instruments have to be understood as producing 
what are essentially subjective measures of value as objective market prices.
181
 As 
Donald Mackenzie has described it, financial formulas are best understood as 
‘engines’ not as ‘cameras’; they produce the values that they purport to measure.182 In 
a seminal case study, MacKenzie and Millo demonstrated how the foundational 
formula for valuing the prices of financial options — the Black and Scholes formula 
— was performed via institutional structures into an ‘accurate’ tool for pricing such 
options. Initially producing inconsistencies, over time, through widespread use and 
the shaping of trader expectations, the formula generated the price data needed to 
confirm its validity.
183
 It is important to emphasise that the data used by many of the 
financial models used to ‘calculate’ the prices of instruments such as commodity 
options and commodity index funds is data on the values at which those instruments 
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have been traded in the past. As Donatella Alessandrini emphasises, the value of a 
derivative is derived from the trend of that value in the market.
184
  
 
Alessandrini has been carrying out pioneering work on the role of derivatives 
in producing prices and the relationship of this with broader debates about social 
value. Some of her conclusions in this regard are illuminating: 
 
‘derivatives can be seen as providing the crucial link between prices and 
“fundamental values” not because the latter actually exist but because they represent 
the way in which the market judges or perceives “fundamental values”. They turn the 
contestability of fundamental value into a tradable commodity… Derivatives are 
therefore significant because they point clearly to the fact that while value is 
contested, its measurement is nonetheless always instituted’.185   
 
 
v. Implications 
 
The financialisation of commodity futures trading introduces radical doubt 
about the veracity of many of the foundational assumptions upon which mainstream 
market pricing theory is based. Neoclassical theories of price formation do not register 
the fact that commodity prices are being ‘discovered’ by a set of boundedly-rational, 
informationally-challenged market actors who are operating in volatile, liberalised 
global markets in which it is cheaper, and less risky, to follow the herd. This theory 
makes no account for the fact that financial traders are using instruments that 
contribute to the creation of the value that they purport to measure. Taken as a whole, 
the arguments outlined above evidence serious limits to the adequacy of the economic 
theory used to negate a possible causal relationship between food commodity 
speculation and the events of the global food crisis.  
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Importantly, however, closer scrutiny of contemporary market practice also 
brings to light flaws in the accounts of campaigners and NGOs who focus on the 
‘short-term’ or ‘highly risky’ nature of speculative behaviour.186 Index fund 
speculation is carried out over the long-term and provides stable, as opposed to risky 
returns.
187
 Practices of ‘herding’ and algorithmic trading, while more likely to be 
transacted as short-term trades, are also difficult to characterise as risky or reckless — 
quite the opposite. Such trading strategies may now be less risky than trading based on 
research into fundamentals. What is more, ascribing blame to individual financial 
‘speculators’ elides the fact that food commodity speculation has become an industry, 
involving a diverse array of practitioners many of whom are commercial actors. 
Above all, both camps in the debate over speculation misrepresent the dynamics of 
this trading behaviour in presenting it as in some way exceptional, extraordinary or 
irrational — be it in terms of the risks taken or in the sense of going against market 
‘rationality’. Increasingly, trading speculatively and against ‘fundamental’ values is 
commonplace and ordinary. It is the rational way to transact in financial markets.  
 
By examining the historical context in which futures trading has been 
financialised and the changes in market practice that have resulted I have illustrated 
critical limitations to the explanatory power of neoclassical economic theory on 
commodity pricing dynamics. I will now reach for a broader explanation of this shift 
in market dynamics by locating the origins and identifying the hallmarks of a market 
logic of speculation — the operation and implications of which I will trace throughout 
the thesis.  
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V. EXPLANATION 
 
For centuries, economic behaviour among human beings in many parts of the 
world has been seen to exhibit a logic of what might be termed ‘accumulation’.188 
People in markets tend to exhibit the characteristics of homo economicus — they seek 
to maximise their own self-interest and to make profit when engaging in market 
exchange. Now widely naturalised, this behaviour is commonly assumed to be a 
function of basic human proclivities. However, as the work of many scholars, 
including Marxists, institutional sociologists, economic anthropologists and SSF 
theorists has demonstrated, there is nothing necessary or natural about this behaviour. 
Instead, this body of work makes clear that the characteristics of homo economicus are 
socially constructed — conditioned through an array of different forces inhering in 
centuries of capitalist modes of market exchange.  
 
In recent years, numerous analysts have suggested that this now pervasive 
economic logic based on individual utility maximisation has morphed into something 
more extreme. Scholars analysing both trends and crises have made reference to the 
operation of a ‘speculative’ market logic. As Olivier De Schutter told The 
Independent in March 2012, ‘[t]he result of this financialisation of the commodities 
market is that the prices of the products respond increasingly to a purely speculative 
logic’.189 A similar phenomenon is intimated by Saskia Sassen, who, describing global 
finance, argues that ‘its organizing logic has evolved into a relentless push for 
hyperprofits and a need to develop instruments that enable it to expand the range of 
what can be financialized’.190 It is my argument that the events in global food 
commodity markets in 2007-08 and beyond are, at least in part, attributable to the 
emergence of this speculative market logic and to related changes in pricing dynamics 
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for food commodities. In order to make this argument convincingly, it is necessary to 
attend to three critical questions. First, how are we to explain the rise of speculation as 
a means of profit making? Second, how can ‘speculative logic’ be differentiated from 
the logic of accumulation — from the logic of homo economicus? And third, how can 
speculative behaviours it be convincingly described as a logic of the marketplace?  
 
I have already discussed the history of the financialisation of commodity 
futures markets and established that financialisation has changed the institutional 
environments in which market actors are embedded. However, this does not tell us 
what informed processes of financialisation in the first instance. Nor does it entirely 
account for the dramatic surge in levels of speculative activity in the years leading up 
to the global food crisis. Explaining this requires paying attention to the policy context 
in which speculative trading practices came to be enabled, and even celebrated: enter 
neoliberalism.  
 
 
i. Neoliberalism and the logic of speculation 
 
While the precise connotations of ‘neoliberalism’ are by no means uncontested, 
I use the term to refer to the political programme advanced by governments in the 
West since the 1980s that has led to the privatisation, liberalisation, and ‘deregulation’ 
of markets based on the conviction that both the freedom of the individual and the 
good of society are best advanced through efficient markets left to operate without 
government interference.
191
The catalogue of actors, influences, organisations, and 
events that combined to produce this distinctive programme is now very familiar: 
Jevons,
192
 Waldras,
193
 and Marshall
194
 — market equilibrium, utility, and value; 
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Menger and Mises and methodological individualism;
195
 Adam Smith, economic 
liberalism, and the ‘invisible hand’;196 Arrow and Debreu197 and ‘Pareto efficiency’; 
Friedrich Hayek,
198
 ‘self-regulating markets’, Mont Pelarin, and the Chicago School; 
Buchanan, Tullock
199
 and Riker
200
 and ‘rational choice theory’; the 1973 oil crisis, the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, and the fall of Keynesianism; Milton Friedman,
201
 
monetarism, and monopoly; Eugene Fama, the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ and 
‘informational efficiency’;202 Reagan, Thatcher, Clinton, Blair, Obama, Cameron, 
etc.
203
  
 
Using a broad conceptual brush, it is possible to connect with the neoliberal 
policy agenda a) the wider market conditions in which grain prices became more 
volatile ; b) the rise of a specialised financial market structure within which financial 
actors were increasingly incentivised to speculate ; c) the emergence of a more 
speculative logic, or mode of engagement with markets, that transcends financial 
markets ; and d) the hegemony of a form of economic analysis that has impeded 
understanding of the new dynamics occasioned under the neoliberal policy agenda. 
These themes will be explored throughout this thesis. For now, however, I want to 
focus on c) — the emergence as part of the neoliberal turn of a speculative mode of 
engagement, or a more speculative logic, as a result of the neoliberal policy climate. I 
will now gesture to some of the critical shifts pursued under neoliberal policies that 
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have made engaging in speculation the logical thing to do within modern financial 
markets.  
 
First of all, through processes of liberalisation and deregulation, neoliberal 
policies unleashed the essential conditions for speculation by creating a global market 
in which capital could move. Previously, when capital was held captive and exchange 
rates were fixed, the opportunities to profit from shifts in value were far more limited. 
As well as creating an incentive to speculate on market pricing movements, this also 
created a disincentive to engage in productive forms of activity as commercial 
industries and manufacture were threatened by the prospect of new species of 
‘financial risk’. The risks of engaging in productive activity — particularly 
agricultural production — were further exacerbated by the dismantling of centralised 
institutions designed to stabilise prices, such as buffer stocks and marketing boards. 
However, this risk was supposed to be mitigated by the development of a new range 
of financial products — derivatives — which were positioned as a solution to the risk-
management problems faced by commercial hedgers. In fact, it was the purported use 
of commodity derivatives for hedging purposes that legitimated the increased 
involvement of financial actors in commodity futures markets. Alongside the claim of 
finance to have ‘mastered risk’ via mathematical formulas, the need to provide 
liquidity to hedgers was leveraged by the financial services industry to persuade 
legislators, regulators, and the judiciary to legalise trade in OTC derivatives. The 
bespoke nature of these instruments further enabled financial actors — banks, hedge 
funds and individual traders — to engage in more speculative and increasingly risky 
forms of trading as they could back up myriad financial risks using derivatives. They 
could balance their investment portfolios on a macro level. This assisted financial 
institutions in meeting the requirements of new principles and guidelines for their 
‘self-regulation’, such as capital adequacy standards. The trust in industry self-
regulation under neoliberalism and the culture of incentives that resulted further 
contributed to a rise in speculative trading by rewarding successful traders with large 
bonuses. 
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On a broader macro-economic level, the active pursuit of social goals was 
replaced by a focus on monetary stability and the promotion of market efficiency as 
the principal objective of economic policy under the neoliberal policy agenda. 
Financial markets play a vital role in enabling this economic vision as they are 
deemed to be efficient at processing information into prices. Thus, speculative 
practices condemned as socially harmful in prior eras were seen to comprise a new 
measure of social utility. Speculation went ‘from villainous to venerable’204 — to use 
Ann Berg’s characterisation. Simply by transacting in financial markets financial 
actors were serving the cause of ‘informational efficiency’. As David Harvey has 
argued, under neoliberalism, ‘market exchange is an ethic in itself, capable of acting 
as a guide for all human action’.205 Critically, however, whilst forming a key part of 
the neoliberal social vision, such a vision is not operative in the minds of market 
actors themselves. Indeed, following the prescriptions of classical economic thought, 
the neoliberal position is that there is no need for market participants to contemplate 
the broader economic and social implications of their transactions. This is entrusted to 
the invisible hand of the market. Whilst ostensibly in the service of market efficiency, 
the resulting mode of transactional behaviour actually appears to correspond more to 
the layman’s definition of efficiency: that of attempting to achieve maximum 
productivity, or profitability, with minimum wasted effort or expense.  
 
Taken together, I argue, these shifts in economic policy, modes of regulation, 
and social attitudes towards speculation have served to make speculating more 
attractive than investing in other more productive forms of economic activity. They 
have made speculating on fluctuating values, rather than trading based on perceptions 
of fundamental ones, increasingly the rational thing to do. While it may be carried out 
via an array of different kinds of trading or investment strategy — index fund 
investment, short-term speculative trading, arbitrage, or algorithmic trading — under 
neoliberalism, financial speculation is not extraordinary. It is the norm. More than 
that, it is normative — that is to say, it has led to a way of behaving in financial 
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markets that has become increasingly prescriptive. Increasingly, financial traders feel 
that speculating is what they should or even must do. 
 
 
ii. Hallmarks of speculative logic 
 
I am by no means alone in arguing that economic behaviours have 
fundamentally shifted under the influence of the neoliberal policy agenda.
206
 Thus, for 
example, in a series of lectures on the ‘operative thought’ of neoliberalism, Michel 
Feher explores what he contends is a fundamental shift in the ‘human condition’ to 
what he calls the ‘neoliberal condition’ — a consciousness that he argues is now 
endemic amongst the populations of many Western states.
207
 Wendy Brown, drawing 
on Feher’s work and that of Michel Foucault, argues that neoliberalism itself must be 
understood as ‘a normative order of reason developed over three decades into a widely 
and deeply disseminated governing rationality’ — a rationality that ‘transmogrifies 
every human domain and endeavour, along with humans themselves, according to a 
specific image of the economic’.208 
 
What both Feher and Brown argue is that under neoliberalism, not only is 
humanity ‘only and everywhere homo economicus’209— but that the traits of homo 
economicus have changed, such that people exhibit increasingly ‘financialised’ 
behaviours. As Brown puts it, humans are now ‘human capital’, tasked with 
improving and leveraging their competitive positioning and enhancing their (monetary 
and non-monetary) portfolio value across all of their endeavours and ventures.
210
 The 
result, as Foucault intimated in his work on biopolitics, and as Brown develops in her 
book, Undoing the Demos, is that the political consciousness of both the state and 
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individual human beings is being formatted through neoliberal governance into a 
subjectivity that ‘economizes the social’ or regulates society in the interests of the 
market.
211
 This forms a central part of my thesis — directing us as it does to the idea 
that current approaches to the regulation of food speculation fail to take into account 
the role of law constructing market subjectivities. In Chapters Four and Five I will 
consider the way legal entitlements help to lay a basis for homo economicus and 
market society. At present, however, I want to focus on what distinguishes the new 
mode of economic rationality discussed by Feher and Brown, and how this relates to 
what I term ‘speculative logic’. 
 
If the logic of homo economicus is constructed through capitalist modes of 
market exchange, it stands to reason that changes in capitalist modes of market 
exchange would produce an altered economic logic. As Costas Lapavistas has argued, 
through processes of financialisation — processes themselves conditioned by 
neoliberalism — the monetary framework of capitalist accumulation has radically 
altered since the 1970s, both internationally and domestically.
212
 There has been a 
fundamental shift away from production-focused capital accumulation towards 
financial forms of accumulation. Finance is no longer in the service of productive 
activities that make money; financial activities are, increasingly, how money is made. 
There are, however, important differences in the way money is made through financial 
activity. This takes us back to the issue of defining speculation, discussed at the start 
of this chapter. As Lapavistas emphasises, ‘[p]roduction creates value; its motive is 
profit (surplus value) deriving from the exploitation of labour; its aim is the 
accumulation of capital. Circulation does not create value; it results in profits, but they 
derive mostly — though not exclusively — from redistributing surplus value’.213 
While the ultimate objective remains the same — the pursuit of profit — the logic of 
accumulation is different when one is trying to ‘profit without producing’ — to use 
Lapavistas’s catch-all phrase.214 Money is principally produced through ‘speculative 
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multiplications’ — through the creative use and development of financial instruments 
that profitably liquidate, redistribute, and circulate capital, like securities; instruments 
and trading strategies that enable market actors to profit from anticipating how capital 
will move and impact on market values, like derivatives; and the provision of capital 
and risk management services, such as investment schemes, hedging tools, and 
investment advice.
215
 This is increasingly how money is made in centres of global 
finances, like New York and the City of London. What, then, can market actors take 
to be true in economies in which the mode of accumulation shifts from one centred on 
the production of surplus value to one centred on the profitable circulation of surplus 
value? And further, what forms of reasoning might ensue? Without attempting to be 
exhaustive, I would like to suggest a number of possibilities. 
 
First, there are now two economies — one in the production and circulation of 
commodities, and the other in financial assets that derive their value from 
commodities or redistribute value accumulated from the production of commodities. 
Profit can be made in both; however, profiting without producing is typically less 
costly and less time-consuming. Second, the pricing of assets and the movement of 
capital in the financial economy impacts on values in the underlying productive 
economy. This presents a risk — and thereby a disincentive — to productive modes of 
accumulation in which a stable revenue stream is desirable, or in which an upfront 
investment must be made that takes time to produce value. Third, the need to manage 
risks arising from capital movements is a market opportunity: risk management can be 
a profitable industry, which incentivises instruments to manage different types of 
financial risk. If risks can be managed, more risks can be taken, making speculative 
‘bets’ on the movement of capital increasingly safe and profitable. Fourth, capital in 
the financial economy is circulated by the financial services industry. Bankers and 
financial traders advise on and transact capital movements in accordance with 
predictions about future market values. What they are predicting, in the pricing of 
financial assets, is why and when other bankers and financial traders are going to buy 
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and sell assets and move capital. Thus, while many financial assets are purportedly 
linked to underlying commodities, they are valued in an intra-industry dynamic. The 
‘real’ values of commodities may become less important than the values assigned to 
financial assets by other financial actors. Increasingly, decisions informing the 
circulation of capital and the pricing of financial assets are dissociated from the needs 
of the productive economy. Fifth, capital must be liquid and there must be a degree of 
market volatility in order to ensure ongoing profitability from the circulation of 
capital.  
 
Taken together, I argue, speculative market logic is distinguished from the 
logic of the pre-financialised-era homo economicus, not by the postulated objectives 
of economic activity but by the preferred means of meeting those objectives. Homo 
speculativus — as we might call him — displays a marked preference for making and 
managing future profits through financial instruments; and for speculating on capital 
movements and the values of existing assets, rather than producing things. He is 
further distinguished by a tendency to value assets according to predictions on how 
other financial actors will value them, as opposed to attempting to discover their ‘true’ 
values; by a mode of transacting that is not only not in the service of the productive 
economy, but is instead dissociated from the needs and operations of that economy; 
and by drive towards ensuring the existence of future modes of profitable 
accumulation through financial instruments that facilitate the circulation of capital and 
speculations on market movements.   
 
 
iii. A market logic of speculation?  
 
In terms of how this could have evolved from something that was logical to do 
in the marketplace to a shared rationale that could be accurately described as a logic of 
the market place, and even a dominant logic, it is instructive to consider the work of 
scholars associated with the Science and Technology Studies. Callon argues that 
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market actors can be ‘formatted’ into acting a certain way.216 Over time, through 
processes of institutionalisation, knowledge production, behaviour legitimation and 
especially performativity,
217
 there may emerge a socially incentivised market 
preference for short-term profit realisation and, with that, a prescription for how to 
enter into economic transactions. Market actors may be swept up into a trading culture 
in which successful trading is speculative trading; those who successfully transact 
risky trades are rewarded with big bonuses; new instruments and incentives to trade 
speculatively proliferate; every risky trade appears capable of being counterbalanced 
with a hedge; models and technologies that transcend human capacities for economic 
calculation start to structure market movements into conformity; and it becomes 
increasingly unprofitable to follow fundamentals. Eventually, market actors are no 
longer freely choosing to engage with markets in a mode of speculative acquisition, 
they are cognitively structured into conformity. However, it goes beyond this. This 
behaviour and the instruments developed to further enable it — legitimated by a shift 
in the social toleration of speculation —also impact on the production of values, on 
prices. Those speculating on shifts in market value are not just individual impartial 
observers taking positions — or placing ‘bets’ — about fundamentals. They become 
active agents of price formation collectively manifesting behaviours that they have 
been conditioned to engage in, and reconditioning their ‘ecologies’ as a result. Under 
this reappraisal, speculation constitutes a socially conditioned, cumulative force of 
price manipulation in the market for food commodities.  
 
As a wise man once said: ‘people know what they do; frequently they know 
why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does’.218 
What this critical mass of financial speculators appear to have done is to have remade 
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the world that made them.
219
 The implications of this for food prices have been 
discussed at length in this chapter. Financialisation means that the price of food is now 
vulnerable to influence by financial actors acting according to a diverse range of 
motives that have nothing whatsoever to do with food. Beyond the problematic 
tendencies in the global food system I identified in Chapter One — that food has come 
to be understood first and foremost as a commodity, by reference to its exchange 
value — food as a financial commodity is increasingly traded by those who have no 
conception that what they are trading is food at all. As Frederick Kaufman reminds us, 
‘[o]ur age has fallen in love with the virtual, with the derivative, with the indexical. 
 But when food becomes something virtual, it is no longer food’.220 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have sought to elucidate the phenomenon of food commodity 
speculation, as well as quell some of the residual anxieties over its causal significance 
in the context of the global food crisis. My aim has been to shift some of the doubt 
surrounding the causal significance of food commodity speculation onto the 
neoclassical theory commonly invoked to reject the argument that speculative activity 
contributed to recent price volatility. While finding much of the evidence put forth by 
campaigners persuasive, I argued that they erred both in their focus on individual 
‘speculators’, and in their identification of ‘risky’ ‘speculative’ practices as the ones 
conditioning price volatility. Instead, I suggested, the problem is both more structural 
and more societal. Those labelled ‘speculators’ are but the visible tip of the iceberg; 
emblematic of a paradigmatic shift in mode of capital accumulation that is dependent 
on this manner of market behaviour. I will now move on to consider the implications 
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of this for the regulatory initiatives developed to respond to concerns about excessive 
speculation in commodity derivative markets. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
Catalysed by recognition of the role that derivatives played in aggravating the 
global financial crisis, in 2009, G20 member states committed to an overhaul of the 
regulatory structures governing the global financial system.
1
 A key target has been to 
improve regulatory oversight of the market in OTC derivatives — the swaps market 
— in which speculative trading practices are understood to have proliferated. In 
pursuit of this goal, governments in the US and in Europe have devised new 
regulations for the OTC trading space. Some of the provisions are explicitly aimed at 
addressing ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in commodity derivative markets. NGOs 
which have fought to gain recognition of the role of food commodity speculation in 
the causation of the price spikes in 2007-08 and 2010-11 have welcomed the 
measures.
2
 Influential figures, including Olivier de Schutter, former Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, have argued that other governments should follow 
suit and regulate to protect food prices from speculative practices.
3
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the new regulations and to 
assess the potential that they hold in terms of shielding commodity prices from 
speculative interference. Part I will recall the key events comprising the global 
financial crisis and will note how concerns about the role that derivatives played in 
bringing it about have motivated regulatory reform. Part II will provide a summary of 
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the new regulatory measures installed in US and in Europe, foregrounding those 
provisions that campaigners hope will address the phenomenon of food commodity 
speculation. Part III will then discuss a number of challenges that have emerged as 
efforts to implement the regulations have gotten under way. Moving on to engage in a 
critical analysis of the provisions, Part IV will expose a number of limitations of the 
regulatory project for the project of tackling food commodity speculation. I will argue 
that the new regulations are flawed on two principal grounds. Firstly, they replicate a 
problematic ‘neoliberal-neoclassical’ understanding of how financial markets 
function that fails to account for the way practices of food commodity speculation 
could have impacted on spot prices in the first place. Secondly, the regulations largely 
attempt to reinstate regulatory measures used to tackle speculation in commodity 
futures prior to the creation of the OTC market in the 1990s. Though once effective, 
reinstating these measures now fails to account for the fact that something was 
produced by processes of deregulation that is not so easily contained. In Part V, I will 
expand the analysis beyond the potential of the existing reforms and suggest that 
there are limits to what financial regulation as a broader endeavour can hope to 
achieve in terms of tackling the speculative market logic identified at the end of 
Chapter Two.   
 
 
I. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 is widely recognised to be the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Like its predecessor, its 
origins are traced to the US. A glut of credit amassed as a result of large inflows of 
foreign funds in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 encouraged US 
banks to engage in increasingly risky lending practices in the years leading up to the 
crash. Financial institutions began to extend dubiously collateralised loans to 
customers whom they would not formerly have considered eligible for credit. This 
encouraged a spate of ‘sub-prime’ mortgage lending and eventually culminated in a 
real estate bubble. A further consequence of this credit boom was that financial 
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investors were seeking profitable vehicles for investment at this time. Innovators in 
the financial services industry seized upon the US housing boom as an opportunity to 
develop new financial products. The result was a highly lucrative market in financial 
derivatives such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt 
obligations (CDO). These financial instruments pooled the risks associated with the 
mortgages and loans on offer, repackaged them, and marketed them as an attractive 
vehicle for investment. A further layer of derivatives was added to this financial mille-
feuille in the form of the Credit Default Swap (CDS). CDS instruments allowed 
institutions buying MBSs and CDOs to insure themselves against the risk of default 
by transacting to ‘swap’ their outstanding credit risks with those of other institutions.  
 
Whilst these instruments purported to lower financial risk, with the benefit of 
hindsight it has become apparent that in fact they were aggravating overall levels of 
risk in the global economy. The threat that this complex web of debts posed to the 
stability of the global financial system was grossly misunderstood. When the bottom 
fell out of the US housing market in 2006 and scores of lenders began to default on 
their loans, the values of mortgage-backed securities plummeted rapidly. Thousands 
of lenders and investors then sought to claim what was owed to them only to find that 
many financial entities did not have sufficient funds conserved to pay them. Instead of 
keeping adequate capital in reserve, many banks and financial institutions had instead 
re-invested this capital in more derivatives. The financial traffic jam that ensued 
ultimately triggered a global liquidity crisis which resulted in numerous bankruptcies 
of financial institutions in countries throughout the world. A mass bailout of the banks 
was undertaken by national governments in an effort to prevent the financial system 
from caving in on itself. The effects of the global financial crisis are still being felt to 
this day and many countries continue to suffer the consequences of a global 
recession.
4
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It is widely acknowledged that the global financial crisis was born of a 
catalogue of different factors. However, as the post-mortem on causation has been 
carried out, derivatives have been increasingly implicated in aggravating the turmoil.
5
 
Derivative instruments are seen to have greatly exacerbated conditions of systemic 
risk in the global economy and have been lambasted for causing a ‘chain reaction of 
defaults’ amongst systemically important institutions.6 The fact that many such 
instruments were being traded OTC — and thereby outside of the ambit of regulatory 
supervision — is now seen as a critical failing of financial governance. The threat that 
derivatives are now seen to pose to financial stability has of itself been a strong 
motivation for regulatory intervention. At the same time, there has also been 
significant pressure on regulators to tackle the culture of speculation seen to have 
grown up alongside the market in derivatives trading. Anger at the use of public funds 
to bail out banks has been channelled towards speculators who now stand accused of 
having created social havoc by playing ‘Wall Street roulette’ at the expense of the 
taxpayer.
7
 The common narrative that speculators have socialised risk while 
privatising profit has been taken up by leading political figures, including former 
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who has openly chastised ‘the 
irresponsibility of speculators who have transformed the world into a gigantic 
casino’.8 
 
It is against this backdrop of financial chaos that the motivation to strengthen 
the regulation of global finance has formed. In September 2009 world leaders met at 
the G20 forum in Pittsburgh and sought to ‘turn the page on an era of irresponsibility’, 
agreeing to develop regulations to stabilise the financial system in order to meet the 
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needs of the 21
st
 century global economy.
9
 Wide ranging reforms to multiple areas of 
financial services supervision including new guidance for the valuation of securities,
10
 
an overhaul of global accounting regulations,
11
 revision of the standards for credit 
rating agencies,
12
 and greater capital adequacy requirements for banks
13
 have since 
been agreed. This chapter will not attempt to address the totality of these reforms. 
Instead, the forthcoming analysis will focus specifically on regulatory interventions in 
the OTC trading arena that campaigners hope will address the phenomenon of food 
commodity speculation. 
 
 
II. REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
 
Among the commitments made at the G20 Summit was a specific pledge to 
improve the regulation, functioning, and transparency of financial and commodity 
markets in order to ‘address excessive commodity price volatility’.14 G20 leaders 
undertook to ensure that ‘where appropriate’ all standardised OTC derivative contracts 
should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest.
15
 Whilst all of the member states have 
committed to enact this reform, the US and Europe have been leading the charge. 
Owing to the size of the US market and the speed at which it has enacted its reforms, 
it is expected that the US provisions will act as a blue print for other countries in their 
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efforts to develop regulations.
16
 With an estimated 43 per cent of the global market in 
OTC derivatives traded from London,
17
 the European reforms are also of critical 
significance. The next section will offer an analysis of the two regimes.   
 
 
i. US and European Reforms: Dodd-Frank, EMIR and MiFID II 
 
In the US, the provisions giving effect to the G20 commitment on OTC 
derivatives have been merged with the broader project of financial sector reform and 
consolidated into a single piece of legislation: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).
18
 The reforms to the trading of 
derivatives are enacted in Title VII of the Act, entitled 'Wall Street Transparency and 
Accountability'. In Europe the G20 commitment will be met by two separate 
instruments: the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
19
 and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).
20
  
 
In broad terms, the overall ambit of both these sets of reforms is to construct a 
framework of rules to ensure that the trade in OTC derivatives is more effectively 
monitored, better collateralised and poses less of a threat to the stability of the global 
financial system. It is important to emphasise that neither the text of Dodd-Frank nor 
of EMIR-MiFID II comprises the totality of provisions to be implemented in their 
respective jurisdictions. National and regional regulatory agencies have been tasked 
with refining the rules and elaborating technical standards to give substantive effect to 
the broader objectives outlined in the framework agreements. In the US this falls to 
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either the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) depending on how a given instrument is classified.
21
 In 
Europe, the task has been allocated to the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), a new regulatory body established to oversee financial stability and 
investment practices in the EU.
22
 In effect, this means that the regulations will come 
into force in stages over a number of years. Thus far, the US rules have been finalised 
significantly in advance of the EU measures.  
 
ii. Outline of key provisions 
 
a. Central counterparty clearing 
 
The consensus reached in the aftermath of the global financial crisis was that it 
was the bilateral character of OTC trades that was particularly problematic. 
Accordingly, the centrepiece of the OTC reforms is a requirement that trades go 
through ‘centralised clearing’. Under this process, instead of trading bilaterally with 
one another, the counterparty of each trader taking a position in a derivative market 
will ultimately be an institution known as a clearing house — labelled ‘CCPs’ under 
EMIR and ‘DCOs’ under Dodd-Frank.23 A central counterparty is an entity that 
‘interposes itself’, in one or more markets, between counterparties to the contracts 
traded, becoming ‘the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer’ and thereby 
guaranteeing the performance of contracts.
24
 New clearing houses attached to futures 
exchanges including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the NASDAQ stock market in 
the US, and NYSE and LIFFE in Europe have been established to fulfil this purpose. 
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In terms of how central clearing is intended to mitigate the risks of bilateral 
trading, this is accomplished in a number of ways. Firstly, centralised clearing houses 
are directly regulated by the CFTC and SEC, in the case of the US, and by ESMA in 
Europe. Secondly, these organisations are required to submit OTC transactions that 
they wish to clear to the relevant regulator, which will then determine whether the 
instruments should be subject to mandatory clearing taking into account factors 
relating to notional exposures, liquidity, pricing data and the effect that clearing might 
have on systemic risk. Categories of derivatives that are subject to the mandatory 
clearing requirements must also be transacted on a regulated trading arena: a futures 
exchange, a swap-execution facility (SEF), a registered electronic trading platform, or 
an organised trading facility (OTF). Thirdly, cleared trading requires market 
participants to post greater margin payments than those typically stipulated under 
bilateral OTC trades. Whereas the execution of an OTC trade involves ‘variation’ 
margin — pledging a sum of money to act as a buffer against daily market movements 
— additional payments in the form of ‘initial’ margin are involved in centrally cleared 
transactions. Initial margin thereby functions as an additional source of collateral for 
making trades and has been described as a clearing organisation’s first line of defence 
against the insolvency of a market participant.
25
  
 
b. Reporting requirements 
 
A dominant theme in debates over the market in OTC derivatives is that they 
are opaque, and that this lack of transparency has impaired regulators in their efforts 
to monitor these markets. Key provisions under Title VII of Dodd-Frank and Article 9 
of EMIR require both trading entities and central clearing organisations to report 
details of all derivatives contracts to the CFTC and SEC in the US, and to designated 
‘trade repositories’ in the EU. Both sets of reporting requirements are broadly similar, 
comprising requirements to maintain daily trading records, to provide transparent 
pricing policies, and provide transaction data to regulators. However, EMIR is 
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considered to be slightly more demanding as it requires reports from both parties to a 
transaction.
26
 Dodd-Frank only requires reports from larger banks and financial 
institutions that deal in large volumes of derivatives. The overall purpose of these 
provisions is to give regulators more information in order that risks may be identified 
at an earlier stage. Reporting requirements are also intended to make the prices at 
which derivatives are traded more transparent.  
 
c. Position limits 
 
The key measure that campaigners hope will tackle food commodity 
speculation is the imposition of limits restricting the number of positions that financial 
institutions can hold in commodity derivatives markets. Position limits place an upper 
limit — a quantitative ceiling — on the number of contracts other than bona fide 
hedging positions which an investor or combined group of investors may hold for a 
specific commodity. Dodd-Frank mandated the CFTC to calibrate position limits with 
the explicit intent to ‘diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation’.27  CFTC 
commissioners voted in October 2012 to issue position limits on 28 commodity 
derivative contracts including nineteen agricultural commodities, metals, and fuels.
28
 
The position limits apply for exchange-traded futures contracts and their 
‘economically equivalent’ futures, options and swaps — the OTC contracts.29 The 
proposed rules set forth two types of speculative limits: spot-month position limits and 
non-spot-month position limits.
30
 The standards vary as the spot month is the month in 
which a futures contract matures and becomes deliverable. Since physical delivery is 
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required in that month, excessive positions and disorderly trading practices are 
thought to be particularly disruptive and the limits are therefore stricter.
31
 The CFTC 
has set spot-month limits at 25 per cent of estimated deliverable supply. For non-spot-
month contracts the limits will be set at 10 per cent of open interest in the first 25,000 
contracts and 2.5 per cent thereafter.
32
  
 
The specifics of the EU position limits regimes were still being negotiated at 
the time of writing. At present, the Draft Regulatory Technical Standards developed 
by ESMA under the auspices of MiFID II are largely identical to the US provisions, 
setting a limit of 25 per cent of deliverable supply in spot-month contracts.
33
 Positions 
on non-spot month contracts are yet to be decided. However, there is one important 
difference in that Draft RTS 29, article 1(5) allows national authorities within the EU 
to use their discretion to set higher limits than those recommended by ESMA.
34
 
National authorities may vary the baseline by either increasing or decreasing it by up 
to an additional 15%. In practice this would mean that no position limit is higher or 
lower than 40% of deliverable supply.
35
  
 
d. High frequency and automated trading technologies 
 
Automated and high frequency trading technologies are widely regarded as 
having played a key role in aggravating leading commodity futures prices to diverge 
from fundamentals. The CFTC is in the process of developing a range of interventions 
to respond to technologies that encourage reliance on trading algorithms. A 
Technology Advisory Committee and a further Subcommittee on Automated and High 
Frequency Trading have been charged with conducting investigations and holding a 
series of public meetings to develop knowledge on these innovations with a view to 
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formulating new regulations.
36
 An agreement on provisions impacting upon high 
frequency trading that is to be implemented under MiFID II has recently been agreed 
by the European Parliament. The measures include regulations designating a 
standardised ‘tick’ size — the size of the individual trade — in a bid to prevent 
exchanges and other trading venues from attracting aggressive trading based on 
miniscule differences in price.
37
 Other provisions include a requirement for exchanges 
and trading venues to synchronise their clocks to make it easier to spot abuses, testing 
of algorithms and trading software on regulated exchanges, and the use of ‘circuit 
breakers’ to stop the trading process if price volatility gets too high.38  
 
e. Proprietary trading 
 
A final provision relates to provisions on proprietary trading. In the US this 
measure is enacted under Title VI of Dodd-Frank and is known as the Volcker Rule.
39
 
This form of trading occurs when financial entities use their own funds to trade in 
addition to that of customers in order to make a profit. Such practices are deemed to 
be largely speculative in nature by industry experts, such as Paul Volcker, the former 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve and the proponent of the rule. Under the Volcker 
Rule, banks are prohibited from using or investing more than 3 per cent of their capital 
for this variety of trading.
40
 The aim is to deter banks from using the deposits of 
customers insured by the state through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) from taking risky speculative positions in complex financial derivatives.
41
 
Commercial banks are restricted from short-term proprietary trading in certain kinds 
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of instruments, including securities, futures and commodity derivatives, as well as 
from investing that capital in other institutions, such as hedge funds.
42
 
 
On the European side, draft plans by the EU financial services chief Michel 
Barnier propose to restrict systemically important banks from proprietary trading from 
2018 onwards. Whilst the US Volker rule applies to small and mid-tier banks, the 
EU’s ban will only apply to the EU’s biggest banks — those deemed global 
systemically important institutions.
43
 The EU proposes to deal with the risks 
emanating from proprietary trading through the use of supplementary provisions that 
‘ring-fence’ such trading, requiring banks to transfer other high-risk trading activities 
including complex derivatives and securitisation operations to separate legal trading 
entities within the group.
44
 This regulatory enforced subsidiarisation echoes the 
separation between retail and investment activities put in place under the Glass-
Steagall Act in the US in 1933. It is intended to avoid the risk that banks would 
attempt to circumnavigate the prohibition of these trading activities by engaging in 
hidden proprietary trading activities which could lead to systemic risk.
45
  
 
 
iii. Classifications and exemptions  
 
Provisions on trading technologies and proprietary trading aside, the 
cumulative impact of the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID II reforms will be to subject 
the trade in OTC derivatives to many of the prudential regulations that are used to 
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govern futures exchanges.
46
 Such are the similarities that it would be reasonable to 
wonder why legislators did not simply require all derivatives trading to be carried out 
via these forums. However, commercial lobbyists stressed that many companies have 
come to rely on the flexibility afforded by the OTC market to mitigate risks to their 
business emanating from global markets.
47
 Accordingly, an exemption has been built 
into the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID II provisions to retain the benefits of 
bilaterally negotiated OTC trading for commercial hedgers. Title VII of Dodd-Frank 
delineates between numerous categories of market participant including: ‘Swap 
Dealers’, ‘Major Swap Participants’, and ‘End Users’. The full spectrum of the 
regulations in Title VII is reserved to ‘Swaps Dealers’ — large financial entities such 
as banks who create financial products, formulate indices and habitually deal in 
derivative instruments.
48
 The principal justification behind imposing a higher 
regulatory burden on these institutions is that they pose a greater threat in terms of 
systemic risk owing to the instability that they would create were they to become 
insolvent. Commercial ‘end-users’ seeking to hedge against commercial risks are 
deemed less systemically risky, and are therefore able to claim an exemption that 
lightens their regulatory burden.
49
 Most critically, parties able to claim this exemption 
are not subject to the mandatory clearing requirement and are also exempt from the 
provisions on position limits.  
 
The European reforms distinguish only between ‘financials’ — banks, insurers, 
asset managers — and ‘non-financials’ — defined as any EU firm whose positions in 
OTC derivative contracts (unless for hedging purposes) exceed the EMIR clearing 
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threshold.
50
 However, some of the provisions are targeted at larger global financial 
institutions deemed to be systemically risky.
51
 
 
a. Bona-fide hedging and de minimis exemptions 
 
Commercial risk has been defined by the CFTC as risk that it ‘economically 
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial 
enterprise, where the risks arise in the ordinary course of business’.52 Examples given 
are risks arising from a potential change in the value of assets that a person ‘owns, 
produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises’.53 The CFTC has further 
emphasised that the definition of hedging does not include a market position that is 
held for a purpose that is in the nature of ‘speculation, investing, or trading’,54 defined 
as ‘those positions executed primarily to take an outright view on market direction or 
to obtain an appreciation in value of the swap position itself’.55 Article 10 of EMIR 
carves out very similar provisions to define the meaning of legitimate hedging for 
‘non-financial counterparties’. A further exemption based on the volume of trade that 
an entity is carrying out has been granted under Dodd-Frank and under EMIR. Title 
VII of Dodd-Frank grants an exemption to what are termed ‘small financials’ engaged 
in a ‘de minimis quantity’ of derivatives trading.  
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b. Scope of exemptions 
 
Regarding the scope of the exemptions, the de minimis exemption has been 
defined with some precision. In the US, in order to claim such an exemption, the 
aggregate gross notional amount of the swaps that the person enters into over the prior 
twelve months in connection with dealing activities must not exceed $3 billion.
56
 
Similar provisions enacted under EMIR allow financial counterparties to bypass 
central clearing up to a threshold volume of 3 billion euros of commodity 
derivatives.
57
 It is likely that only smaller banks, savings institutions and hedge funds 
will be able to claim this exemption. Parties claiming these exemptions will still be 
subject to minimum requirements relating to adequate capital and risk management 
but will escape the more onerous requirements of centralised clearing and, 
importantly, will be exempt from position limits.  
 
Bona fide hedging, on the other hand, has several differing definitions within 
the CFTC rulemaking areas.
58
 The CFTC has recently updated the relevant sections of 
the Code of Federal Regulations
59
 and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to clarify 
what would appear to be its overarching definition. CEA Section 4(a)(c) requires that 
a bona fide hedge must be ‘economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the 
conduct and management of a commercial enterprise’.60 This is expanded on in 17 
CFR 151.5 which elaborates that a bona fide hedge must, among other criteria, arise 
from the potential change in the value of one or several: (a) assets that a person owns, 
produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, 
manufacturing, processing, or merchandising; (b) liabilities that a person owns or 
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anticipates incurring; or (c) services that a person provides, purchases, or anticipates 
providing or purchasing.
61
 EMIR has proposed an almost identical definition in its 
draft regulations under RTS 30, Article 1.
62
  
 
While EMIR stipulates that a bona fide hedge must be a transaction made by a 
‘non-financial entity’, the Dodd-Frank classification rests on the qualification of the 
transaction, rather than the entity making it. There remains considerable ambiguity 
over which transactions may or may not be able to qualify as bona fide hedges under 
the reforms. This has led numerous financial companies and law firms to publish 
guidance seeking to clarify the terms of — and to find loopholes in — the 
regulations.
63
 Notably, it has been suggested with respect to Dodd-Frank that a person 
who does not directly hedge commercial activity, such as a swap dealer, can 
nonetheless benefit from the hedging exemption if such swap would qualify as a bona 
fide hedge for the swap dealer’s counterparty.64 This could mean that banks and hedge 
funds are exempted from position limits entered into with other actors with a 
commercial interest in the underlying commodity; a farmer, manufacturer, or, 
potentially, an agricultural conglomerate. NGOs have recently criticised the MiFID II 
reforms for allowing such indirect commercial hedging to be exempted, arguing that 
ESMA was only mandated to exempt positions ‘reducing risks directly relating to 
commercial activities’.65 
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iv. Response 
 
The reaction to the new regulations in both the US and in Europe has been 
highly polarised. Hailed by advocates as ‘one of the most significant regulatory 
reform measures since the Great Depression’, they are seen by many people — 
including those within the financial services community — as vital if another global 
financial crisis is to be prevented.
66
 Others have been highly critical, arguing that the 
‘Dodd-Frankenstein’ reforms are far too extensive and complex and are ‘too big not to 
fail’.67 Concerns have been raised about the impact on financial sector 
competitiveness
68
 and about the unintended consequences of the ambitious 
provisions.
69
 
 
Many NGOs and campaigners have welcomed the reforms, suggesting that 
they represent ‘some success’ in tackling food commodity speculation.70 However, 
others have argued that the provisions don’t go nearly far enough. There is widespread 
concern that the provisions will be watered down as the guidelines provided in the 
framework agreements are transposed into technical rules. NGOs in Europe including 
SOMO and Finance Watch have argued that ESMA’s decision to allow national 
authorities to raise position limits by up to 15 per cent are contrary to the spirit of the 
MiFID II agreement and, if approved, will turn limits on speculation decided by the 
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European Parliament into ‘an empty shell’.71 Much would appear to rest on the final 
shape of the reforms as they are implemented by the CFTC, SEC and ESMA. 
 
 
III. CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORS 
 
As the efforts to implement the regulations have gotten underway, a number of 
challenges have emerged that threaten to impede their successful operation.  
 
i. Funding 
 
A major challenge in terms of implementing the provisions has been a lack of 
funding for regulators. Prior to Dodd-Frank the CFTC issued an average of three or 
four rules a year. Now, however, the agency has been handed the ‘Herculean task’ of 
finalising more than 50 rules in that same time allocation.
72
 This leap in organisational 
efficiency is anticipated in the absence of any substantial increase in resources. The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that the Republican-dominated House of 
Representatives continues to reject proposed budget increases to implement Dodd-
Frank rules and is moving to reduce the budget of the CFTC.
73
 Some analysts have 
argued that this is a deliberate tactic to ‘beat the law’.74 ESMA has also run into 
funding difficulties and has put out an urgent request that it be fully funded by the EU. 
Currently, the agency relies on national regulators for 60 per cent of its budget — a 
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position that looks untenable owing to the difficult budgetary situation faced by a 
number of EU member states.
75
  
 
 
ii. Litigation 
 
A second major hurdle has arisen with attempts to impose the provisions on 
position limits. The CFTC’s position limits were due to be imposed in October 2012. 
However, two trade associations associated with the derivatives industry, the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), successfully petitioned to have the 
regulations struck down. The text of Dodd-Frank only mandates the imposition of 
such limits ‘as appropriate’.76 These groups contend that this was not the case since it 
remains unclear that excessive levels of speculation were the cause of recent price 
volatility. On 28
th
 September 2012, a District Court in Washington DC ruled that the 
CFTC’s decision to impose the limits was not in line with instructions from 
Congress.
77
 Judge Robert Wilkins ruled that the CFTC had failed to heed instructions 
requiring it to determine that its rule was ‘necessary to diminish, eliminate or prevent 
excessive speculation’.78 CFTC Commissioner Chilton has made it plain that he 
considers that court’s judgment to be ‘deeply flawed’.79 The CFTC appealed the 
judgement, and has since drafted a new rule to impose the limits on the basis of a 
finding that they are indeed ‘necessary and appropriate’ to this goal. The re-proposed 
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rules closely mirror the vacated rules.
80
 However, there is widespread concern that the 
victory in the court of Judge Robert Wilkins will embolden banks to challenge other 
new rules and result in similar legal challenges being mounted against the European 
provisions.
81
  
 
 
iii. Evasion 
 
Another set of challenges concerns efforts by the financial services industry to 
mitigate the impact of the regulations. Firstly, financial institutions are reorganising to 
get around the rules. The Economist has noted: ‘[a]nticipating the Volcker rule, bank 
departments previously using the word “proprietary” have been dropped, renamed or 
quietly shifted to sheltered corners’.82 Secondly, the global character of OTC 
derivative markets has prompted fears, based on substantial precedent, that financial 
institutions will relocate their derivatives trading ‘offshore’ or, at any rate, to 
jurisdictions that offer the most attractive set of regulations. Anxiety within the 
financial industry over so-called ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ is centred on a loss of 
competitiveness. However, the possibility that an uneven patchwork of global 
regulation could drive OTC derivative trading into less regulated arenas where 
systemic risks could ferment presents a broader challenge to the success of the 
regulatory endeavour as a whole.
83
 Thirdly, product innovation has already 
conditioned a new shift in trading to the exchange-traded arena. CME Group, the 
largest derivatives exchange in the US, has already begun to enable novel trading 
practices facilitated by instruments known as ‘swap-futures’ that allow OTC swaps to 
be executed as block futures trades and are thereby exempted from Dodd-Frank 
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regulations.
84
 These products ‘take the functionality’ of OTC derivatives and 
standardise their trading for futures markets.
85
 Product innovation has been a 
longstanding problem within financial markets. As Partnoy observed in 1996, 
‘[F]inancial intermediaries are constantly structuring new financial derivatives in 
response to changes in financial regulation’.86  
 
 
iv. The particular challenge of food commodity speculation 
 
Since the provisions were first tabled, a great deal of analysis has been carried 
out on the challenges faced by regulators and the likely efficacy of the reforms. 
However, with a few exceptions, comparatively little analysis has emerged assessing 
the impact that the regulations will have in terms of tackling food commodity 
speculation. I will now seek to reinstall this question into this debate. I will draw on 
the assessments that have been offered by analysts including as Jayati Ghosh,
87
 and 
Cornelia Staritz, and Karin Küblböck
88
 to assess the potential of the new regulations 
in tackling practices of food commodity speculation and addressing their impact on 
commodity price volatility. 
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a. Limits of position limits 
 
The only measure in both the US and European regulations explicitly enacted 
to address concerns about speculatively conditioned commodity price volatility are 
position limits. Campaigners at the WDM and Oxfam have fought hard to ensure that 
these limits are put in place. In particular, these groups have lobbied European 
regulators to ensure that the provisions under MiIFID II would not be limited to a 
weaker approach of ‘position management’.89 As well as a strong stance on position 
limits, Staritz and Küblböck have noted that the US provisions could also be 
considered something to emulate as they explicitly cover the trade in OTC instruments 
— swaps — which the EU proposals do not.90 However, critics have pointed out that 
the US limits are set so high as to be of dubious value in the efforts to tackle 
speculation. As analysts at the IATP have pointed out, at 25 per cent, ‘in theory, four 
trading entities could control the market in a specific contract’.91 Even assuming that 
the CFTC is able to successfully implement its new proposed rule on position limits, 
reissued following the lawsuit brought by the ISDA, there are doubts about the likely 
efficacy of the measures.
92
  
 
The biggest problem with reliance on position limits is that they don’t 
correspond with the most persuasive explanation of how practices of food commodity 
speculation have come to influence underlying food prices in the first place. As 
explained in Chapter Two, evidence from market practice suggests that recent 
commodity price volatility was not a consequence of the excessive volume of 
speculative trading, or ‘outsize’ derivatives transactions by single market actors, but 
of new trading techniques: index fund trading, reliance on trading algorithms, and a 
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culture of herding behaviour. Rather than a product of the activities of single 
monopolistic market actors, price volatility needs to be understood as a consequence 
of the cumulative trading practices of thousands of individual traders, located across a 
diverse range of banks, hedge funds, and commercial companies, who were 
incentivised to exploit market fluctuations and push prices higher. On this 
understanding, position limits miss the mark entirely in terms of the efforts to curb 
price volatility. Staritz and Küblböck have raised this concern with respect to the EU 
provisions, arguing that the focus on individual traders does not account for the ability 
of aggregate classes of trade to have an influence. They suggest that a more effective 
strategy would be to deny certain types of investors (irrespective of their trading 
strategy) access to commodity derivative-related investments.
93
 
 
b. Ancillary potential 
 
In light of these limitations, the capacity of the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID 
II reforms to protect food prices from speculative interference would appear to rest on 
the ancillary effect of the other regulations principally crafted to respond to systemic 
risk. On an initial appraisal, these provisions hold some potential. Clearing and margin 
requirements along with proprietary trading rules will make it more costly and 
laborious for financial institutions that deal in derivatives to do so for speculative 
purposes; reporting requirements will help to counteract the market opacity that 
disabled regulators in the years leading up to the global financial crisis; and the 
restrictions on proprietary trading are likely to curb the volume of capital used by 
financial institutions to enter into short-term speculative trading ventures. There 
would appear to be significant potential for introducing regulations to curb high 
frequency trading. However, the efficacy of the provisions will depend on their final 
shape and implementation. Anti-spoofing measures have already resulted in some 
criminal prosecutions for traders using algorithms to submit false bids for gold, 
soybean and copper futures — activity now considered to be a criminal manipulation 
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of the market.
94
 On the other hand, the European Parliament has backed down from a 
provision imposing a minimum resting period that would have required a trade to stay 
on an order book for 500 milliseconds — a provision financial industry lobbyists 
argued would effectively kill off high-frequency trading as dealers now routinely 
operate at much faster speeds measured in microseconds.
95
  
 
Upon closer scrutiny, these provisions form part of a broader framework of 
regulations centred on an uncertain, and some might say unworkable, classification of 
market participants and their behaviours. The de minimis exemption and confused 
classification regarding what amounts to commercial hedging have created loopholes 
that could allow a proportion of purely speculative OTC contracts to escape the bulk 
of the market infrastructure reforms.
96
 The hybrid nature and porous motivations of 
both sets of market actor remain largely unaddressed. Not only do the plurality of 
operations carried out by large agricultural conglomerates such as Cargill and ADM 
confound the classification, many of these entities are global actors and can easily 
move ‘speculative’ operations off-shore or create functionally ‘independent’ 
subsidiaries. Armajaro Asset Management LLP — the London-based hedge fund that 
infamously ‘cornered’ the entire European cocoa market in 2010, pushing prices to a 
33-year high
97
 — owns seven other hedge funds, four of them based in the Cayman 
Islands.
98
 Black River Asset Management, the hedge fund owned by Cargill, 
advertises on its website that its investment professionals are located in thirteen 
countries spanning five continents.
99
 As Joshua Schneyer has suggested, the kind of 
proprietary trading carried out by such firms would fall foul of extensive regulations 
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restricting insider trading if it were carried out on the stock market.
100
 Yet, the Dodd-
Frank and EMIR-MiFID II regulations appear largely insensitive to these critical 
inter-linkages. 
 
As with position limits, many of the provisions are also wide of the mark 
concerning how speculative practices impact on food prices. The prevailing view that 
measures increasing market transparency will be beneficial to the project of tackling 
food commodity speculation is highly contestable. As financial industry insiders have 
noted, greater transparency affected through data reporting allows opportunistic 
market participants to learn about their competitors’ trading strategies.101 As discussed 
in Chapter Two, so-called ‘uninformed’ noise traders who follow market trends are 
seen to have contributed significantly to driving prices away from fundamentals. 
Coupled with the pervasive practice of basing spot prices on those listed on those in 
futures markets, greater market transparency could serve to put food prices in further 
jeopardy. 
 
Overall, at the current juncture, the utility of the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID 
II regulations for the project of tackling food commodity speculation would appear to 
be limited at best. Instead of constraining speculation, the regulations would appear to 
displace it — or become the target of it. As correspondents for the Washington Post 
have noted, hedge fund EJF Debt Opportunities Fund has been reaping in profits by 
‘making bets on how lenders would alter their capital structure’ in the aftermath of 
Dodd-Frank.
102
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IV. CRITIQUE OF DODD-FRANK AND EMIR-MIFID II 
 
In this section I engage in a more critical analysis of the regulatory provisions 
as enacted in the US and in Europe and suggest that they suffer from a number of 
deeper structural flaws as a result of the assumptions upon which they are predicated. 
 
 
i. Reproducing problematic assumptions 
 
At the end of Chapter Two, I provided a sketch of a speculative market logic 
that I suggested has resulted from processes of financialisation brought about under 
neoliberalism. My concern at that juncture was to explain how practices of food 
commodity speculation could have impacted on underlying spot prices, and why 
traditional tools of causal economic analysis were unable to account for this new 
market dynamic. I noted that with the ascendency of neoliberalism came the 
ascendency of neoclassical economics. While not able to explain recent patterns of 
commodity price volatility, this economic theory produced a powerful set of 
assumptions about how financial markets operate that have been used to discredit the 
argument that speculation contributed to the price volatility. What I am now seeking 
to demonstrate is how this neoliberally-conditioned neoclassical vision of how 
financial markets operate is being reproduced in Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID II. By 
that I mean that the regulations fail to adequately contend with the dynamics of these 
markets, leaving the logic of speculation intact. 
 
The ‘neoliberal-neoclassical’ vision of financial markets to which I am 
referring has been identified in other scholarly work. As Julia Black has argued, ‘[t]he 
global financial crisis demonstrated that market actors, governments and regulators 
were operating on the basis of a set of understandings about how markets worked that 
were based in neoclassical economics, and in particular rational actor theory, which 
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were largely erroneous, with disastrous consequences’.103 Lord Turner, former 
Chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
104
 has made a similar 
diagnosis.
105
 The problematic features of this vision, made explicit by both Black and 
Turner, might be summarised as follows: assumptions relating to the rationality of 
market actors; overestimation of market actors’ risk-management and information 
gathering capacities; underestimation of the impact of their immediate and broader 
social environments on their trading decisions; misplaced faith in the benefits of price 
discovery, liquidity, mathematical modelling and product innovation; and a limited 
approach to intervention focused principally on the prevention of monopolies.
106
 
 
Numerous academics have charted the rise of neoliberalism and have attempted 
to lend specificity to the label commonly used to describe the policy climate since the 
1980s.
107
 Some, notably Ha-Joon Chang, have sought to explain the relationship 
between neoliberalism and neoclassical economics. Chang describes neoliberalism as 
‘an alliance’ between neoclassical economics, which provides most of the analytical 
tools, and what he terms ‘the Austrian-libertarian tradition’, which informs its political 
and moral philosophy.
108
 What is missing is an account of how the rise of 
neoliberalism led to the oversimplified neoclassical wisdom that resulted in a ‘lax’ 
regulatory treatment of financial markets — identified by Turner and Black — in the 
run up to the global crisis. Whilst neoclassical economics is almost universally cited 
as forming a core part of the economic theory underpinning neoliberalism, the precise 
nature of the relationship between this principally micro-economic theoretical 
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discipline and the neoliberal movement is perhaps less frequently elaborated. A few 
thoughts on this relationship will now be offered. 
 
a. Neoliberal-neoclassical market vision  
 
As discussed in the last chapter, at the heart of neoclassical economics is a 
theory of how prices are formed in a market economy that is constructed around a set 
of central assumptions about how people behave in markets. Friedrich Hayek used this 
neoclassical pricing mechanism to translate his conviction that free markets 
safeguarded human freedom into a persuasive argument that markets are self-
regulating and that prices act as a mechanism for social coordination that surpasses the 
capabilities of centralised regulation. Developing this further, Milton Friedman 
developed the macro-economic theory of monetarism, which contended that even 
during times of recession and high inflation governments should not intervene as 
intervention would be likely to make things worse.
109
 Through the macro-economic 
theories of Hayek and Friedman, the characteristics of the rational economic actor of 
neoclassical economics were translated into a broader force of market rationality that 
precluded the government from actively steering the market towards social goals. 
Since the 1970s, furthered by Fama’s work on the efficient market hypothesis, 
financial markets have come to function as the font of this broader market 
rationality.
110
 Regarded as ‘the epitome of neoclassical economics in their 
operation’,111 these markets have come to be viewed as both an authority on value and 
as an arena in which risk can be accurately identified, measured, priced and 
predicted.
112
  
 
Neoclassical economics is the theory operationalised to make the neoliberal 
political agenda of securing the freedom of the individual by restricting the powers of 
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government a reality. Under neoliberalism, this school of economic thought has been 
positioned as a science that is capable of producing economic truths. It has also been a 
building block for the creation of modern global financial markets that appear to self-
regulate and fulfil a broader regulatory function in terms of regulating market 
fluctuations and coordinating economic actors. The result, as identified by Turner and 
Black, is that financial markets were effectively left to self-regulate and entrusted with 
the regulation of the broader economy in the years leading up to the global financial 
crisis. Critically, however, what this agenda overlooked was that underpinning 
financial markets is the same set of basic assumptions about individual market 
behaviour. As Dan Awrey has argued, along with the efficient market hypothesis, 
many of the other ‘canonical theories’ of financial economics including modern 
portfolio theory and capital asset pricing models share a ‘common and highly stylized 
view of financial markets — one characterized by, inter alia, perfect information, the 
absence of transaction costs, and rational market participants’.113 The problem with 
treating financial markets as though they self-regulated was that the theory that helped 
to make them appear self-regulating treated economic actors as though they behaved 
in a certain way when, in fact, they didn’t — or, at least, not always. The result, in 
Turner’s estimation, was the propagation of an ‘over-simplified and dogmatic 
adherence to neoclassical economic assumptions’ by the ‘reasonably intellectual men 
and women who are employed in the policymaking functions of central banks, 
regulators and governments and in the risk management departments of banks’.114 In 
other words, Black’s ‘erroneous neoclassical understandings’ or what I term 
‘neoliberal-neoclassical’ market vision.  
 
In his Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public Policy, given at 
Cambridge University in 2011, Lord Turner was speaking as the Chairman of the 
FSA. Recognition of the flaws in the neoclassical vision inhering in the decades 
before the crisis has thus been accorded at the highest levels of the regulatory 
establishment. Nevertheless, moving beyond analysis of the substantive provisions 
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and focusing on the broader theoretical underpinnings of the US and EU financial 
market regulations suggests that this dominant wisdom continues to hold.  
 
b. Restricted vision, restricted reform 
 
As discussed at the end of Part III, the principal regulatory measures 
implemented to respond to speculatively-conditioned commodity price volatility — 
position limits — are grounded in a market-power analysis of how flows of 
speculative trade have impacted on food prices. The measures seek to limit the 
monopoly that any given financial entity can exercise within a contract cycle for a 
commodity derivative. The propensity to attribute market imperfections to instances 
of monopoly is a neoclassical proclivity. Another such proclivity is to assume that 
greater transparency will improve matters by enabling ‘rational’ market actors to 
produce the ‘right’ prices, fulfilling their price discovery function. This diagnosis and 
treatment of the problem is fundamentally at odds with theory from behavioural 
economics and evidence from market practice — discussed in Chapter Two — as to 
how food prices could have been impacted by speculation in the first place. The 
incongruous result is that regulators are seeking to respond to market phenomena that 
can only be explained by alternative theories on market dynamics using tools 
informed by neoclassical financial theory — the teachings of which would preclude 
the possibility of speculation impacting on underlying commodities in the first 
instance.  
 
The regulations further reproduce problematic neoliberal-neoclassical 
assumptions about financial markets in their focus on problematic individuals or types 
of market participant. As Arnsperger and Varoufakis have argued, a hallmark of 
neoclassical economic theory is methodological individualism. The neoclassicist 
‘follows the watchmaker’s method’ — like the watchmaker’s cogs and wheels, 
individual agents continue to be studied independently of the social whole which their 
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actions help bring about.
115
 The exigent regulatory project of delineating between 
problematic ‘speculators’ and beneficial ‘hedgers’ repeats this trend and treats 
practices of speculation and hedging as distinct, when market practice demonstrates 
they are inextricably linked. As discussed in Chapter Two, the motivations of both 
financials and commercial hedgers are porous, with large agricultural conglomerates 
uniquely placed to play both sides of the market. The regulatory frameworks, which 
are intent on painstakingly carving out categories and exemptions for these types of 
market actor, neglect critical changes in how these actors engage with markets. 
Hedgers and speculators continue to be studied in isolation from the changing 
institutional structures, trading cultures, and market power in which individual traders 
are able to act as a collective force impacting on food prices. Under the lenses of 
Dodd-Frank and MiFID II the problem continues to be with ‘irrational’ speculators or 
criminal manipulators
116
 — viewed independently of the broader social conditions 
which frame their actions — who are guilty of distorting prices away from their ‘true’ 
values. 
 
The notion of restoring markets to their ‘rational’ state further reinforces the 
fiction produced by neoclassical economic theory that traders can ‘discover’ the real 
fundamental values of commodities by analysing forces of supply and demand. As 
Alessandrini has noted, the regulatory response to perceived speculative excesses 
‘remains predicated on a conceptual separation between the real and the financial 
sphere of the economy which does not attend to the complex value-making processes 
to which financial derivatives contribute’.117 A weight of other theory on value 
formation, including Alessandrini’s own work on the critical contribution of 
derivatives to this process, rejects the possibility that there are any such things as 
‘real’ values for commodities to be restored to. From these perspectives, the prices at 
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which food commodities were sold in 2007-08 and 2010-11 could, in fact, be regarded 
as the only ‘real’ market prices as these prices were accurate reflections of the social 
values informing the actions of financial traders — prices understood, as per 
Durkheim, as ‘social facts’.118 
 
The regulations also display a substantial neoclassical bias in the assumption 
that, by ‘fixing’ financial markets, desirable social ends, such as stable commodity 
prices, will follow. Overwhelmingly, the focus of the Dodd-Frank and MiFID II 
regimes has centred on tackling systemic risk and restoring stability in financial 
markets to reassure and attract investors. The goal appears to be that of enabling an 
ongoing and globally competitive trade in derivatives but within the confines of a 
systemically secure market framework — an objective that, if attained, it is presumed, 
will eventually result in the stabilisation of food prices and the attainment of social 
goals by proxy. This is a hallmark of neoliberal vision of markets. While a political 
priority at the outset of the regulatory process, concerns about commodity price 
volatility have been progressively marginalised as the reforms have taken shape. The 
global food crisis continues to be conceptualised as something separate from the 
global financial crisis. That is to say, it continues to be conceptualised as something 
that other agencies, other international institutions, must deal with. The possibility that 
the conditions of profitability in modern financial markets are dependent upon short-
term, index-fund and herding trading strategies, and that it may not be possible to 
retain these market features and attract investors without putting food prices in 
jeopardy, doesn’t appear to be acknowledged.  
 
Despite the trumpeting of a transformative overhaul of regulatory structures 
sounded out in recognition of flaws in the pre-crisis trust in the self-regulatory 
capacities of financial markets, the new regulations appear nonetheless to be largely 
attuned to a neoclassical score. Although a return to conspicuous state intervention 
and hands-on market regulation comprises a break with the neoclassical tradition, the 
regulations are largely constructed on its theoretical foundation. The protagonists are 
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conceived as rational economic actors who, if only shielded from disruptive 
monopolists, purged of an unruly contingent of ‘irrational’ speculators, and urged 
towards prudence by conscientious regulators, will transact to restore the market to a 
state of equilibrium. Rather than questioning the fundamental dynamics of financial 
markets and the social impact that they are producing, regulators have become ‘mired 
in the sea of small fixes to the system’.119 As the counterproductive tendencies 
registered above would attest, attempting to ‘repair and re-create the pre-crisis system 
by fixing the obvious defects’,120 the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID II reforms largely 
serve to transpose the pre-crisis market dynamics into new structures. The logic of 
speculation endures. 
 
 
ii. Reintroducing outdated regulations 
 
Neoliberal-neoclassical assumptions about the operation of financial markets 
are not the only aspect of the Dodd-Frank and EMIR-MiFID II regulations that is 
familiar. Those provisions that are concerned with commodity markets effectively 
reinstate regulatory measures adopted in the 1930s in response to concerns about 
excessive speculation and commodity price volatility. Position limits, classifications 
that distinguish ‘financial’ ‘speculators’ from ‘commercial’ hedgers, and the 
requirement that all derivatives be traded on regulated exchanges are all throw-backs 
to the English and American common law restrictions on ‘purely’ speculative 
trading,
121
 many of which were formalised as part of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 in 
the US, and later re-enacted in 1936 as the CEA. While these provisions did help to 
curb the speculative trade in ‘off-exchange’ commodity futures during much of the 
20
th
 century, reinstating them now fundamentally fails to account for the fact that 
these markets, the global economy, and the world at large, have changed in the 
interim. 
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a. Old rules, new markets 
 
As discussed at the end of Chapter Two, there has been a profound shift in 
global economic structures since the ascendency of finance in the 1980s. New 
markets, a new financial services industry, new instruments, and new practices have 
been brought into being. The monumental size of the OTC derivatives market is 
routinely emphasised in the literature on derivatives and their regulation. Most 
commonly expressed in statistical terms — ‘[n]otional amounts of all types of OTC 
contracts stood at $683.7 trillion at the end of June 2008’122 — commonly 
underweighted are the more material dimensions of this market. Expressing the 
volume of OTC contracts by the trillion fails to convey the real world implications of 
this trade. The OTC market is not just a web of contracts or a statistic. It comprises the 
creation of new companies and jobs, new relationships with clients, new offices built 
and new computers bought, new software programmes developed and patented, new 
legal departments set up and staffed. All of this and more besides has been brought 
into being to facilitate the market in OTC derivatives and to make it operate 
effectively. This comprises a huge amount of investment in the operation of OTC 
markets in general, and a further specialised industry in commodity derivatives, by a 
huge web of investors that extends far beyond the traders carrying out the trade. 
Whilst some of these relationships, spaces, and innovations can be adapted and put to 
other uses, this still comprises a hefty constituency with a very strong interest in 
keeping the speculative trade in OTC derivatives in business.  
 
Also underweighted by regulators attempting to apply old rules to this new 
market is the structural shift from production toward finance as the main engine of 
accumulation in the UK and US.
123
 The US economy and, even more so, the UK 
economy are now heavily dependent for revenue on financial services, and derivatives 
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form a significant part of this industry.
124
 While more traditional and productive 
investment strategies are positioned as alternatives to the casino capitalism of the 
1980s, effecting such investments on the domestic front is less straightforward than 
might be imagined. Overwhelmingly, manufacturing and retailing operations have 
moved abroad since the 1970s and 1980s, meaning that it is no longer so easy for 
financial investors to channel capital into production, at least domestically. Other 
economies — India, China, Brazil — are now serious rivals in the fields of 
information technology, manufacturing, and agricultural production.
125
 Critics of 
neoliberalism, of its manifestation in Thatcherism in the UK, and of the discourse of  
‘comparative advantage’, have condemned the outsourcing of manufacturing to less 
regulated zones and the devastating social impact that shifts towards a services 
economy conditioned, both at home and abroad.
126
 Before the global financial and 
food crises, what appears not to have been contemplated is the flip-side of that coin — 
that governments in the UK, US, and in other prosperous nations might be inclined to 
return to earlier modes of production only to find themselves stuck. As well as facing 
competition from other emerging economies, moving away from speculative finance 
towards productive forms of financial investment requires contending with the forces 
of liquefied, previously immobile, capital wrought by liberalisation, securitisation, and 
other changes that have enabled it to circulate faster.
127
 If derivatives are the solution 
to this financial risk, and derivative markets rely on speculative financial investment 
to provide liquidity, how can productive investments be made without speculative 
activity? 
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b. New mentalities 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, what has also altered over the past decades of 
neoliberal governance and processes of financialisation is the mindset of market 
actors, both within financial markets, and more broadly. Increasingly, market actors 
have been structured into a mode of speculative engagement that, as well as 
predisposing them towards certain economic strategies, produces a particular response 
to regulation. This speculative rationale and this drive to create more efficient 
pathways for realising profit were a key force conditioning the development of the 
market in OTC derivatives. Under the logic of speculation, imbued with a drive to 
seek efficient means of ‘profiting without producing’, procedural and regulatory 
requirements for trade are an impediment to be avoided. The logic of speculation can 
be understood to produce a necessary response to regulation, that of regulatory 
evasion. The rational response under extant logics of market operation is to engage in 
a calculative appraisal of the regulations and to respond in a manner that is least 
detrimental to efficiency and profitability. If it is more cost effective to devise a new 
instrument, cut a regulatory corner, or invest overseas, this is likely to determine the 
trader’s response. 
 
All of these arguments can be read as an endorsement for the ongoing 
operation of OTC derivative markets and seen as support for neoclassical complaints 
of clumsy attempts at government regulation of markets. That is not my aim here. 
What I am seeking to expose are the serious limitations of the current reforms which 
— indulging in a little cynicism — could be said to amount to little more than 
providing an instruction manual, a higher premium for use, and a few ‘safety’ checks 
for what Warren Buffet described in 2003 as ‘financial weapons of mass 
destruction’.128 
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V. LIMITS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Limits to the ability of centralised regulators to regulate the financial system, or 
the state to regulate the economy, are typically pointed out by those with a preference 
for economic laissez-faire and the promotion of self-regulating markets. In support of 
their complaint, such critics have pointed to the inefficacy of regulators, the tendency 
to get caught up in games of ‘regulatory cat-and-mouse’, and the phenomenon of 
regulatory capture — propagated by George Stigler in the 1970s.129 Similar 
suggestions have been made in the context of the recent reforms by commentators, 
suggesting that they underweight the fact that regulators will be ‘out-smarted by 
smarter and better-paid practitioners’.130 What I wish to suggest here is that those who 
are not generally inclined towards this view — those on the political left who are 
opposed to economic laissez-faire and the promotion of self-regulating markets — 
may have to concede that, in current conditions, many of these critiques of centralised 
regulation are well-founded. This is not to suggest, of course, that critics of 
neoliberalism must give up on their political convictions, but it is to argue that it 
might be more effective for them to direct their critical energies towards thinking 
more creatively and finding alternative ways — including uses of law — through 
which economic behaviours can be altered. 
 
Beyond the instant regulations just discussed, I want to suggest that financial 
regulation in general has notable limitations as an apparatus of reform. First, however, 
it is vital to acknowledge that financial regulation comprises a diverse set of practices 
and cannot accurately be conceptualised as one thing. This is evident from an 
extensive literature debating the merits of different types of financial regulation from 
more rigid ‘rules-based’ regulation to the ‘art’ of flexible, ‘principles-based’ 
regulation, and further what have been termed ‘new governance’ techniques such as 
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‘risk-based regulation, reliance on internal management and controls, and market-
based regulation’.131 These different approaches manifest in a plurality of different 
regulatory forms: prudential regulation, capital adequacy requirements, investment 
guidelines or restrictions, and risk management procedures being just a few. Indeed, 
derivatives themselves are a form of regulation (I will address the significance of this 
in the next chapter). Nevertheless, all of these regulatory tools share a common goal 
— that of making financial markets work ‘more efficiently’. Relatedly, they all 
continue to presuppose the existence of financial markets and are, to a significant 
extent, designed to preserve their current scheme of functions: raising and allocating 
capital, enabling risk management via the use of derivatives, and facilitating price 
discovery. What this fundamentally fails to account for, I argue, are the implications 
when financial markets worldwide are increasingly becoming the dominant engine of 
economic growth for national economies. This would surely this would imply that 
making financial markets work efficiently and preserving their scheme of functions 
involves safeguarding those financial practices — speculative trading, derivatives, 
index funds — that make this economic motor profitable.  
 
As intimated by its etymology, the meaning of the verb ‘to regulate’ is to ‘to 
govern by restriction’.132 This, I suggest, makes the suitability of financial regulation 
as a tool to tackle speculatively-conditioned food price volatility vulnerable to two 
further critiques. Firstly, by regulating to restrict ‘excessive’ volumes of speculation 
— or by regulating the trade in derivatives at all — reforms can operate to legitimate 
that proportion of speculation permitted and the ongoing trade in these instruments. 
Second, common to the spectrum of financial regulation practices is a pervasive 
failure to reckon with the tendency for regulation to make things worse, channelling 
problematic behaviours into more diverse structures and operating to incentivise even 
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more ‘socially suboptimal over-innovation’.133 These dynamics of complexity, 
regulation and innovation are being explored by Dan Awrey, who has offered a 
detailed analysis of how more complex products such as synthetic exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs) and collateral swaps were developed by the financial industry for 
precisely this motive.
134
 Already today, one can invest in weather derivatives, freight 
derivatives, emissions derivatives, inflation derivatives, catastrophe derivatives, and 
election derivatives.
135
 This garners a sense of what has already become not just 
commoditised, but financialised in economies in which finance is an important engine 
of economic growth. Where is all of this speculative capital going to go if — through 
whatever form of regulation — it is restricted and lesser volumes of it invested in 
OTC commodity derivatives? 
 
As I made clear in the Introduction, this thesis does not seek to provide 
solutions to the problems that my analysis uncovers. Whatever solutions are pursued, 
however, this discussion in this chapter leaves little doubt that, if any change in the 
operative logic of financial markets is to come about, it can only come about through a 
prior shift in the broader political consciousness. To be sure, some proposals of a 
regulatory character, such as a ‘Tobin Tax’ on short-term financial transactions, might 
potentially be more effective in shifting financial motives and changing the logic of 
these markets.
136
 Debate over the possibilities of such a measure — and, critically, the 
rate of the tax to be imposed — is ongoing. Were such a tax to be implemented, quite 
considerable changes in the operations of the financial services industry might follow. 
Yet this would not solely accrue from the impact of the regulation itself. Rather, the 
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fact that such a tax had been agreed upon and successfully implemented in the first 
place would betoken a shift in the political wind away from the market values 
propagated under neoliberalism.   
 
Overall, my argument is that altering the logicof speculation cannot be effected 
by regulatory initiatives alone. Additional measures are needed that reorient the 
political economy in which financial markets are embedded in order to recover the 
opportunity to profit from producing, or indeed in order to allow another mode of 
production to arise. Position limits — held up as a regulatory success from the 1930s 
— were not the only factor behind the stabilisation of food prices during that era. 
Other measures that actively stabilised food prices through legislation were 
introduced, a significant example being the holding of public stocks. Persuasive 
arguments about the vital need for combining ‘financial’ regulations with changes in 
the ‘productive matrix’ of the region have been advanced by Donatella Alessandrini, 
among others.
137
 In focusing on the market (and market failure), neoclassical 
economics conditions a false perspective in which, as Ha-Joon Chang has also argued, 
we ‘lose sight of a large chunk of the economic system and concentrate on one, albeit 
important, part only’.138 The very premise of financial regulation — rules to govern 
but one part of the broader economy in isolation from the rest — repeats this 
tendency. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the regulatory initiatives that campaigners 
hope will tackle the problem of speculatively-conditioned food price volatility are 
inadequate. Not only do they replicate a problematic ‘neoliberal-neoclassical’ 
understanding of how financial markets function, but the regulations largely attempt to 
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reinstate old regulatory measures that don’t account for fundamental changes effected 
under the neoliberal policy agenda over the last three decades. In order to be effective, 
regulatory measures would have to be accompanied by wider changes in the political 
stance towards markets by governments, and complemented with policy shifts relating 
to political economy. All in all, I would suggest, those who continue to focus their 
energies and place their hopes in financial regulation as the solution to these dilemmas 
fall foul of a predisposition common to those concerned to affect social change — a 
tendency explored by Susan Marks in her work on the perils of what she terms ‘false 
contingency’.139 Ambitions for change can be impeded, Marks suggests, by a tendency 
to critically underweight the extent to which that change has to unfold within a context 
that includes systematic constraints and pressures.
140
  
 
Moving away from a focus on law as the solution — on the ‘regulatory’ arm of 
the law — I now want to focus on law as enabler of speculative behaviour, as 
constituter of the market in OTC derivatives.  
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Chapter Four 
 
‘OTC’, ‘Financial’ Innovation, and  
Food Commodity Speculation 
 
 
 
 
Overwhelmingly, the growth of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market 
and the speculative behaviour that has flourished in these spaces is understood to have 
taken place outside of the purview of law and regulation. The OTC market is 
frequently portrayed as a ‘regulatory void’,1 or a ‘legal vacuum’,2 in which, prior to 
the introduction of new regulations in 2010, ‘almost no law applied’.3 It is 
conceptualised as an environment in which speculators were able to ‘run wild’,4 
reaping enormous profits from a trade in ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’5 to 
the detriment of financial and food price stability. This leads to the assumption that 
improvements in regulation, and particularly the introduction of internationally 
harmonised provisions, are the solution to these market woes. Yet, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, new regulations devised for this market not only fail to address the 
threat that speculative activity poses for food price stability; they may also serve to 
drive speculative practices into more diverse structures aggravating trends towards 
product innovation and financial complexity.  
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Shifting the focus away from the remedies law might extend in terms of fixing 
financial markets and constraining speculation, this chapter will approach the 
significance of law in this context from an alternative perspective. Taking issue with 
the popular presentation of the OTC market, I will argue that this ‘regulatory vacuum’ 
is, in fact, a legally constituted arena.  ‘OTC’, I will demonstrate, functions as a legal 
fiction that obscures the nature of the role that law and the state play in relation to this 
market. Moving on to take a closer look at derivative instruments themselves, I will 
suggest that the dominant conception of these products as ‘financial’ technologies is 
equally misleading. I will argue that these instruments must also be understood as 
legal technologies — their social destructiveness as much a consequence of legal, as 
of financial innovations. Contrary to widespread belief, law isn’t lagging behind the 
financial curve, so to speak. As this chapter will seek to demonstrate, more often than 
not, it has been one step ahead.  
 
 In Part I, I will explore how the arguments of those who view the OTC market 
as the paradigmatic self-regulating marketplace and those concerned to subject it to 
centralised regulation have coalesced to portray it as a regulatory void. Challenging 
those who present its emergence as spontaneous, or attribute it to legislative acts of 
deregulation, in Part II I will argue that the origins of the OTC market lie with a legal 
device known as ‘offshore’ finance. Extrapolating from this argument, in Part III I 
will suggest that not only can the origins of OTC derivatives be traced to this legal 
fiction, but that the label ‘OTC’ functions in a similar vein. Drawing on the work of 
scholars including Annelise Riles
6
 and Rachel Harvey,
7
 I will demonstrate that the 
unregulated — or self-regulating — quality of the OTC marketplace is  
a work of legal construction. In Part IV I will move on to challenge the dominant 
characterisation of the products traded within this market as ‘financial’ innovations. I 
will argue that modern day derivatives should be more accurately conceptualised as 
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legal technologies — as complex assemblages of neoclassical assumption and legal 
fiction — that, by creating a permissive legal environment for speculation, have 
produced a market that privileges the needs of financial investors over wider society 
when it comes to food.  
 
 
I. ‘REGULATORY VOID’? 
 
The majority of legal academics writing about OTC instruments are grappling 
with the question of how best to regulate them. In these scholar’s accounts, and within 
the broader literature on the recent global food and financial crises, law only enters the 
picture in the search for solutions. It is the remedial tool used to fix financial markets; 
it is regulation. Where law is deemed relevant to events within financial markets prior 
to 2007, its significance is predominantly conceptualised in terms of its absence. It is 
common to read descriptions of the OTC markets containing ‘a host of exotic 
unregulated “invisible” financial instruments’,8 or to read of the ‘regulatory stasis’ that 
accompanied the precipitous growth and proliferation of OTC derivatives.
9
 Michael 
Greenberger exemplifies this interpretation in his article ‘Overwhelming a Financial 
Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight’.10 Whilst Greenberger’s article 
makes the most explicit use of this trope, the image of a regulatory black hole or a 
legal void resonates in much of the press coverage and academic writing on this 
subject.
11
  
 
This is reinforced by a broader discourse on the relationship between law and 
the development of the global economy and global financial markets in particular. As 
political leaders have lamented, ‘our 21st century global economy remains regulated 
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largely by outdated 20
th
 century laws’.12 Along with technological innovation, 
jurisdictional challenges are frequently invoked to explain the failure of law to control 
the unruly antics of global market actors. As David Gerber argues, global markets are 
‘managed ineffectively, from the margins’ by regimes of national laws that do not 
always converge.
13
 When it comes to derivatives, one is given to understand, the law 
hasn’t caught up yet. These descriptions, along with other adjectives repeatedly 
deployed to characterise the OTC markets — ‘dark’, ‘private’, ‘opaque’, ‘complex’, 
‘anarchic’ —  condition a particular and now widely prevalent understanding about 
how these markets emerged, how they operate on a day-to-day basis, and how 
speculative practices have flourished within them. This commonplace conception of 
OTC markets will now be elaborated in greater detail. 
 
 
i. OTC impressions 
 
For many within the financial sector, the OTC arena is the paradigmatic self-
regulating market place. It emerged spontaneously as a response to the evolution of 
the global economy to service businesses that required protection from the forces of 
globalisation.
14
 As bespoke instruments tailored to particular risk-mitigation needs, 
OTC instruments represent the natural evolution of derivatives from less flexible 
exchange-traded futures. These instruments are regarded as a technology of risk 
management that enable the financial sector to self-regulate. While they may be used 
in service of it, OTC derivatives are said to be predominantly traded between 
sophisticated financial actors and bear little relation to the underlying productive 
economy. They are the preserve of financial professionals — an informed trading 
elite. Critically, from this ‘pro-self-regulatory’ perspective, as I shall call it, 
speculative activity is the expression of natural human appetites for maximising self-
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interest. Taken altogether, on this view, the social consequences of the market in OTC 
instruments and practices of speculation are a function of economic necessity.  
 
 In contrast to this is the view of what I will call the ‘pro-centralised-regulatory 
camp’. In their efforts to make the case for reform, campaigning groups such as 
Global Justice Now, Oxfam, and SOMO have been key players in conjuring this 
image of the OTC space as a regulatory void.
15
 They have sought to present the OTC 
market as an unregulated, anarchic trading arena in which greedy speculators have 
taken on extraordinary levels of risk, exploiting loopholes in the law. Academics and 
journalists writing on the need for regulatory reform have made similar gestures.
16
 
Steve Suppan at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) has described 
OTC instruments as ‘transactions between private individuals’ over which 
governments ‘had, and still have, no authority, or even verified information’.17 In 
terms of the emergence of the market, the pro-centralised-regulatory camp tends to 
either follow a pro-self-regulatory line of the ‘evolution’ of the OTC market — the 
critical difference being that this is seen as a negative thing — or to argue that the 
OTC arena was created through acts of deregulation. Nonetheless, an element of 
spontaneity does tend to be evoked owing to a tendency to leave the ‘forces’ that gave 
rise to the derivatives industry in the first place un-interrogated and the suggestion 
that, with the legislative decision to deregulate, the OTC market is spontaneously 
expanded into a monumental global market. Arguing in this vein, these NGOs and 
academics have inadvertently run some of the same arguments as the pro-self-
regulatory camp.  
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While many of their claims coincide, there are nonetheless critical differences 
of opinion informing the pro-self-regulatory and pro-centralised-regulatory 
perspectives. Most significantly, from pro-centralised regulatory perspectives, the 
OTC market has emerged primarily to service not the underlying economy, but the 
needs of financial investors — often designated ‘speculators’. While likely to agree 
that the OTC arena operates at a distance from the underlying economy, the central 
concern of anti-speculation groups is that the distance between these fields of 
economic activity is illusory. In fact, it is this condition of illusory autonomy that they 
regard as so problematic — financial traders are seen to be transacting in ignorance of 
both market fundamentals and the actual impact that their activities have on 
underlying markets, with disastrous social consequences.  
 
It is as a result of the co-constitutive claims of these different contingents that 
the image of the OTC market as a regulatory void has solidified in the media and 
within academic scholarship on this subject. As well as serving to enhance its 
‘unregulated’ quality, both accounts also coalesce in presenting the OTC market as 
one that is global, private, and hence stateless. My argument in this chapter is that this 
presentation is fundamentally inaccurate and operates to misrepresent the true 
character of these markets and their relationship to national legal and political 
institutions. To begin this work, it is first necessary to flesh out precisely how pro-
self-regulatory and pro-centralised-regulatory perspectives on the OTC market 
understand its relationship with law and the state. 
 
 
ii. OTC, law, and the state 
 
In the accounts of pro-self-regulatory conceptions of the OTC market, law is 
understood to be an intrinsic part of the market mechanism. However, the law that is 
visible in these accounts is private law that serves as the enabler of market activity. It 
oils the wheels of the market mechanism allowing market actors to follow their 
instincts to ‘truck and barter’ and transact in service of their own self-interest. Thus, 
179 
while such accounts of the markets recognise that property law, contract law, and a 
host of other facilitative legal regimes and devices such as insolvency law, money, 
and payments systems, are integral to the functioning of the market, they are seen to 
be neutral.
18
 This is also the case with regards to private international law, which 
fulfils this function on a global level. What is not ‘there’, under this conception, is the 
state. Neoliberal-neoclassical conceptions regard the OTC arena as the paradigmatic 
self-regulating market place. Instead of clumsy state regulations, the OTC space is 
deemed to operate through a far more sophisticated, less bureaucratic, self-regulatory 
system of risk management — of which derivatives form a central component. 
Contrasting this with pro-centralised-regulatory accounts, the focus is overwhelmingly 
on the law around the market mechanism. Often, the law within it is not really seen to 
be there in any significant sense — hence the portrayal of this arena as a regulatory 
void or legal vacuum. Law, under this lens, is public law — it is state regulation, or 
global regulatory initiatives, that act as a break on the mechanisms of the market, 
controlling ‘excessive’ speculation. Pro-centralised-regulatory accounts coincide with 
the pro-self-regulatory accounts in presenting this as arena in which the state is largely 
absent. The critical difference is that the former argue that it should be brought back 
in.  
 
I take issue with both of these presentations. Both of these narratives perpetuate 
outdated notions of what states are and what they do, and what regulation is, and what 
it does. In both accounts, whether by virtue of a tendency to focus on the law around 
the mechanism, ignoring the law within it, or owing to an assumption that the private 
law within the mechanism is neutral, the law within the OTC arena is often rendered 
invisible. When it is seen to be there, it isn’t seen to be doing anything. This leads to a 
tendency to focus the search for solutions on regulation of the market, rather than 
looking at which laws are making the market operate as it does, and how those laws 
might be changed in order to effect change. Bringing this law into focus, I will argue 
that the law within the mechanism is neither ‘neutral’, nor ‘private’. Instead, I will 
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suggest, it fulfils a number of critical functions, the cumulative effect of which is to 
absolve states from responsibility for socially-corrosive activity within the OTC 
market while simultaneously empowering speculative agencies, helping to structure 
the market logic of speculation I identified in Chapter Two.  
 
Before focusing on the role of law in the operation of the OTC arena, it is first 
necessary consider, or re-consider, its role in the emergence of this market. 
 
  
II. ‘OFFSHORE’ ORIGINS 
 
Countering the suggestion that the OTC market evolved spontaneously is not 
especially challenging. As already discussed in Chapter Two, the expansion of the 
OTC market place was quite incontestably occasioned as a consequence of legislative 
acts of deregulation. The Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986
19
 in the UK and the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) 2000
20
 in the US dismantled 
statutory and common law rules put into place expressly to prevent the speculative 
trade in ‘off-exchange’ futures instruments21 — rules that were put in place owing to 
concern that speculation in commodity futures could lead to price spikes.
22
 Focusing 
principally on the US, a number of scholars and journalists including Bruce 
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Carruthers,
23
 Lynn Stout
24
 and Gillian Tett
25
 have chronicled the decade-long tussle 
between the financial services industry and state regulatory agencies over the legal 
status of OTC contracts. Carruthers illustrates how the financial services industry 
made use of the spectre of legal uncertainty to argue for legislation permitting a trade 
in OTC instruments.
26
 Stout demonstrates how the industry engaged judges in a 
project of differentiating derivatives from contracts for difference, eventually 
procuring blanket permission for OTC derivatives under the CFMA.
27
 Tett focuses on 
the personalities and politics involved, foregrounding the practices of the financial 
services industry in designing internal rules to demonstrate that they were managing 
risk themselves and didn’t require centralised supervision.28 Stout is the most explicit 
in her argument about the role that law played in the emergence of the OTC market. 
She concludes that the global financial crisis was ‘the direct and foreseeable … 
consequence of the CFMA's sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-old legal 
constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter derivatives’.29  
 
This argument is extremely important. Not only does Stout draw attention to 
critical causal linkages between neoliberal policy making, the rise of speculation in 
derivatives, and the global financial crisis, she challenges the notion that the crisis was 
due to ‘innovations’ in the markets or ‘the legal system's failure to “keep pace” with 
finance’.30 As she goes on to reinforce, ‘[t]he crisis was caused, first and foremost, by 
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changes in the law’.31 While of critical significance in terms of foregrounding the role 
of law not as a remedy to crisis-conditioning speculative practices but as their enabler, 
the focus on deregulation as the watershed moment of the OTC market is misleading. 
It coincides with the problematic presentation of the OTC market as an ‘unregulated’ 
trading arena — albeit one that was created, as opposed to evolving naturally. What is 
more, this line of argument leads into the trap of calling for re-regulation as the 
solution to these problems, the drawbacks of which I outlined in Chapter Three.  
 
The market in OTC derivatives pre-dates both the FSA and the CFMA. The 
first such transaction occurred in 1981, when Salomon Brothers arranged a currency 
swap between IBM and the World Bank.
32
 It was in order to protect the pre-existing 
investments in OTC instruments that the derivatives industry, represented by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), clamoured for blanket 
deregulation.
33
 Neither Tett nor Stout claims that the CFMA created the market in 
OTC instruments. Both, along with Carruthers, demonstrate that processes of 
deregulation were more incremental, beginning with the Treasury Amendment of 
1974, which protected certain futures and swaps from the CFTC’s regulatory 
oversight, and the CFTC’s own relaxing of position limits.34 However, their emphasis 
on legislative acts of deregulation critically under-estimates both earlier and later legal 
developments in the market in OTC instruments. I will now bring these other legal 
developments into focus.  
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i. Liberalisation before deregulation 
. 
Before the trade in financial derivatives could be deregulated by the FSA and 
the CFMA, it had to exist. Today it is difficult to imagine a global economy not 
characterised by price volatility in which values are constantly shifting in response to 
flows of financial capital. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine a global economy 
not serviced by a market in financial instruments managing the risks that arise from 
such market movements. Prior to the 1970s, however, the character of the global 
economy was quite different. Market movements were not so erratic, and ‘financial 
risk’, particularly emanating from fluctuating exchange rates, was not yet something 
from which commercial enterprises commonly required protection. Under the 
international gold standard, states committed to fix the prices of their domestic 
currencies to a specified amount of gold.
35
 Capital could move across borders, but its 
movement didn’t present the same spectrum of risks (and opportunities) as in 
contemporary global markets. It was not until the US suspended gold convertibility of 
the dollar in 1971 that fixed foreign exchange rates became a thing of the past, and a 
new market climate of instability and uncertainty — to which derivatives were 
positioned as the solution — emerged. If there was a watershed moment in the 
creation of the OTC derivatives market, I would argue this was it. The abandoning of 
the Bretton Woods system gave force to a new species of risk which the financial 
services industry is now dedicated to managing. The liberalisation moment thereby 
created an apparently legitimate economic role for speculation to service this new 
industry in risk management — one that was later leveraged by the financial services 
industry to bring about the deregulatory moment.  
 
Financial liberalisation was effected through legislative decisions on a 
multitude of levels. In leading Western states, it was largely negotiated through 
international institutions.
36
 The OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements 
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agreed in 1961 stipulates a number of legally binding rules relating to the progressive 
and non-discriminatory liberalisation of capital movements.
37
 Commitments to the 
progressive liberalisation of financial services were also included in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), entering into force in January 1995 as a 
result of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
38
 In the case of developing countries, 
liberalisation policies were pushed through via processes of structural adjustment.
39
 
The significance of these developments in conditioning a shift towards a more 
financialised and volatile economic order has generated a substantial literature.
40
 The 
factors precipitating it are, however, subject to dispute. Many narratives attribute the 
fall of the Bretton Woods architecture to the ‘forces’ of globalisation, and 
technological innovation in particular.
41
 Few have challenged the argument that 
derivatives were a timely development on the part of the financial services industry to 
respond to the challenges and needs of a liberalised global economy. I will now seek 
to do precisely this.  
 
 
ii. The Euromarkets, ‘Offshore’, and the origins of ‘OTC’ 
 
During the post-war period, a strict regime of capital controls that effectively 
‘caged’ international capital was implemented as part of the Bretton Woods 
consensus.
42
 This ensured that financial activity was largely conducted on a domestic 
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basis, and that capital flows into other countries were conducted, in the main, through 
official state channels. It was not possible, for example, for a British investor to buy 
American stocks and bonds.
43
  It was in this climate, over the course of the 1950s and 
1960s, that the ‘Euromarkets’ emerged. Financial institutions in Europe, principally in 
London, began processing transactions that enabled financial institutions in other 
jurisdictions to deposit funds in their home currency denominations — often US 
dollars (‘Eurodollars’) — and thereby circumnavigate restrictions on capital flows.44 
These offshore financial centres became marketplaces for new financial products and 
techniques.
45
  
 
Contemplating the role of law in this context, what leaps out initially is the 
familiar pattern exposed in Chapter Three — acts of regulation produce a 
corresponding act of evasion. However, the critical point to impress is that these acts 
of evasion were also constituted by law and encouraged by governments. As Eric 
Helleiner has underlined, despite claims to the contrary, the Euromarket was not a 
stateless market.
46
 Its existence was heavily dependent from the outset on state 
support, particularly from the UK and the US. The British Government solicited the 
market's growth on British soil through various regulatory and tax changes.
47
 Under 
the 1947 Exchange Control Act, some British banks were granted special permission 
to deal in foreign currency.
48
 In terms of the US, although it had the power to do so, it 
chose not to prevent its financiers from participating in the market. In fact, by the mid-
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1960s, US officials were in fact actively encouraging US banks and corporations to 
move their operations to the offshore London market.
49
  
 
Often identified as the predecessors to other ‘stateless’ markets like the OTC 
derivatives market, these early ‘offshore’ financial centres were, territorial speaking, 
‘very much onshore’.50 Offshore finance, as Ronan Palan has argued, ‘is essentially a 
legal device’ — the notion of ‘offshore’ is ‘a ‘fictional’ or purely ‘juridical space’.51 
The Euromarket achieved its offshore status because the state on whose territory it 
was originally located, the UK, ‘accepted, or even produced, an interpretation of its 
own laws that permitted the fiction that certain types of financial transaction did not 
take place within that territory’.52 It was in this arena of regulatory exception that 
international banking ceased to be solely ancillary to trade and investment, and began 
to ‘develop its own dynamic’.53 As Colin Read has highlighted, the 1960s saw the 
emergence of finance as a discipline of its own, out of the shadow of economics.
54
 
Crucial to this shift was the innovation of a new science of financial risk management 
that brought in an era of models, formulas, quantifiable methodologies, and 
sophisticated financial products, such as derivatives. As Helleiner has argued, it was 
the creation of the Euromarkets and the growth of ‘private’ international financial 
activity within these ‘offshore’ centres that motivated the facilitative technological 
developments and increasingly speculative behaviours that proved disruptive of the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.
55
 While the International Monetary 
Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the first futures exchange 
expressly created for the trading of financial markets, was not officially launched until 
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some months after the US ‘went off gold’,56 the development of financial techniques 
to protect commerce clearly predates the taking of that decision.
57
  
 
As well as obfuscating the role that the pre-configured ‘solution’ of derivatives 
played in enabling this policy decision, what also slides from view is the role of the 
state in these processes. All that is visible is the law around the mechanism — the 
regulatory arm of the state intervening first to remove capital controls, and, later, to 
deregulate — and the state’s role in that. The fact that the actions of the UK and the 
US set it all in motion, kicking off a new dynamic in financial activity that developed 
on the margins of the existing regulatory order, but came eventually to overtake it, is 
no longer visible. Critically, this also upsets the portrayal of the OTC space as a 
regulatory void. While deregulation did remove regulation in the form of existing 
centralised controls, this depended on trust in the ability of the financial services 
industry to manage risk and ‘self-regulate’. In the post-crisis era, these instruments are 
overwhelmingly discussed as the object of regulation. What this elides is that 
derivatives are themselves regulatory instruments; they were part of a new order of 
‘self-’ or ‘private-’ regulation that established the modern global financial system. As 
the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate, however, the ability of the financial 
services industry to ‘self-regulate’ via the management of risk is a mirage, constituted, 
operated, and at the same time obscured, through the proliferation of a legal fiction: 
OTC.  
 
Having traced the origins of the OTC market to the use of a legal device, 
‘offshore’, to create a separate realm in which derivatives were developed, I am going 
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to argue that OTC is a legal device that functions in a very similar vein. The first step 
is to explain the meaning of ‘offshore’ and how it functions as a legal ‘device’ — or 
what others have called legal ‘fiction’ — in more detail.  
 
 
III. ‘OTC’ AS LEGAL DEVICE / LEGAL ‘FICTION’ 
 
In the context of financial activity, ‘offshore’ is commonly associated with tax 
havens — also designated ‘offshore financial centres’ — such as Liechtenstein and the 
Cayman Islands. Deposits are made in banks that are located in a different 
jurisdiction. However, large volumes of ‘offshore’ financial transactions are actually 
transacted onshore in the very same financial centres that handle domestic 
transactions. As with the Euromarkets, what the label really connotes is a position of 
differentiation within the realm of the state — a legal ‘device’, in Palan’s terms — or 
a ‘realm of regulatory exception’, materially supported and legally capacitated by state 
institutions.
58
  
 
While Palan chooses to designate offshore as a legal ‘device’, we might equally 
use the label legal ‘fiction’. This concept was perhaps most famously elaborated by 
Lon Fuller.
59
 He used it to explore how judges and courts make use of certain ‘false 
statements’, ‘makeshifts’ or ‘false assumptions’ that, while understood to be 
inadequate, or even amounting to a ‘partial untruth’, have a certain utility.60 Many 
scholars have been influenced by his work. In her book, Collateral Knowledge, Riles 
tears apart the operation of collateral, typically seen as a technical matter of arcane 
property law, demonstrating how it functions as a ‘private technology of regulation’.61 
I will explore the significance of this argument shortly. For now, I want to focus on 
her designation of collateral as a legal fiction — or a series of legal fictions — by 
which the courts choose to act ‘as if’ the rights of the parties over the payment of 
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collateral were well defined. Though a legal fiction as elaborated by Fuller typically 
takes the form of a statement made by a legal official, Riles’s work suggests that a 
legal fiction can also be tool or a technique. For her, a legal fiction is not just a 
statement — it can be a thing, or a set of things. As she contends, ‘[C]ollateral is not 
just one thing. It takes several different forms — material documents, legal reform 
projects, legal theories, legal doctrines, mathematical calculations, and more’.62 
Applying the label ‘legal fiction’ to the OTC market is a little more challenging. The 
term ‘over-the-counter’ is used to differentiate one class of derivatives from another 
— those traded bilaterally, as opposed to those traded on regulated futures exchanges. 
As a description of these instruments, this is factual. However, I want to argue that, 
when used to describe the market in these instruments, the label ‘OTC’, as with the 
label ‘offshore’, creates a false image of the operation of these markets. Specifically, it 
has conditioned a legal approach to the OTC market that involves acting, albeit with a 
degree of awareness of the partial inaccuracy of this, ‘as if’ it is an unregulated, 
private, global market.
63
 It is my contention that, over time, this fictional legal 
understanding of OTC markets has crystallised to make the label ‘OTC’ itself function 
as a legal fiction. 
 
In spite of the many parallels between the OTC market and ‘offshore’ finance, 
advancing this argument for the OTC market is vulnerable to a critical objection. 
Owing to its size, complexity, and virtuality, the OTC market is regarded by many as 
a ‘truly’ global market place64  — as well as one that is both private and self-
regulating. In previous chapters of this thesis I have stressed the dangers of 
underweighting the drastic changes that have taken place under processes of 
financialisation. Just as the modern financialised OTC market is not the same as the 
futures markets that pre-dated it, so too, it would follow, it is not the same as the 
‘offshore’ Euromarket or other offshore transactions. In order to make my counter-
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argument persuasive, it is necessary to acknowledge those characteristics of the OTC 
market place that could be said to make it the real deal. 
 
 
i. OTC fact 
 
OTC derivative markets are currently headquartered in banks and financial 
institutions in New York and London. They are nonetheless very much global markets 
in terms of the participants engaged in them. OTC transactions are not only made 
bilaterally, between two private parties, but increasingly they are made virtually. 
Investopedia describes OTC markets as ‘a decentralized market, without a central 
physical location, where market participants trade with one another through various 
communication modes such as the telephone, email and proprietary electronic trading 
systems’.65 Since they were deregulated, the trade in these instruments was removed 
from direct supervision by centralised regulatory agencies. In the place of the rules 
elaborated by these agencies, the techniques and formulas informing risk management 
through derivatives and the calculation of their pricing formulas have been translated 
into internal regulatory mechanisms. During the 1990s, ‘Value at Risk’ (VaR), a 
method of determining how to work out how much money the bank could expect to 
lose on a given day, was translated into a new regulatory practice introduced at large 
banks, such as at JP Morgan, known as the ‘4-15’ report.66 So named as it was to be 
placed on the Chairman’s desk at 4.15 pm each day, this calculation was used to 
generate a figure expressing the bank’s total exposure measured from across the 
bank’s entire trading portfolio.67 In doing so, it was argued, senior management at the 
bank were able to gain understanding of the risks at stake, and to facilitate the better 
allocation of capital.
68
 Through such practices, as Tett has chronicled, the financial 
services industry was able to claim that it was ‘self-regulating’.69  
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What is rendered visible appears to be a market in which private actors transact 
with one another via contract, understood as a private law discipline, relying on 
internally developed systems of regulation based on the management of risk that are 
increasingly articulated at the global level. In the case of OTC derivatives, self-
regulatory measures have been developed by the ISDA and other industry groups such 
as the Futures Industry Association and the Derivatives Policy Group.
70
 The ISDA 
system has been described as a ‘highly developed standard-setting regime’.71 ISDA 
publishes user’s guides and best practice manuals72 that disseminate advice and set 
standards for industry self-regulation. It has also collaborated with other financial 
market trade associations, such as the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) to 
facilitate Shari’ah law compliant derivatives.73 Not only supplementing the 
development of self-regulatory standards and mechanisms, ISDA has developed a 
standard form contract — the ISDA ‘Master Agreement’ — that is used in an 
estimated 90 per cent of all OTC derivatives.  First developed in 1987 and revised in 
1992 and 2002,
74
 these standard documents have been called a ‘modern international 
law merchant’,75 and ‘a kind of global law by contract’.76 The template functions to 
set out in detail the ongoing legal and credit relationships between the parties, also 
defining how each transaction entered into by the parties is to be governed, and 
incorporating provisions that deal with how the rights of the parties are to be treated in 
the event of a default. ISDA's process of updating and implementing these documents 
is seen to have numerous regulatory characteristics. It employs about 3,000 people in 
                                                          
70
 Pagliari, Stefano, “Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, 
Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds,” European Law Journal 18, no. 1 (2012): 44-61, p. 51. 
71
 Biggins, John, and Colin Scott, “Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, 
the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform,” European Business Organization Law Review 13, no. 3 (2012): 
309-346 p. 327. 
72
 ISDA, Settlements Best Practice, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/market-infrastructure/settlements 
73
 ISDA and International Islamic Financial Markets, “IIFM and ISDA Launch Tahawuut 
(Hedging) Master Agreement,” 1
st
 March 2010, http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press030110.html 
Last accessed 18th August 2015. 
74
 Biggins, John, and Colin Scott, “Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime,” p. 
323. 
75
 Frankel, Tamar, “Cross-border securitization: Without law, but not lawless,” Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law. 8 (1997): 255. 
76
 Golden, Jeffrey B., “The courts, the financial crisis and systemic risk,” Capital Markets Law Journal 4, no. 
suppl 1 (2009): S141-S149, p. S144. 
192 
its documentation committee,
77
 which reacts quickly to modify the contracts — 
striking and redefining terms — to remain efficient as legal and economic 
circumstances change.
78
  
 
As well as regulatory principles and boilerplate contracts, ISDA has played a 
leading role in developing a number of legal techniques that manage the risks of one 
of the parties failing to meet their obligations. The most important of these are netting 
and collateral. In the event of a default, or one party going bankrupt, netting means 
that the outstanding obligations between the parties are tidied into one settlement 
figure, as opposed to leaving a mass of unresolved transactions.
79
 Parties that have 
‘netted out’ their transactions in this way are able to occupy a privileged position in 
the event of bankruptcy, and are treated in law a secured creditors.
80
 ISDA has 
developed a model ‘netting act’ that is offered to national legislators as a means of 
ensuring that netting is legitimated in the formal legal code of a country.
81
 The 
positing of collateral (otherwise termed ‘margin payments’) is a means of countering 
the risk associated with transacting OTC derivatives. Collateral operates as a kind of 
deposit that insures the parties against the risk of default. Greater collateralization of 
swap transactions is explicitly viewed as the private market-based alternative to 
greater governmental regulation. ISDA has also developed a legal framework for 
collateral, and has commissioned legal opinions to confirm the suitability of this 
technique as a means of legitimate risk management.
82
 As ISDA reports, ‘[t]he 
Association’s work in this area has resulted in a series of laws being passed in various 
countries that ensure legal certainty in those nations’.83 Hence, ISDA activity extends 
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beyond producing boilerplate contracts to also offering boilerplate legislative 
provisions relating to aspects of the Master Agreement for national legislatures to 
adopt as they see fit.
84
 
 
A number of scholars have suggested that via its standardised documentation, 
ISDA has created the ‘global rules’ of the OTC derivative markets. As Choi and 
Gulati argue, ‘[a]s a global private actor, ISDA has replicated in varying degrees the 
basic jurisdictional powers — prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement wise — of 
government actors.
85 
ISDA has increasingly begun to seek public incorporation of 
private norms within national legislation from the outset. This strategy ‘enrols’ the 
legislative capacity of national governments to extend the reach of otherwise 
voluntary contractual rules.
86
 In doing so, ISDA is seen to have reversed traditional 
law-making and regulatory functions, developing norms itself to which states merely 
accede. As well as apparently leapfrogging the legislative capacities of the state, ISDA 
is developing new global adjudicative mechanisms — ostensibly to obviate the need 
for reliance on its judicial functions and forums. ISDA has founded five ‘Credit 
Derivative Determination Committees’ each having ‘jurisdiction’ over a specific 
region of the world (the Americas, Asia excluding Japan, Australia/New Zealand, 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), and Japan). The committees make 
official, binding determinations regarding the existence of ‘credit events’,87 and may 
trigger obligations under OTC derivatives contracts.
88
 In March 2012 for example, 
ISDA issued a statement declaring that Greece, through passing legislation that forces 
losses on all its private creditors, had triggered payment on default insurance 
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contracts, thus instigating a credit event that entitled holders of affected instruments to 
receive payment.
89
  
 
The common term used to designate the kind of rule-making employed by 
ISDA is ‘Transnational Private Regulation’ or ‘TPR’. Janet Koven Levit has called 
this ‘[b]ottom-up lawmaking… [which does] not feature state policymakers but rather 
the very practitioners — both public and private — who must roll up their sleeves and 
grapple with the day-to-day technicalities of their trade’.90 Emphasising the regulatory 
nature of these types of law-making, she argues that a process can become 
functionally regulated even where no sovereign authoritatively imposes the norms and 
practices.
91
 Other scholarly work that has been widely acclaimed supplements this 
analysis. Gunther Teubner has argued that a global law beyond the state has emerged, 
in which decentred law-making process has come into existence not by formal acts of 
nation states but by strange paradoxical acts of self-validation.
92
 He argues that other 
types of social rule production produced in the periphery of the legal system are 
increasingly recognised as law production, and that these regimes ‘break the frame’ of 
national laws.
93
 What emerges, he contends, is ‘global law without a state’, in which 
other social systems challenge the supremacy of state-based legal systems.  
 
While what is conjured, reading this scholarship, is the image of a private, self-
regulating global marketplace, I will now seek to demonstrate that this understanding 
of ‘OTC’ markets is, nonetheless, a mirage.  
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ii. OTC fiction  
 
OTC derivatives are traded globally. However, as with earlier offshore 
financial transactions in the Euromarkets, these transactions are also carried out very 
much onshore. The financial institutions that deal in OTC derivatives are, to 
paraphrase Edelman and Suchman, ‘immersed in a sea of law’.94  The law that they 
are immersed in, while much of it is now paralleled in international legal systems, is 
largely domestic. Banks and hedge funds are born through the legal act of 
incorporation, and they die through the legal act of bankruptcy.
95
 This is affected 
through domestic regimes of company and insolvency law. In between, they raise 
capital under domestic securities law, hire employees under domestic labour law, 
exchange goods and services under domestic contract law, develop public identities 
under domestic trademark law, innovate under domestic patent and copyright law, and 
engage in production under domestic environmental, and health and safety law, and — 
at least some of the time — pay taxes according to domestic tax law.96 The operations 
and activities of financial traders and banks that trade in derivative instruments are all 
intrinsically dependent on this web of facilitative legal protections and permissions 
that lie with the state, its domestic legislation, and its judicial systems of enforcement. 
While some of these regimes are typically understood as private law, notably contract 
law, labour law and corporate law, many have questioned the cogency of the 
distinction between public and private.
97
 Others, like environmental and tax laws, are 
clearly public in character.  
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Likewise, while the instruments that are traded in OTC markets, derivatives 
‘contracts’, are understood to be private law instruments, numerous scholars have 
demonstrated that they are nonetheless dependent on domestic public legal institutions 
for vindication.
98
 Drawing on disciples including economics, sociology, anthropology, 
and financial regulation, Katharina Pistor,
99
 Karin Knorr Cetina,
100
 Annelise Riles,
101
 
Bruce Carruthers,
102
 Rachel Harvey,
103
 and Julia Black
104
 have all demonstrated that, 
as bundles of legal rights and obligations — synthetic legal constructions that have no 
independent existence outside of their contractual form
105
 — derivatives are reliant on 
state enforcement. Legal institutions have to be used to create rights of some kind, 
contractual or proprietary or some form of sui generis right with respect to that newly 
created product.
106
 Locations for exchange have to be constructed, even if only 
virtually as computer platforms. Rules of exchange need to be devised, and 
institutional structures put in place for their enforcement.
107
 As well as vindicating 
these financial instruments, as Black is keen to impress, law constitutes these 
instruments.
108
 This point will be elaborated in Part IV on derivatives as legal 
innovation. For now, I want to echo Morris Cohen, and ‘generations of legal theorists’ 
before him, in reinforcing that private law, like the private image of the OTC market, 
isn’t really private.109 At some point, all private laws interact with other regimes of 
national law and depend on national institutions for enforcement. Private rules only 
exist as a delegation of state power or legal authority. 
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A counter-argument to this is that the law-making practices of ISDA have 
altered this traditional dependency. This could explain why the insights of generations 
of legal theorists have been forgotten — allowing the legal fiction of OTC to 
permeate. I acknowledge that it very much looks as though ISDA is ‘making law’ — 
that it has surpassed the state with its model laws and standardised global contracts. 
However, upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that this privatised global law 
making is nonetheless tethered to the state. The ISDA Master Agreement has to be 
‘customised’ and requires parties using it to make certain elections. One of these, in 
the Schedule to the agreement, is the choice of law.
110
 While ostensibly free to choose, 
the parties cannot put ‘global law’ in this box. They must select a jurisdiction. In 
practice, ISDA stipulates that the parties have a choice between the law of the UK and 
the law of the State of New York.
111
 This use of ‘touchdown points’, in which reliance 
on domestic law is required to back up transnational law making, has been described 
by Robert Wai.
112
 Biggins, drawing on Wai, has noted that the so-called transnational 
or global law making of ISDA never entirely ‘takes-off’, relying on what he terms 
‘“targeted touchdown” in “derivatives friendly” jurisdictions’.113 
 
Typically, the reliance of these norms and standards of private governance on 
domestic law only emerge in the trading of OTC derivatives when something goes 
wrong. As Joanna Braithwaite emphasises, the ISDA’s Master Agreement does not 
provide for private dispute resolution; rather, both the 1992 and 2002 versions provide 
for the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales or New York depending on the 
parties’ choice of governing law in the Schedule to the agreement.114 This purportedly 
paradigmatic example of ‘privatised private law’ appoints the national courts, rather 
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than opting for private alternatives.
115
 What is more, as both Riles and Moran have 
explored, the ostensibly ‘private’ legal techniques of netting and collateral pivotal to 
the claim that OTC markets are self-regulating are also bound up with public law and 
dependent on recognition by the state. As Moran notes, the effect of netting law is to 
subordinate general creditors’ rights in cases of bankruptcy to the rights of 
counterparties to swap agreements.
116
 This so-called private risk regulation has, 
therefore, a very public impact. In the case of collateral, parties have to be sure that it 
will be recognised in local jurisdictions.
117
 In sum, as Rachel Harvey argues, state 
enforcement should not be regarded as ‘ancillary to these contracts or a factor that 
only became important after they were widely used in markets’.118 Like Black, who 
argues that law must be understood to constitute financial instruments, not merely to 
vindicate them, she emphasises that the use of these contracts is dependent upon their 
state-based enforcement.
119
 In her exploration of these markets, Saskia Sassen makes 
the same diagnosis: ‘[T]he state remains the ultimate guarantor and enforcer of 
economic rights’.120 Her arguments echo earlier scholarship, notably by Max Weber, 
and Robert Hale who drew on Weber, to argue that, since each contracting party seeks 
to invoke the state’s coercive force in defence of their own interests, contracts cannot 
be regarded as wholly private affairs separate from public policy.
121
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While my own analysis and the scholarship referenced thus far focuses 
principally on the role of national courts in making OTC derivative markets 
functional, there are two other important aspects of domestic public involvement that 
challenge the conception of this market as ‘self-regulating’. First, the claim of the 
financial services industry to be able to self-regulate through risk management did not 
inspire a complete withdrawal of centralised regulatory supervision. Contrary to the 
narrative of deregulation and the emergence of a ‘regulatory black hole’, this claim 
simply inspired an alternative regulatory approach. Market-based measures of value 
and risk were ‘hard-wired’ into regulatory policies to replace standardised regulatory 
requirements in financial governance.
122
 It was via ‘self’-regulatory mechanisms such 
as VaR that firms and banks satisfied international regulatory bodies such as the Basel 
Committee on capital adequacy measures.
123
 So long as their VaR was reasonably 
low, the amount of money they had to set aside to cover risks could also be low.
124
 
Secondly, the claim of the financial services industry to have mastered risk was 
proved spectacularly wrong by the events of the global financial crisis — and, as I 
have argued, the related global food crisis. The bailout of the banks by domestic 
governments using public money is perhaps the most convincing illustration that the 
operations of ‘global’ finance cannot adequately be described as ‘private’, and that the 
‘self-regulation’ of this global enterprise is illusory. 
 
Finally, to debunk the notion of the OTC trading space as a global market, I 
would like to refer to the anthropological insights of Riles in her ten-year study on the 
functioning of collateral in the Japanese financial markers. In her words, ‘[g]lobal 
private law is not private, nor is it global’; rather, the ‘technical fantasy’ of global 
private law is a fiction: ‘the preprinted material form of the ISDA documents, drafted 
by American and British lawyers, written in English, and laden with assumptions 
about market practices in the American and British markets, was literally nonsensical 
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in the Japanese market’.125 OTC derivatives markets inspire global participation. 
There are also undoubtedly processes at work on the international level developing 
law on OTC derivatives which exert significant influence on government policy and 
on domestic law-making. Nevertheless, the trade in derivatives is concentrated in just 
two cities: London and New York. The standard form contracts of ISDA are heavily 
shaped by the laws of these two states, and ‘global’ derivatives transactions are 
dependent for their enforcement on domestic courts in these jurisdictions. 
Characterising these markets as ‘global’, ‘virtual’, or ‘offshore’ elides the extent to 
which the operations of these markets occur within a few square miles — in particular 
territories, firmly within the jurisdictional reach of particular governments and 
particular courts.    
 
 
iii. Half-truth – legal fiction 
 
Commonplace conceptions that are read into the description of the market in 
over-the-counter derivatives as ‘OTC’ — namely that it is a global, private, and 
unregulated market — have all been shown to be highly contestable. This global 
market is, as David Gerber has argued, managed from the margins by regimes of 
national laws that do not always converge, but this management is certainly not 
‘ineffective’.126 As Benjamin and Rouch have underlined, international financial 
institutions open their doors every morning to do business in this ‘fragmented’ legal 
and regulatory environment.
127
 The prevalent tendency to portray this market as 
‘stateless’ is misleading. It perpetuates an outdated notion of the state and its function 
with respect to the market. Reifying the state in this way obscures the more persuasive 
account of these developments, which is that the role of the state has been 
reconditioned with the rise of financial markets and as a result of a neoliberal policy 
agenda. Palan, Sassen, and Wai all suggest that states play a dual role in modern 
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markets, both enabling and constraining the operations of finance. Sassen has argued 
that that globalisation has entailed a ‘partial denationalizing of national territory and a 
partial shift of state sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational entities to the 
global capital market’.128 Palan has advanced a similar argument regarding the 
operations of offshore finance.
129
 Wai describes this as the ‘inter-legality’ of 
transnational private law.
130
 While arguments by Teubner and others regarding the 
self-regulatory and norm-creating characteristics of global actors are an accurate 
description of law-making processes at the global level, their accounts underweight 
the extent to which these developments are a product of a stance taken by the state 
towards the markets at the national level — a political stance.  
 
Thinking of the OTC arena as a ‘public-private’ collaborative initiative draws 
parallels that reinforce that these developments are a result of neoliberal political 
policies. Far from being something that is unusual, or a feature of global markets, 
similar initiatives proliferate at the domestic level. The use of public-private finance 
— entailing private sector equity underwritten by public debt —  to deliver public 
services has led to significant levels of privatisation within public institutions, such as 
health services and prisons. The effect is in some ways the opposite to that of the OTC 
arena by allowing a privately run service to maintain the appearance of a public one, 
as opposed to making a publically constituted market look like a private one.  
However, the ways and means are much the same. State practice in both areas has 
shifted from active public control and regulation of markets and institutions to the 
effort to harness the ‘invisible hand’ of the market and align it with the goals of 
regulation. The result, as Riles notes, is that private legal technique becomes a tool of 
public governance.
131
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iv. A ‘certain utility’ 
 
Having explored how the expedient but misleading label of ‘OTC’ operates to 
propagate a fictional account of the relationship between this market, law and the 
state, it is now time to consider the second element of such a fiction as identified by 
Fuller — its utility. What does the propagation of this legal fiction concerning the 
derivatives market do and whose interests does it serve? 
 
In the first instance, I would suggest, the effect of the ‘OTC’ label is to distance 
the operations of this market from the ordinary operations of law and the state, thereby 
enabling the evasion of responsibility for activities carried out within it. Via the legal 
fiction of OTC, speculative behaviours are seen to be taking place in a self-regulating 
economic realm in which libertine speculators have transposed natural human 
inclinations for the pursuit of profit into developments in financial technology. 
Governments — notably in the US and in Europe — are able to simultaneously profit 
from the activities in the OTC arena but to claim a critical distance, all the while 
condemning those who are visibly profiting: the much maligned financial speculators. 
What this also conspires to produce, evidenced in the last chapter, is to focus critical 
energies on seeking to tame this ‘unregulated’, ‘private’, ‘global’ market through state 
regulation. It conditions a propensity to try and curb excessive volumes of speculative 
activity, rather than trying to think more critically about why such a broad spectrum of 
market actors have been speculating and driving prices away from ‘fundamental’ 
values. Following the arguments made by Riles and Harvey, I would argue another 
critical function of the ‘OTC’ label is that it generates the image of a self-regulating 
market.
132
 It disguises the fact that it is via the very same technical apparatus of the 
‘clumsy’ interventionist state so disdained by advocates of free markets that a market 
sphere of apparent autonomy is carved out and made operational.
133
 The central claim 
of advocates of free markets — that markets can take care of production, distribution, 
and social regulation better than governments — is shown to be false. The two spheres 
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— economic and political — are mutually-dependent. Who, then, benefits from 
disguising this?   
 
An important class of beneficiaries are those who argue that markets can self-
regulate. Seen as the paradigmatic self-regulating market, the OTC market would 
appear to testify to the possibility of this as a governance strategy. The events of the 
global financial crisis, of course, make advancing this argument successfully more 
difficult. Perhaps, then, the greater significance of the positioning of this market 
conjured by ‘OTC’ is that it elides the fact that what goes on in the economic realm is 
constituted and shaped by choices made in the political realm. It enables behaviours in 
the economic realm — the pursuit of self-interest, profit, and, in recent years, a more 
speculative market logic — to be presented as natural human behaviours. This 
corroborates the argument of advocates of self-regulating markets that these human 
tendencies will win out, and will always conspire to out-smart centralised regulations. 
It helps to make the case that the smarter regulatory approach is to incentivise and 
manage these behaviours in a way that will ultimately procure the social good, rather 
than devising regulatory codes that do this directly. What I have sought to expose in 
this thesis — identifying the role of neoliberal politics in conditioning a more 
speculative mode of market engagement in Chapter Two, and exploring scholarship 
on the shaping of homo economicus in Chapter Three —  is that these behaviours are 
not accurately conceptualised as entirely natural human traits. As I will go on to argue, 
the law in the OTC market helps to structure a certain type of economic agency. It is a 
contributing factor in conditioning the shift to a more speculative mode of market 
engagement — the producer of speculative market logic.  
 
In a final argument that would, at the outset, appear to contradict the one that I 
have just made, I would also suggest that what the ‘OTC’ label also does is contribute 
to the phenomenon, referred to in Chapter Three, that Susan Marks has called ‘false 
contingency’.134 Seeking to caution against a tendency in deconstructive work to do 
precisely what I have tried to do above — where I sought to challenge the assumption 
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of certain economic behaviours as natural and necessary — Marks warns of the 
danger in placing too great an emphasis on the contingencies which conspire to 
produce such naturalising assumptions. Doing so, she suggests, risks underweighting 
the extent to which present social arrangements — while not actually natural or 
necessary — do, nonetheless, tend towards the necessary. What Marks is concerned to 
emphasise is that agencies seeking change can only operate within a context that 
‘includes systematic constraints and pressures’.135 As well as naturalising certain 
assumptions, the legal fiction of ‘OTC’ also lends an aura of contingency or 
randomness to the ‘market chaos’ of 2007-08, placing responsibility on the impersonal 
‘forces’ of globalisation and technology. There is the suggestion, in other words, that 
these markets are something novel and exceptional. Critical scholars who have written 
on the active decision to deregulate these markets — Tett, Carruthers and Stout, as 
examples — collude in this. The work of many of these analysts — and also my own 
work — focuses significantly on the contribution of neoliberal politics to the creation 
of the OTC arena and the structuring of a speculative market logic. What Marks’s 
work helps to remind us of is that these developments have their roots in deeper 
material structures — longer-standing logics. Applied to the case of the OTC 
derivatives market it serves to recall that, in maintaining a false separation between 
the political and economic realms, the legal fiction of OTC is not just an aide to 
neoliberalism, it is an aid to capitalism. After all, that is a system which depends on 
this same separation between the political and economic spheres.
136
  
 
Taken together, the legal fiction of ‘OTC’ may exemplify what Saskia Sassen 
has described as the ‘enormous technical and legal complexities’ deployed, in the 
contemporary period, to execute ‘elementary extractions’.137 In this market, seemingly 
distanced from the state, and rendered a ‘self-regulating’ law unto itself — and 
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pervasively understood as novel and exceptional, what is also happening is the 
elementary extraction of profit for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many. 
 
 
IV. ‘FINANCIAL’ INNOVATIONS 
 
Now that it has been established that the OTC arena is not a regulatory void but 
is, to borrow a formulation used by Fleur Johns in another context, ‘full to the brim 
with legal expertise, scrutiny and analysis’,138 I want to move on to the question of 
what some of the constitutive law within the OTC market — law that is often rendered 
invisible and nearly always seen as neutral — actually does. Using commodity 
derivatives as a case in point, I will argue that these instruments must also be 
understood as innovative legal technologies. Far from being neutral implements of 
speculative agency, they have helped to condition that speculative agency. I will 
further suggest that this legal structuring is a critical part of the mechanism whereby 
speculative practices in commodity derivative markets have been able to impact on 
underlying food prices.  
 
 
i. Depiction of derivatives 
 
Within the financial sector derivatives are regarded as ‘natural economic 
products circulating according to a universal and transparent logic of efficiency and 
profitability’.139 The problem with derivatives in the post-crisis context — insofar as 
there is acknowledged to be one — is seen to lie with the ‘financial wizardry’ that has 
engaged complex mathematics in a project of devising formulas to calculate risk.
140
 In 
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recent years, the assumptions upon which formulas such as the Black and Scholes 
Option pricing formula are based have been subject to challenge.
141
 This criticism is 
reinforced by broader claims about the ‘blind trust’ of financial industry management 
in ‘quants’,142 and the assessments of Lord Turner and Julia Black, who have also 
been critical of the deference to neoclassical economic theory.
143
 Derivatives have 
been described as ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’144 and the ‘wild beast’ of 
finance.
145
 The use of these ‘exotic’ instruments is widely seen to have gotten ‘out of 
control’.146  
 
As with the claim about the impact of practices of commodity speculation on 
underlying food prices, there is considerable ambiguity concerning how derivatives 
have effected mass destruction. A common claim is that they have enabled traders to 
take on excessive levels of risk. Others have focused on how these instruments 
distribute that risk within the financial system. Those concerned about food price 
volatility and bubbles in markets for other commodities, such as oil, suggest that these 
instruments have caused shifts in market pricing structures. Perhaps an overarching 
concern is that the proliferation of derivatives has served to produce incentives to 
speculate on fluctuating values rather than to invest more ‘productively’, thereby 
producing ‘intrinsic value’, as suggested by John Bogle.147 The prevailing tendency is 
to associate these socially concerning developments primarily — and, in some cases, 
entirely — with financial innovations. Although derivatives are widely acknowledged 
to be legal instruments — contracts — these contracts are conceptualised as neutral 
vehicles that merely facilitate the pre-existing preferences of those seeking to use 
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them in making transactions.
148
 Their ostensibly neutral character is reinforced by a 
prevalent discourse that focuses on how these instruments can be a tool for hedging or 
for speculation. 
 
A financial formula alone does not a derivative instrument make. In order for 
anyone to speculate or to hedge risk by trading a derivative, financial formulas must 
first be transposed into tradeable commodity derivatives contracts. The legal 
innovations required for this transposition to take place have been subject to 
remarkably little scrutiny.
149
 Before taking steps to remedy this scholarly neglect, it is 
first necessary to elaborate a little on the significance of financial innovations 
foregrounded in so much of the literature on derivatives. While  
not the whole story when it comes to these instruments, they are nonetheless an 
important part of it.  
 
 
ii. Innovative finance 
 
As Arnoldi has argued, the financial technology of derivatives is based on new 
probabilistic and non-linear forms of scientific knowledge that make it possible to 
envisage and meaningfully ‘model’ the future.150 The development of this knowledge 
is thought to have begun in the 1950s with Henry Markowitz who, using a marriage of 
statistical protocols and linear programming, argued that it was possible to quantify 
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risk.
151
 This was developed into modern portfolio theory, which conceptualises risk as 
the variance of return on a given asset — its volatility, in order words, or the 
magnitude of swings in a price in relation to its mean price.
152
 Building on this, 
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, later developed what become known as the Black 
and Scholes Options Pricing Formula.
153
 This equation is seen to have opened up the 
world of derivatives by developing a model to calculate the rate at which the value of 
such instruments would change over time, thereby facilitating speculation on shifts in 
market value.
154
 This breakthrough, or so it is told, allowed ‘relational objects to be 
translated into individual concrete units’,155 so that ‘risks become “things” like 
commodities — tradable at any moment at the right price’.156 The result, according to 
LiPuma and Lee, has been the elaboration of financial formulas that have detached 
value, cost, and price from the fundamentals of the economy, particularly the needs of 
production, the social welfare of the producers, and the political needs of citizens.
157
  
 
Although undoubtedly highly significant, the pervasive attribution of the 
socially destructive character of derivatives to such innovations is incomplete. The 
basis for the claim can be gleaned from a few indications suggesting that financial 
innovations were not necessarily the most important in terms of fostering speculative 
trading and in conditioning undesirable social effects. First of all, the focus on the 
contribution of finance fails to account for earlier incidences of speculative bubbles 
occurring in stock markets, such as the South Sea Bubble in 1720, and in grain 
markets in the 1930s — widely attributed to financial speculators investing in 
commodity futures markets. Second, while financial innovation is supposed to enable 
the calculation of risks and asset prices with unprecedented accuracy and precision, as 
Brian and Rafferty have emphasised, derivatives trade ‘exactly on the contestability of 
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such values’.158 For a derivative transaction to take place, two parties must contract 
with one another based on a difference in opinion on the future value of an underlying 
asset or commodity. A third indication extends from an observation by Mirowski and 
Nik-Khah pointing out that neoclassical orthodoxy has ‘flipped’ at least three times 
with regard to its core price theory: from Marshallian supply & demand to Walrasian 
general equilibrium, and then to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.
159
 The 
persistence of what continues to be conceptualised as its core price theory, they 
suggest, is ‘thanks not to anything particularly conceptual that the economists have 
said or done; it is rather more directly attributable to more durable structures like the 
nation-state, the corporation and the military’.160  
 
All of this suggests the role of other ‘durable’ structures in producing socially 
destructive derivative instruments. One of those, I will argue, is law. Derivatives are 
not just legal vehicles that incorporate innovative financial calculations. They are also 
innovative assemblages of rights and obligations. These legal innovations operate to 
alienate, interlink, and liquidate legal rights and obligations in a way that causes 
changes in the motivations of their owners. As I will now seek to explore, this may be 
just as relevant to how derivatives instruments are priced and valued, and to how they 
produce prices and values, as the financial calculations that they embody.   
 
 
iii. Legal innovations 
 
I will now explore the significance of law in contributing to the construction of 
speculative market logic. First I will consider the role that law has played in 
facilitating separation of rights and interests in food that conditions the dissociated 
mode of trading characteristic of speculative market logic. I will then foreground a 
                                                          
158
 Dick, Bryan, and Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with derivatives: A political economy of financial derivatives, 
capital and class, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 37. 
159
 Mirowski, P., and E. Nik-Khah, “Markets made flesh: performativity and a problem in science 
studies, augmented with the consideration of the FCC auctions,” in D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa and L. Siu (Eds), 
Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 216 
160
 Ibid.  
210 
number of significant innovations that have helped to condition the propensity to 
pursue profit by speculating on future shifts in value. Next I will seek to demonstrate 
that derivatives operate as legal — and not just financial — technologies, focusing on 
just how innovative the law facilitating speculation actually is. Finally, I will examine 
the contribution of law in the production of the speculative effect on food prices.  
 
a. Dissociative trading  
 
Joanna Benjamin has argued that derivatives are part of ‘a new order of 
disassociation between rights and interest’.161 Of course, the disassociation of rights 
and interest is not, in reality, all that new. The work of writers as diverse as Karl 
Marx,
162
 Karl Polanyi,
163
 and most recently, Michel Callon,
164
 has shown how, 
through processes of commodification, private property rights are established over 
things in which all humans have an interest — land, food, water — causing such a 
dissociation. In order for anything to become a commodity, it has to be disentangled 
from a web of other social relationships and interests, and the right to own and trade it 
has to be established. What Marx calls the ‘fetishism of commodities’ depends on 
relationships between people coming to be seen as relationships between things.
165
 As 
the legal market of a commodity
166
 property — a thing, and the legal marker of a 
commodity — blocks out all of the other human interests, associations, and values that 
attach to it. Long before there were financial calculations that enabled relational 
phenomena to be disaggregated into concrete units and resold as ‘risk’ in financial 
derivatives commodification was sealed in law. The societal effects, as recounted by 
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Polanyi, were highly destructive.
167
 If derivatives were to become financial weapons 
of mass destruction, property rights wreaked their own mass destruction. They were 
used to expel people from their land, notably via the Enclosures in Britain and during 
the period of European colonialism. They were also fundamental to the transformation 
of food into a commodity, and to the denial that non-private interests in food have 
validity at law.  
 
Two important points extend from this analysis. First, well before financial 
derivatives were even invented, legal norms of property and contract were dissociating 
and privileging the exercise of rights by a select group of people — those with private 
property rights over land and resources — from the interests of a broader array of 
people with respect to that same land and those same resources. The owner of a field 
of wheat is legally entitled to harvest and sell that wheat on conditions that suit him. 
He need not have any regard for how his terms of sale will impact on the welfare of 
local people who may want to eat the wheat, and nor is he obliged to pay wages to the 
labourers who do or help with the cultivating that fairly reflect the price it is able to 
command on the market. Second, the ability to exercise proprietary and contractual 
rights has to be understood as having both a social effect and an effect on the mind-set 
of the rights holder. Scholars across a range of disciplines, including Robert Hale, 
Joseph Singer, and Jennifer Nedelsky have all in their different ways shown that 
property rights have an exclusionary effect.
168
 Furthermore, as Trubek and Santos 
have underlined, background norms of contract and property structure behavioural 
incentives and play a key role in the distribution of economic resources and power in 
society.
169
 Via the creation of entitlements that empower individuals to access 
resources and to exclude others from accessing them, property rights are deeply 
implicated in the entrenchment of what are now taken to be natural human traits — 
the pursuit of self-interest and the maximisation of one’s own utility. Looked at from 
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this perspective, it is not just economic doctrine, but also legal doctrines that tend to 
assume a certain kind of market actor. Property rights anticipate and empower an 
acquisitive individualistic agency. 
 
Property law and contract law facilitate dissociation between legal rights to 
own and trade food on the one hand and the interests of other people attaching to that 
food on the other; in Marxist terms they facilitate a separation between the exchange 
value of food and its use value. Subsequent innovations in these schemes of right and 
entitlement have functioned to detach the legal rights to own and trade a commodity 
derivatives contract from awareness that what is being traded is connected to food at 
all. First of all, the interplay of rights and interests associated with food commodities 
was fundamentally altered by the standardisation of traditional forwards to create 
exchange-trade futures contracts. This conditioned critical changes in the motives of 
parties trading futures contracts, which, as detailed in Chapter Two, gave rise to a 
spate of speculation and grain price volatility that prompted a legislative clampdown 
in the 1930s. Standardisation interposed another layer of self-interested-socially-
dissociated entitlement between those exercising rights over forwards contracts and 
the broader class of interests in the use of underlying commodity as food. With the 
introduction of OTC financial derivatives, the balance of rights and interests arising 
out of these instruments underwent further revolutions. As LiPuma and Lee have 
suggested, the fact that exchange-traded futures contracts continued to stipulate the 
delivery of the agricultural commodity in question maintained a connection between 
trading and agricultural production.
170
 Where the contract remains one for the 
transference of property in foodstuffs, this can help to promote the convergence of 
cash and spot prices for commodities.
171
 The introduction of OTC instruments such as 
commodity options, swaps and index funds depended on innovations in the 
understanding of entitlement that formed the basis of new constellations of ownership 
— such as rights to income streams from swaps transactions and index funds.172 As 
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Roy Goode has described them, derivatives comprise ‘a wondrous array of contractual 
and securitisation devices which enable market participants to package financial 
assets, loans and investments in whatever way best suits their needs’.173 This 
wondrous array of legal innovations also removes the the underlying foodstuff from 
the equation. With exchange-traded futures, parties were still contacting for a given 
quantity of a specified harvest of a particular crop — ‘July 2012 contract for Chicago 
SRW Wheat’. Now many investors purchase a ‘long only position’ in an ‘index’ such 
as the ‘S&P GSCI’.   
 
It is not just financial innovations, then, that have ‘detached value, cost, and 
price from the fundamentals of the economy’ or segregated the trade in derivatives 
from the needs of production or social welfare.
174
 Legal innovations have also been 
deeply implicated in these processes.  
 
b. Speculative shifts 
 
While the establishment of a new order of dissociation of rights and interests 
has been central to the rise of a speculative trade in commodity futures contracts, other 
legal innovations have also been important. Among these is the invention of 
commodity ‘options’. Described as ‘among the most important inventions of 
contemporary finance’, an option contract eliminates the need for a contracting party 
to commit to deliver or pay for a particular good at a particular future date.
175
 The 
buyer of an option contract gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy or 
sell the good.
176
 No longer having to go through the rigmarole of ‘offsetting’ futures 
contracts to avoid physical delivery, options enabled parties to transact more cheaply 
and with less commitment. As a result of a wave of speculation in commodity prices 
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in the 1930s, options were banned by the US legislature precisely in recognition of 
this fact. Today, the ‘dangerous lure’ of options continues to attract would-be 
speculators.
177
 As Jay Kaeppel has observed, ‘[t]hanks to the (relatively) low cost of 
entry when considering many trades, individuals often flock to the option market to 
attempt to take advantage of a particular market opinion’.178 Equally significant has 
been the elaboration of alternative contractual structures facilitating longer-term and 
passive forms of investment in commodities. Commodity indices are advertised as an 
asset class that can ‘deliver “equity-like returns” while reducing overall portfolio 
risk’.179 Such instruments offer investors ‘a broadly diversified, long-only passive 
investment’ that gives a steady rate of return.180 ‘Structured’ products — Commodity-
linked Notes, Commodity Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs), and Collateralised 
Commodity Obligations (CCOs)
181
 — trade like stocks, and allow investors to gain 
exposure to fluctuating commodity prices without investing directly in futures 
contracts.
182
 These instruments are marketed as ‘an easy way to participate in the price 
fluctuation of a commodity or basket of commodities’.183 As well as making it cheaper 
and easier to speculate, instruments such index funds, swaps, commodity ETNs and 
CCOs also make speculative trading less risky. The elaboration of legal instruments 
tailored to the need of different types of investor enrols a broader array of market 
actors — those who are not financial traders by profession — in the speculative trade 
in commodity futures.  
 
A further set of innovations that has fostered an increased propensity to 
speculate is the various legal techniques for making capital more liquid. As Riles 
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argues, collateral functions to tie up a financial trader’s resources, holding it as a 
deposit for a given trade. However, the development of techniques such as netting and 
rehypothecation permits traders to shift the obligations and rights over the collateral, 
enabling the capital deposited as security or collateral for one transaction to be 
liquidated and used for another. Netting is a contractual arrangement between two 
parties who each owe the other a monetary debt.
184
 When transactions are netted out, 
it means that the parties have agreed that there will be just one amount — a single 
monetary claim being owed by one party to the other at any point in time throughout 
the contract.
185
 As well as conferring parties with the status of a securitised creditor 
for bankruptcy purposes — discussed above — netting frees up substantial volumes of 
capital to enable parties to enter into further transactions. Rehypothecation operates to 
a similar effect by creating a contractual arrangement whereby financial institutions 
can reuse collateral posted by their clients to enter into further transactions.
186
 The 
concept was alien to English law, but was formally introduced in 2003 by the adoption 
of the EU Financial Collateral Directive.
187
  
 
Before derivatives could have any effect as an innovative financial technology, 
they had to take effect as an innovative legal technology and specifically, in Joanna 
Benjamin’s words, as an ‘innovative contractual technology’.188 Considering the 
classical principles and doctrines of English contract law — the need to act in good 
faith, the requirement of consideration, misrepresentation as a ground of voidability 
— one gets a sense of just how far from such principles and doctrines, and hence just 
how innovative, the various techniques just considered are. As Johnson and Hazen 
have argued, what makes futures trading one of humanity’s ‘more impenetrable’ 
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concepts is that it ‘involves selling what one does not own and, as a rule, buying what 
one does not want. It is shrouded in terminology that conceals its meaning’.189 A great 
deal of legal work has had to go into changing accepted rules of contract law, so that 
offering to buy a bushel of wheat and then failing to pay for it, or offering to sell a 
bushel of corn, and then failing to deliver it, is no longer considered a breach of 
contract. 
 
c. Legal technologies 
 
Technology is commonly understood to mean the practical application of 
knowledge for a particular end, or a manner of accomplishing a task especially using 
technical processes, methods or knowledge.
190
 As discussed in Chapter Three, 
financial formulas are predicated on neoclassical assumptions about how people 
behave in markets. In derivative instruments, this claim to knowledge is not 
interrogated. Financial formulas are treated in law as outcome-determining, price-
producing truths; they are the very motor powering the derivative and determining the 
obligations of the parties throughout the life cycle of the contract. Yet, the tasks 
purportedly performed by derivatives — that of calculating and pricing risk, 
‘discovering’ prices, and providing market liquidity — are not accomplished through 
the industrious application of mathematical knowledge alone. As Riles has explored in 
detail, there is a whole industry based on developing and applying legal knowledge 
about the governance of collateral that is essential to the trade in financial derivatives. 
What her analysis uncovers, however, is that collateral operates as a legal fiction — a 
decision to act ‘as if’ the rights of the parties over collateral are well defined, when, in 
fact, they are not.
191
 There is, she argues, no such property that the parties can claim to 
have rights over. Nevertheless, it is via the pretence of rights over an imagined 
property that the financial services industry has developed a tool through which it is 
able to claim to be managing risk; or, in other words, to create the fantasy of a 
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privately regulated global market.
192
 Glitches in the operations of global markets that 
would impede the management of risk, the pricing of underlying assets, or the 
movement of capital are smoothed over by the application of legal techniques for 
practical ends.  
 
Applied legal knowledge is not just critical for the day-to-day functioning of 
derivatives markets. The application of legal knowledge is a precursor to the very 
existence of these markets. The role of legal opinions such as the Potts Opinion, which 
concluded that credit derivatives should not be characterised as contracts of insurance, 
and the significance of legislative acts of deregulation legitimating the expansion of 
the OTC derivatives market are widely recognised. However, the extent to which the 
development of this market has been dependent on the continual elaboration of the 
legal rights and obligations structuring derivative instruments is less frequently 
acknowledged. All of these innovative financial products, while having a vital 
calculative component, could not be traded without changes in the original contractual 
model of the futures contract to determine the entitlements and liabilities arising out of 
the contract. As the Hedge Funds Consistency Index cautions, ‘the legal nature of 
these products is very different’.193 One scholar who has emphasised the contribution 
of lawyers in this regard is Julia Black. She highlights the way ‘the “law merchants” 
of the legal profession…give material form to these synthetic constructs in legal 
opinions, standard form precedents and bespoke contracts which provide innovative 
ways in which to allocate rights and risks and exert a considerable influence in 
shaping market practice’.194 A similar observation is made by Alisdair Hudson, author 
of the leading textbook on the law of derivatives, who notes that every financial 
intermediary wanting to issue a new financial instrument employs lawyers to ensure 
that it is compliant with relevant laws and regulations.
195
 I have already emphasised 
that the notion that what emerges is a regulatory void or legal black hole cannot be 
accepted. Indeed, it seems that the more risky, innovative, and exceptional an 
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instrument or behaviour is, the more it is perceived to depend on a watertight 
framework of contractual rules, netting laws, standard-form documents, expert legal 
opinions, and specialised tribunals to ensure their effective operation. A final point to 
note about this regimes is that is is filled with ‘repeat players’. As Riles observes, it is 
through the mundane activity of ‘insiders’ that such legal regimes are consolidated 
and reproduced.
196
  
 
We might think of derivatives as a marriage of convenience between 
neoclassical economic theory and positivist legal theory with its investment in legal 
‘fictions’. Quoting Riles again, ‘[t]he As Ifs of law and the As Ifs of the market 
become a kind of virtual context each for the other that substantiate and sustain one 
another’.197 The pivotal legal innovations that have enabled this market to evolve have 
been widely neglected. The real gap here would thus appear to be the failure of legal 
scholarship attending to the ‘technical’, constitutive law that has replaced centralised 
regulation and made possible the emergence of new markets in ‘exotic’ financial 
products. For Duncan Kennedy, this body of law is the ‘Black hole of legal theory’.198 
 
d. Speculative effects 
 
Drawing together these insights, norms of property and contract have, through 
the application of legal techniques, developments in contractual form and function, 
and the ongoing efforts of creative legal agents, been critical to the development of a 
speculative trade in commodity derivatives. Far from coming to these transactions 
fully formed as speculatively inclined economic humans, traders are anticipated, 
empowered, and, over time, institutionalised as speculative market actors. What 
results is a collective of empowered economic agents, formatted in the market 
‘field’,199entering into thousands of contracts for the same imagined commodity (say a 
given quantity of wheat). Importantly, they are assumed by both legal and economic 
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theory to do so in a manner that is not exclusionary.  Their actions are not thought to 
have any impact whatsoever on the underlying price of tangible wheat. Lawyers 
developing derivatives assign new claims over underlying assets based on the 
assumption that each individual claim is separate and distinct. It is assumed by the law 
governing the transactions of Party A and Party B that the outcome of their exchange 
is only of relevance to them. One will win and one will lose, depending on how the 
market moves. As LiPuma and Lee emphasise, ‘agents can buy and sell derivatives as 
though their only social aspect were the execution of the contract’.200 However, it is 
precisely through the repetitive processes of enshrining the formulas of finance in 
legal instruments that asset prices are ‘discovered’, or rather produced. This serves as 
a pricing signal that economically engages, entangles, and impacts upon a far broader 
range of people: farmers, merchants, supermarkets, consumers. Parties are trading ‘as 
if’ it were only their rights and interests that were relevant; they are acting as if the 
market in commodity derivatives and the market for underling commodities were 
unconnected. Yet, as the events of the Global Food Crisis clearly attest, unconnected 
is precisely what these two markets are not.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Taking issue with the prevalent portrayal of the OTC trading space as a legal 
vacuum or regulatory void, I have demonstrated that this market is, in fact, full of law. 
Beyond this, I have exposed the fictitious character of the label ‘OTC’ and how it 
operates to produce a misleading perception of the trade in off-exchange derivative 
contracts. ‘OTC’ enables the state to distance itself and elide responsibility for the 
socially damaging practices carried out within this trading space. Via the operations of 
this legal fiction, the market appears to ‘self-regulate’, lending credence to the 
political preferences of those who argue for market freedom. Finally, OTC garners the 
impression of exceptionality. It distracts from the continuities of capitalism, in which 
the extraction of profit is made possible by the labours of the many for the benefit of 
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the few. Far from being neutral vehicles that libertine speculators have co-opted for 
their own selfish ends, derivative instruments have brought with them a radically 
speculative and socially destructive market logic. Norms of property and contract have 
provided a basis for disregarding the social significance and value of food. Legal 
innovations have detached financial actors from any sense that what is being traded 
has implications for the satisfaction of nutritional needs. I will now explore the role of 
law in the functioning of another international market — the market in physical food 
commodities — and the erection of the global food system. I will again be contesting 
the portrayal of aspects of these markets and their functioning as natural or inevitable 
— as challenges to which law simply responds.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The ‘Global’ Food Crisis, the Global Food System,  
and (International) Law 
  
 
 
 
Paralleling the efforts to regulate financial markets in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, law is also being positioned as the solution to the global food crisis. A 
UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF) was established 
in April 2008 to coordinate responses to the challenge of food insecurity. Via its 
Comprehensive Framework for Action, the HLTF recommends a plethora of reforms to 
improve the structure and functioning of food systems.
1
 National authorities are advised 
to implement regulatory measures to improve the functioning of markets on a domestic 
level. Equally important are reforms designed to improve the performance of 
international commodity markets in line with the needs of low-income countries in the 
Global South. Beyond regulations to carry out market reform, there is a broad consensus 
that food insecurity can be tackled via the legal empowerment of vulnerable groups. 
Strengthening the rule of law, the fulfilment of human rights commitments on the 
domestic level, and instilling the hierarchical superiority of human rights norms in trade 
negotiations, are all key ambitions for lawyers in the post-crisis context. 
 
                                                          
1
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Such recommendations for reform might appear to evidence recognition that the 
global food system as it is currently configured contributes — as I argued at the end of 
Chapter One — to the production of hunger and deprivation for a large percentage of the 
global population. On closer inspection, however, the particular vulnerability of affected 
communities remains under-interrogated in much of the literature on the global food 
crisis. A familiar constellation of ahistorical, apolitical misfortunes tends to be offered as 
explanations for the precarious position of the food insecure: under-investment in 
agriculture, erratic climates, poor transport links, and inequitable land ownership.
2
 
Furthermore, responsibility for the pernicious impact of price volatility is seen to lie with 
incompetence and failure on the part of domestic governments. Food insecurity and food 
price volatility are pervasively naturalised within discourse on the global food crisis, and 
law is habitually positioned as a tool to manage these ‘challenges’.  
 
Aspects of international law are recognised in this literature as playing a role in 
enabling the operation of international commodity markets in a general sense. In the 
main, however, particular negative features of these markets — inequalities between 
developed and developing countries, prejudicial food import dependence, the power of 
global agribusiness, and grain price volatility — are seen to have very little to do with 
(international) law. More generally, while law is not treated as absent in the global food 
system, it is largely seen to be innocent with respect to any prejudicial impacts that 
vulnerable groups might be experiencing within it. I will contest this view by examining 
the constitutive role of law in international commodity markets. Drawing on the insights 
of dependency theorists,
3
 critical work on international development,
4
 Third World 
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Approaches to International Law (TWAIL),
5
 and critical scholarship on international law 
and development,
6
 I will demonstrate that both food insecurity and food price volatility 
are produced and sustained, in part, by an international legal order that systematically 
disadvantages vulnerable populations in the Global South with respect to their ability to 
command access to food. 
 
Part I will begin by foregrounding the differentiated impact of the global food 
crisis. After examining competing explanations of this impact, I will explore prevalent 
perceptions of the role of international law in this context. In Part II, I will locate the 
origins of the contemporary global food system in the period of European colonialism 
and will explore the place of law in creating conditions of food insecurity through the 
establishment of new market relations between colonial powers and colonised peoples. I 
will then turn in Part III to the critical significance of public international law in enabling 
the perpetuation of these market structures since decolonisation, through neo-colonial 
practices of economic ‘development’. My particular focus will be on how post-war 
international law and institutions relate to conditions of food insecurity in the Global 
South, as well as on food price volatility. In Part IV, I will move on to scrutinise the 
international legal solutions posited as responses to these ‘challenges’ [from roughly the 
1990s onwards]. There are, I will suggest, significant limitations to the viability of these 
instruments as a response to contemporary manifestations of hunger. 
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I. THE ‘GLOBAL’ FOOD CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES  
 
i. Local food crises 
 
The highly differentiated impact of the global food crisis was first related in 
Chapter One. Whether in terms of domestic food price inflation, increased poverty and 
malnutrition, or the duration of the impact, people living in low-income countries in the 
Global South have been overwhelmingly worst affected by this crisis.
7
 Food price 
inflation was particularly high in Central America, in parts of South Asia, and in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and food prices have remained elevated across these regions.
8
 In 22 of 
the 37 countries categorised as ‘developing’, price rises in staple foods were over 20 per 
cent.
9
 In nine countries of those countries, they were over 50 per cent.
10
 While significant 
impacts amongst the urban poor had been anticipated, many of those who have suffered 
most acutely have been those actually involved in the production of the affected 
commodities themselves. The worst‐ affected groups have been casual wage labourers 
(both rural and urban), land‐ poor farmers, petty traders, and producers of commodities 
— notably pastoralists in Kenya, cotton farmers in Benin and tea workers in 
Bangladesh.
11
  
 
The figures typically used to illustrate the volatility of the prices of staple grains 
are the prices listed on international commodity markets. But changes in world prices 
affect different domestic markets differently. While the price of maize increased by 87 
per cent in Mozambique, for example, it increased by 157 per cent in Malawi during the 
                                                          
7
 Keats, Sharada, et al, “Food price transmission: rising international cereals prices and domestic markets,” ODI 
Project Briefing no.48, October 2010.  
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same period.
12
 A host of factors including exchange rates, border measures, transport 
costs, and domestic food policies can all affect the transmission of international 
commodity prices into local food prices.
13
 Also of relevance is the countries’ position 
with respect to the trade in the grains in question: maize, rice, and wheat. Many countries 
in the Global South, particularly in Africa, are net importers of these grains.
14
 This left 
them with high exposure to the price swings. Some low-income net-exporting countries 
were also seriously affected because the prices of imported food grains rose far more 
dramatically than the price of the commodities that many of these countries export: 
coffee, cocoa, cotton, and tropical fruits.
15
 A number of high-income developed 
countries, such as Japan, are also net importers of grain, and others, notably the US, play 
a prominent role in exporting it.
16
 However, these stronger economies were better able to 
cope with the price volatility.
17
 On the domestic level, producers of commodities suffered 
acutely because their terms of trade declined significantly against food grains.
18
 In the 
case of the urban poor, their wages were insufficient to enable them to purchase sufficient 
grain.
19
  
 
For all the insights that this sort of analysis offers, what is missing is any 
comprehensive attempt to explain how some countries became over-reliant on imported 
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grain — or on revenue from tropical exports — in the first place. Similarly, while the 
factors impinging on the ability of poor people within such countries to access sufficient 
food are often identified, they are rarely, if ever, explained. It is widely acknowledged, 
for example, that ‘[m]any of the rural poor face constraints on land, labour or water 
which make it difficult for them to produce a surplus’.20 Few studies, however, deem it 
necessary to elaborate on the form of these constraints, or how they came to affect rural 
communities in the first instance. Paralleling the taken-as-given vulnerability of the food 
insecure is the taken-as-given volatility of the grain prices to which they are vulnerable. 
Aspects of the cycle of production, the potential for crop failures, the ‘inelastic’ character 
of agricultural prices, and substantial historical precedent would all seem to support the 
argument that agricultural prices are ‘inherently’ volatile.21 Yet, the relationship between 
these ‘features’ of grain prices and the system of production in which they have been 
embedded for well over a century of human history, however, is rarely questioned.  
 
 
ii. Locating responsibility 
 
Those accounts which do attempt to probe more deeply into the unfavourable 
circumstances of the food insecure tend to offer repeated references to ‘Africa’s poor 
track record’ in agricultural production,22 and often point the finger at domestic 
governments. Attention has been drawn to under-investment in agriculture, a lack of 
social safety nets, and the inequitable structure of land ownership across many countries 
in this region.
23
 As analysts at the Overseas Development Institute observe, ‘[m]ost poor 
households were left to cope on their own with high price rises’, with very few afflicted 
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populations interviewed in 2008 reporting having received any assistance from the state 
or NGOs.
24
 By contrast, governments of countries in the Global North, even those that 
export large volumes of the grains at the centre of the global food crisis, such as the US, 
rarely figure at all. To the extent that these governments are mentioned in accounts of the 
global food crisis, it is in their role as leading members of the ‘international community’. 
This international community appears principally in an ameliorative capacity — it 
provides food aid, carries out research, and communicates the catastrophe to the rest of 
the world.
25
 Food insecurity is presented as a ‘challenge’ in response to which developed 
states must mobilise the resources of international institutions, NGOs, and civil society.
26
 
Furthermore, when the international community does appear in the events leading up to 
the crisis, it is sometimes suggested that more could have been done. The failure to 
establish global grain reserves — which many argue could have helped to mitigate the 
impact of the volatility — is frequently invoked.27  
 
 
iii. Rethinking responsibility 
 
The pervasive attribution of responsibility for food insecurity to domestic 
governments in the South is contested by a substantial body of critical work arguing that 
explanations for poverty and food insecurity in countries in this region must take into 
account the important impact of international policymaking. Dependency theorists
28
 and 
the proponents of world systems theory
29
 argue that the precarious position of food 
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insecure populations can only be understood by examining the structures of the global 
food system. From their perspective, the vulnerability of Southern populations is a 
product of a disadvantageous relationship with countries in the Global North. Imagining 
the global economy to be constituted of a core and a periphery, dependency theorists 
have argued that peripheral countries are prevented from developing — or at least 
impeded in their development — along the lines recommended by dominant doctrines of 
international development.
30
  Scholars in these traditions tend to reject the vocabulary of 
food insecurity and instead talk in terms of structured vulnerability, powerlessness in 
relation to the international food order,
31
 or, in more recent work, deprivation of food 
sovereignty.
32
 As Watts and Bohle have argued, vulnerability is ‘a structural-historical 
space which is shaped by the effects of commercialization, proletarianization and 
marginalization’.33 Countering the ahistorical and apolitical discourse of food insecurity, 
this scholarship foregrounds the role of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonial 
development practices, and the policies of countries in the Global North in conditioning 
the ‘insecurity’ from which populations in the South are seen to suffer. Viewed through 
this lens, food insecurity and even agricultural price volatility do not appear as inevitable 
facts of natural conditions or even modernity, but instead come to be seen as socially 
produced phenomena with an identifiable historical origin. They are the product of 
politics. As Bill Winders emphasises, the ebb and flow of food prices and the degree to 
which prices are volatile are functions of changes in global food regimes, which are in 
turn shaped by national policies and agrarian politics.
34
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This scholarship is a vital corrective to the analysis that characterises much of the 
literature on food insecurity and the global food crisis. Nonetheless, even within this 
literature the focus of analysis tends to be on policy actualised as institutional practice. 
The significance of law in these dynamics is not typically elaborated. In fact, faith in 
international legal solutions to the (produced) vulnerability of the ‘food insecure’ is 
common to both mainstream and critical accounts. 
 
 
iv. Perceptions of (international) law 
 
‘End hunger by law’ is the slogan on a website that describes and promotes a 
proposal for an International Food Security Treaty (IFST) which aims to place the human 
right of freedom from hunger under the protection of enforceable international law.
35
 The 
development of a binding set of legal norms as envisaged by the proponents of the IFST 
has yet to be realised. However, international institutions continue to elaborate soft-law 
regulatory principles, guidelines, and recommendations for the achievement of global 
food security. The Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the 
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, for example, predate 
the global food crisis, and were elaborated in 2004.
36
 Another set of guidelines on the 
responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests were agreed by Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS) in May 2012.
37
 In their totality, these regulatory 
recommendations for improvements in labour markets and for better market access for 
land, resources, food commodities and credit are as complex and detailed as the Dodd-
Frank or EMIR-MiFID II reforms for financial markets considered in Chapter Three.  
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Alongside the elaboration of regulatory guidelines, enforceable legal protections to 
empower the food insecure are being pursued under the rubric of the promotion of the 
rule of law,
38
 the fulfilment of human rights commitments on the domestic level,
39
 and 
the fostering of a new legal culture at the international level founded on the hierarchical 
superiority of human rights norms.
40
 These aims are being advanced and advocated by a 
diverse range of actors including the Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights,
41
 the FAO, World Bank, NGOs, and lawyers’ associations such as the World 
Justice Project.
42
 Overwhelmingly, where law is mentioned in debates on food insecurity 
and the recent events of the global food crisis, it is offered as a remedial instrument. 
Either it is a regulatory tool to fix malfunctioning commodity markets, or it is a device to 
empower the vulnerable and to strong-arm governments to make good on their human 
rights commitments.   
 
In the main, critical work on the global food system focuses on the policies of 
Northern states, practices of development agencies, and the prescriptions of the IMF, 
World Bank, and World Trade Organisation (WTO). Reference might be made to 
particular regimes of international law, such as the trade regime; however, there is a 
widespread tendency — identified by Martti Koskenniemi and Marja Lehto — to 
‘dismiss law as a passive reflexion of economic and political forces’.43 Within legal 
academia, some scholars have written extensively on the role of international economic 
law in prejudicing the position of countries in the Global South. Carmen Gonzales is one 
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of the few legal scholars to explicitly link the events of the global food crisis with 
international trade law.
44
 Yet, Gonzales continues to offer international law as the 
primary solution to these problems. The international community must, she argues, 
promote food security through international law and regulation.
45
  
 
Scholars associated with TWAIL, most famously Antony Anghie,
46
 have sought to 
challenge this faith in international law. Anghie’s work and more recent work by 
Sundhya Pahuja
47
 demonstrate that international law was not epiphenomenal to the 
subjugation of developing country populations during the colonial era, but was and 
remains a crucial part of the power complex under which countries in the South are 
systematically disadvantaged. I will use these insights to explore the role of international 
law in the production of food price volatility and conditions of food insecurity via the 
construction of the global food system. I will also reflect on the relationships between 
public international law, international legal regimes for trade and investment, and 
domestic law in the constitution of markets within developing countries. While both 
Anghie and Pahuja touch on this, their focus is on the meta-narratives of international law 
and how governments in the South have been persuaded to engage with it. Recent critical 
work on law and development focuses more concretely on the use of law as a tool by 
development agencies to erect a constitutive body of law for the market.
48
 However, 
these scholars rarely speak to the significance of public international law in the 
development context. I hope to take steps towards bridging this gap.  
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v. Caveats 
 
Before embarking on this analysis, it is first necessary to acknowledge its 
limitations. The economies, geographies, political cultures, and peoples living in 
countries the Global South are, of course, extremely diverse, complex, and rich in 
particularity. I don’t wish to fall into the trap of homogenising the ‘developing world’.49 
It is particularly important to highlight that not all of the people living in countries 
colonised by Europeans or subject to development practices have been made worse off as 
a result. In fact, some, what might be termed ‘domestic elites’ benefited greatly. A second 
caveat is that the global food crisis has also had a detrimental impact on poor consumers 
in the Global North. Hunger is also on the rise across Europe and in the US with growing 
numbers turning to food banks and other assistance programs.
50
 While a country-to-
country analysis suggests that wealthier countries — the ‘core’ — have benefited from 
their exploitation of the ‘periphery’, these benefits have tended to accrue to ‘elites’ in 
richer countries, and not to the general populous.
51
 Finally, neither European colonialism, 
nor forms of ‘developmentalism’ or international law itself can accurately be 
conceptualised as unitary phenomena. They have to be understood as complex relations 
of ideology and practice, shifting over time. As the work of scholars including Duncan 
Kennedy,
52
 Andrew Lang,
53
 and Michel Fakhri
54
 evidences, even discrete regimes within 
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international law, from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the 
regulation of a single commodity, like sugar, have passed through distinct phases and 
have been influenced by (and have influenced) changing ideas, geo-political events, and 
policy contexts. 
 
 
II. COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM, AND (INTERNATIONAL) LAW:  
ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 
 
i. European colonialism 
 
The role of public international law doctrine in rationalising and legitimating the 
imperial and colonial practices of European colonists is now well established.
55
 As 
Antony Anghie has argued, colonial practices were justified according to a ‘dynamic of 
difference’ that reconciled inconsistent and exploitative legal treatment of native 
populations on the basis that they were ‘uncivilised’ and therefore undeserving of the 
same rights as ‘civilised’ Europeans.56 Anghie tells a very different story about public 
international law than that which it tells about itself. In order to understand what the 
differential treatment of native populations has produced in terms of hunger and 
deprivation in the Global South, however, it is necessary to take international law’s 
colonial narratives seriously.  
 
The civilising mission of nineteenth century international law was centred on the 
‘dual mandate’ — the belief that colonialism brought industrial benefit for Europeans, 
and progress for the native races of the colonies.
57
 Natives were to be helped to make 
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productive use of the abundant raw materials in their territories that lay ‘wasted and 
ungarnered’ because they ‘did not know their use and value’.58 Of course, native 
populations were not ignorant of the uses and value of food per se. They were simply 
unaccustomed to valuing food in the same way as imperial traders and European 
colonists — primarily by virtue of its exchange value. Operating under the legitimating 
framework of public international law, European settlers bought up land, displacing 
native populations and imposed head and hut taxes to force native populations into the 
workplace.
59
 Widespread programmes of plantation agriculture concentrated landholding 
in the hands of national elites and prevented many indigenous and nomadic groups from 
accessing resources.
60
 These interventions, aimed everywhere at encouraging productive 
activity in the colonies, made native populations increasingly vulnerable to hunger 
mediated through the price mechanism.
61
  
 
Domestic restructuring and new modes of agricultural production established by 
European settlers and administrations laid the foundations for an expanding international 
trade in food commodities. Under colonial policies, the colonial power was the only 
foreign buyer, and colonies were forced to use the best farmland to produce what are 
commonly termed ‘cash crops’, such as sugar, coffee, cotton, bananas, tobacco.62 
Enforced export specialisation meant that large tracts of prime agricultural land in India, 
Africa, and the Americas were shifted from food production to cash crop production.
63
 
This increased countries’ reliance on imports for food staples, and particularly grain.64 
The infrastructure that was set up in the colonies was designed to facilitate exports. 
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Railways and roads were built to carry products from the interior to the coast, and not to 
encourage or facilitate trade within the region.
65
 Consequently, many colonies were both 
physically and economically structured into deepening dependency on international 
commodity markets for physical and economic access to food. Furthermore, as a result of 
access to a new abundance of raw materials and cheap imports, the colonial relationship 
gave the colonising countries a huge economic advantage, enabling them to industrialise 
and develop their economies.
66
 This put former colonies at a structural disadvantage as 
they were incorporated into the ‘global machinations of things’.67  
 
Importantly, while much of the work of TWAIL scholars is centred on public 
international law, it was also during the colonial period that an international economic 
law system based on free trade, the gold standard and private international law got 
underway. As Duncan Kennedy argues, newly independent nations seeking to trade in the 
global economy had to join this game strictly on the terms proposed, that is, within the 
structure of legal rules already in place, or ‘starve in the dark’.68 While the legal status of 
colonies within the international legal order changed upon decolonisation, many of the 
terms and conditions of their engagement in global commerce remained in place. Other 
domestic legal interventions left a lasting legacy. As Kennedy argues, new labour forms 
were ‘incorporated’ in these territories through the categories of classical legal thought — 
the sale of labour power and private property.
69
 This contributed to the spread of 
European modes of legal consciousness: a distinction between the private and public 
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realm, individualism, and commitment to interpretive formalism.
70
 As a result of this 
legal inheritance, during decolonisation, many newly independent states simply ratified 
‘whatever schemes of economic and social hierarchy emerged out of the play of violence 
and culture on the ground’.71 Land ownership in the Global South continues to be skewed 
in favour of traditional landholding elites and large-scale foreign and domestic agro-
export enterprises, many of which effectively obstruct or dilute efforts at land reform.
72
  
 
 
ii. (International) Law and Neo-colonialism 
 
The period of decolonisation at the end of the Second World War is typically 
celebrated by the international community as a transformative moment in the relationship 
between international law and imperialism.
73
 Under the right of nations to self-
determination, colonised people were granted the rights to freely determine their political 
institutions, exploit their economic resources, and decide upon their social and cultural 
development without interference from outside.
74
 Yet, as others have argued, in spite of 
their new legal status as sovereign nation states, the economic policy of many former 
colonies continued to be dictated by governments of the Global North acting through 
newly created international institutions. ‘Neocolonialism’, the umbrella term for such 
practices, has been analysed from numerous disciplinary perspectives. While much of 
this work is complementary, important questions on precise mechanisms enabling the 
continuation of colonial practices remain the subject of debate.  
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From an international relations perspective, the answer lies primarily in the 
superior economic and political power of Northern states.
75
 Problematising the nature of 
this power, other scholarship points to the ‘muscular monetarism’ of the Bretton Woods 
Financial Institutions (BWIs) — practiced through conditionality on loans and reinforced 
by their position as the gateway to global capital markets.
76
 Another body of work is 
focused on the proliferation of ‘expert’ knowledge practices about ‘development’ as a 
means by which countries in the South have been induced into implementing economic 
policies originating in the ‘developed’ world.77 This scholarship elucidates the coercive 
power behind the activities of the BWIs, even in the context of their ‘softer’ functions of 
carrying out research, publishing data, devising ‘recommendations’ and suggesting 
practices of ‘good governance’. It also helps to explain why many governments in the 
South implemented many of these policies willingly, believing in the ‘science’ of 
development. But it does little to clarify the role played by law in this context. Given the 
centrality of international law in regimes of global governance, not to mention the 
constitutive conceptual frameworks from which international institutions responsible for 
development operate, this appears remiss. 
 
Sundhya Pahuja is one scholar who has sought to tackle this oversight head on, 
arguing that international law has been a critical part of the power complex whereby 
influence over countries in the South has been maintained.
78
 Pahuja builds on Anghie to 
demonstrate how the concept of ‘development’ replaced that of ‘civilisation’ as an 
external referent through which the ‘dynamic of difference’ between colonised and 
coloniser was sustained in international law.
79
 She follows Anghie in his argument that 
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nation-statehood and sovereignty are not neutral legal categories but are shaped by their 
distinctively European lineage.
80
 It was in trying to obtain this political and legal status, 
she suggests, that former colonies became vulnerable to development doctrine during the 
process of decolonisation. They positioned themselves in a historical continuum in which 
European states were to be emulated.
81
 The treatment of development as a technical issue 
under international law disguised the highly political nature of the trespasses made on 
state sovereignty by international institutions. Via the ‘new neutral scientific spectrum of 
economic development secured and measured by the “scientific” concept of GDP’, 
measures to assist these countries could be characterised as ‘technical’ and ‘non-
political’.82 This split between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ governance was 
institutionalised through the new international legal architecture. The UN and its organs 
were designated as the site for political debate, meaning that the activities of ‘economic’ 
institutions set up at Bretton Woods were widely seen to be largely neutral.
83
  
 
The fact that international law has failed to deliver on its post-colonial promise of 
a truly equal, inclusive and universal world order is self-evident. Pahuja’s contribution 
has been to demonstrate that international law has been a central mechanism through 
which neo-colonial power is simultaneously exercised and disguised. Enrolling those 
seeking reform with its promised universality, Pahuja demonstrates that international law 
has absorbed and deradicalised movements for social change.
84
 It has embroiled them in 
complex institutional processes in which they are required to articulate their demands 
through legal argumentation, itself, as Koskenniemi has shown, normatively 
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indeterminate.
85
 International law has also created and legitimised the practices of 
specialist institutions in which economics is treated as a science — in which mainstream 
economic theory is detached from the politics that made it mainstream. This has enabled 
lawyers, economists and development practitioners working at international economic 
institutions not only to claim that their developmental prescriptions are technical and non-
political, but, in many cases, to believe it themselves.
86
 Importantly, it is international 
law’s very claim to be law — to be more than politics — that has enabled the ongoing 
exercise of power over formally sovereign states. While neo-colonial development 
practices have not always taken an overtly legal form, they have been extended under the 
broader structures of international law and its claim to legality.  
 
 I will now explore the interplay between norms of public international law, 
practices of international economic institutions, development discourse, the trade and 
investment regimes, and domestic law in creating the global food system. My focus will 
be on how this has served to entrench conditions for food insecurity in the Global South 
and to exacerbate food price volatility since the post-war period. 
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III. DEVELOPMENTALISM, ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM, AND (INTERNATIONAL) LAW: 
THE MAKING OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 
 
Inspired by President Truman and his ‘Four Point Plan’,87 in the post-war period, 
officials working at the new institutions of the United Nations embarked on a project of 
delivering ‘rapid economic progress’ to the ‘less economically accomplished countries of 
the world’.88 As a report from the UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs makes 
apparent, what was required was no less than the complete restructuring of 
‘underdeveloped societies’.89 ‘The outcome was a body of ideas and practices that is 
widely regarded as ambiguous in its effects on improving living conditions for people in 
the Global South. Thus, for example, Shattuck and Holt-Giménez have argued that the 
vulnerability underlying the global food crisis is ‘the product of decades of 
“development” that privileged industrial production for export over local food 
production, exacerbated economic inequality, and made poor countries dependent on a 
volatile global market for their food’.90 Arturo Escobar’s analysis of the policies and 
practices of development is equally damning: ‘The fact that most people’s conditions did 
not improve but deteriorated with the passing of time did not seem to bother most 
experts’.91 As a result of these attempts at restructuring, he reinforces, many countries 
that were self-sufficient in food crops at the end of World War Two became net food 
importers throughout the development era.
92
 
 
As Gilbert Rist has noted, the main ingredients of development ‘doctrine’ in the 
post-war period have ‘hardly changed since’.93 They comprise the promotion of 
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economic development by exporting raw materials, the fostering of comparative 
advantage supposed to benefit all market traders, and making productive use of foreign 
investment and capital.
94
 Yet, while its main hallmarks have remained constant, what has 
changed significantly since the post-war period are the roles assigned to the state and to 
law in processes of economic development. I will now trace the changing modes of 
development practice through two eras: the first beginning in the 1960s and lasting until 
the late 1970s, the second taking off in the 1980s and lasting — albeit with some 
important adjustments — until the present day. 
 
 
i. Development doctrine and the developmental state 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, development policy focused on the role of the state 
in managing the economy and transforming traditional societies. As Anne Marie Burley-
Slaughter has argued, international economic institutions were instrumental in procuring 
the projection and proliferation of the particular institutional forms of the liberal welfare 
state onto developing country economies.
95
 The emphasis was thus on public law, active 
management of the economy, and the erection of regimes of regulatory governance.
96
 As 
the new hegemonic power in the post-war era, the United States became the model for 
post-war theories of development applied to the ‘Third World’.97  
 
In the post-war period, many former colonies embarked on a programme of import 
substitution industrialisation attempting to replicate the industrialisation model of 
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developed states.
98
 As Herbert Feis has observed, ‘they seem to think that they really 
cannot be nations unless they make within their own border many of the things which the 
older industrial nations have in the past supplied’.99 Following the prescriptions of 
modernisation theorists like W. Arthur Lewis, who argued that rural areas were 
unproductive and had an oversupply of labour, many governments in former colonies 
taxed farmers and rural populations transferring income to urban dwellers.
100
 The 
countryside was exploited for the sake of industrial capital formation in the cities.
101
 This 
impacted dramatically upon the livelihoods of small farmers and resulted in an increased 
dependence of low-income countries on food imports. Critically, however, developing 
countries seeking to gain access to still-protected Northern markets were prevented by the 
operations of the GATT (discussed below). This meant that their efforts at 
industrialisation not only impoverished rural communities, they also failed to deliver the 
much sought-after increase in revenue.   
 
The growing reliance of Southern populations on imported food was exacerbated 
by the aid practices and technological solutions ‘gifted’ to the developing world by 
countries in the Global North. In the decades following the war, governments in the US 
and in Europe used tariffs, price supports, and quotas to boost agricultural production in 
their territories — particularly for the production of grain.102 This resulted in a continuous 
oversupply which was then channelled into poor countries as ‘food aid’. As Harriet 
Friedman observes, many governments welcomed this assistance, conducive as it was to 
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the creation of an urban working class.
103
 However, it had the effect of flooding local 
markets with grain priced below the cost of production, further undercutting local 
farmers.
104
 Aid recipients developed a taste for food crops such as wheat that were alien 
to the local environment, further entrenching dependence on imports.
105
 Between the 
early 1950s and the late 1970s, per capita consumption of wheat increased by 63 per cent 
in the market economies of the ‘Third World’.106 Many countries, notably in Africa, 
became major commercial purchasers of US grain.
107
 
 
By the late 1950s, there was growing recognition that food aid policies were 
helping to create a dangerous dependency on imports in the Global South. A new solution 
for developing economies was found in the application of science and technology to the 
task of boosting crop yields — the Green Revolution.108  While delivering record levels 
of grain production, these technical supply-side solutions failed to alleviate hunger in the 
Global South. In fact, as Shiva,
109
 Thrupp,
110
 Gonzales
111
 and others have explored, the 
Green Revolution exacerbated and entrenched conditions of food insecurity. Access to 
prescribed technologies — the expansion of irrigation infrastructure, hybridised seeds, 
synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, and the modernisation of farming techniques — 
required significant capital investment.
112
 This favoured already-wealthy farmers and 
prejudiced the interests of small farmers and local consumers. The Green Revolution 
promoted fossil-fuel-reliant industrialised agricultural production, fostered reliance on 
expensive inputs, converted large tracts of land into cropland for cash crops, displaced 
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local populations, destroyed ecosystems, and depressed grain prices for smallholders, 
tenant farmers, and sharecroppers. This also served to enhance the power of multinational 
companies and suppliers of these inputs. As Susan George highlights, ‘any choice of 
technology automatically means also the choice of its supplier — the seller — and thus of 
a long-term partner’.113 Agrifood, seed, fertiliser and pesticide companies expanded and 
became increasingly transnational in this period.
114
 
 
Critical scholarship has exposed the many flaws animating the ambitions of 
former colonies to industrialise. As Rist argues, economic strategies for industrialisation 
were pursued ‘as if the existence of industrial countries did not radically alter the context 
in which candidates for industrialization have to operate’.115 From the perspective of 
development doctrine, the world was conceived ‘not as a structure in which each element 
depends upon the others, but as a collection of formally equal “individual” nations’.116 
Paradoxically, the very structures and dynamics of the contemporary global food system 
were being consolidated by the state-centric pursuit of national economic growth. 
Governments fixated on their own national economic development were unintentionally 
conscripting their populations into the service of a larger economic structure — an 
increasingly industrialised, specialised, monopolised global food system. Rist locates the 
tunnel vision of developing country governments in the power of economic ideology — 
that of the ‘self-made man’.117 Whilst economic ideology was doubtless influential, Rist 
fails to elaborate on another perhaps more important influence in this regard — that of 
public international law. The view of the world as a collection of ‘formally equal 
“individual” nations’118 was firmly impressed on countries in the Global South by the 
doctrines and categories of international law — not only ideas about economic 
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individualism. What then of the specific international legal regimes of trade and 
investment? 
 
a. PSNR and legal dispossession 
 
As the prospect of decolonisation grew more likely, many imperial powers 
negotiated agreements with new states, procuring undertakings to protect many of the 
rights acquired under colonial rule. Former colonisers were seeking assurance that their 
nationals’ investments in land, industry and manufacture would be respected and that 
they would be affording ongoing access to the valuable natural resources of former 
colonies. These agreements, the first being signed by Germany and Pakistan in 1959, 
were early examples of bilateral investment treaties under which countries negotiate 
protections for what is now termed ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI).119 As nationalist 
movements grew in power, demands to rescind these treaties began to emerge. Attracted 
by the promise of the new universal international law, nations drew on the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination to make a claim for ‘permanent sovereignty’ 
over their natural resources (PSNR). 
 
The attempts of nationalist groups and governments in the Global South to use 
international law to advance their rights provide further support for Pahuja’s thesis 
regarding the false promises of international law. As she explores in detail, their efforts 
were consistently undermined as they worked their way through international institutions. 
First, the UN Secretariat and the Commission on PSNR was assigned the task of 
determining the extent of PSNR within the notion of self-determination. Even this move 
meant that in practice the right was no longer recognised as the absolute right of a 
sovereign state — it was a qualified right, the content of which was in part determined by 
an international institution. This gave international institutions a locus of influence over a 
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matter that was formerly seen as falling within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of a 
sovereign state. As deliberations over the content of the right went on, it came to be 
counter-balanced by obligations to exercise it in the ‘interests of development’.120 As a 
result, the debate over PSNR moved institutional home, from the political organs of the 
UN into the orbit of influence of the BWIs.
121
 Furthermore, in their attempts to articulate 
these rights as rights of ‘sovereignty’, developing countries conspired in the 
propertisation of natural resources which came to be discussed almost exclusively as 
commodities to be exploited.
122
 Once propertised, the nationalisation of natural resources 
implicitly raised the question of compensation.
123
 By the time the right had crystallised 
into Article 4 of General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
th
 December 1962, it 
contained an obligation to pay ‘appropriate compensation’, disputes over which ‘should 
be made through arbitration or international adjudication’.124  
 
A bitter dispute over the appropriate measure of compensation ensued. Developed 
states preferred what was known as the ‘Hull formula’ of ‘prompt, adequate and 
effective’, or market-based compensation, determinable internationally.125 Emergent 
states argued that any compensation should be ‘appropriate’, economically contextual, 
historically sensitive and determinable nationally.
126
 Attempts to adjudicate these matters 
stalled. However, between 1959 and 1991, over 400 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
were signed worldwide.
127
 Typical provisions of BITs included terms governing 
compensation for expropriation, the repatriation of profits, dispute settlement procedures, 
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national treatment requirements, and ‘most favoured nation’ requirements.128 All of these 
provisions served to protect the rights of foreign investors and to limit the ability of 
developing countries to redistribute land, renationalise industries, or carry out reform that 
could strengthen the ability of local communities to access land and resources.  
 
A number of scholars have argued that this has enabled subsequent generations of 
foreign firms to buy up land and resources by investing in the Global South. Described by 
Georg Schwarzenberger as ‘imperialism writ small’,129 an increasingly elaborated 
international legal regime protecting the rights of foreign investors has impeded states 
who have sought to nationalise industries for their economic benefit.
130
 Many of the 
unexplained ‘constraints’ now seen to impinge on the ability of small farmers to access 
land and resources would appear to stem directly from the protected rights of 
international investors. In the Sahel and East Africa, pastoralists have suffered acutely 
from the privatisation and fencing of common land, and the alienation of pastures for 
non-pastoral uses.
131
 This legal regime has also enabled the vertical integration and the 
concentration of power in a few very large firms, with national governments increasingly 
tailoring food regulation to the demands of agribusiness.
132
 
 
b. GATT, the ICAs, and comparative disadvantage 
 
As Carmen Gonzales has argued, even on an ideational level, comparative 
advantage disadvantages the Global South. By de-historicising the relative advantages of 
nations in the Global North and South, she contends, it ‘relegates these nations to 
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economic specialization in their traditional exports — even if this specialization was 
imposed rather than chosen and even if it is disadvantageous under current market 
conditions’.133 In any case, it is now well established that the ability of developing 
countries to develop as enjoined was seriously curtailed by their inability to ‘join the 
club’ of the international trade regime.134 From the middle of the 1950s onwards, it 
became clear that agricultural products were in practice almost entirely exempt from the 
most important GATT market access obligations.
135
 The ability of the US and the states 
of the EU to continue subsidising agriculture through policies like Common Agricultural 
Policy transformed many of these rich countries from net food importers to net food 
exporters over this period.
136
 Meanwhile, poorer countries, forced to lower barriers to 
entry for manufactured goods made in the North and encouraged to specialise in 
agricultural exports, were unable to gain access to Northern markets, leaving them in a 
highly precarious and disadvantaged position.
137
 The situation was compounded by a 
move towards product substitution by industrial economies in the North that reduced 
demand for exports of the South. Industrial chemists made new sweeteners from grain 
instead of sugar, and blended once-profitable vegetable oils with soybean oil.
138
 The 
terms of trade for tropical exports declined significantly in the 1950s and 1960s.
139
 
 
The story of GATT, while the most commonly invoked in accounts on the history 
of international trade, is not the whole story. While the GATT regime was largely 
unresponsive to the needs of low-income countries in the South, alternatives were 
developed that sought to implement an active and coordinated food price policy for the 
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international market. This was one of the key demands of developing countries who, 
during the 1970s, sought the establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  Their 
efforts culminated in the establishment of International Commodity Agreements (ICA) 
which regulated prices of key commodities including tin, rubber, coffee, wheat and 
cocoa.
140
 While this conferred some benefits on some developing countries, wealthier 
states benefited even more from these arrangements. The International Wheat Agreement 
(IWA) went into effect in 1949 and brought wheat-exporting and wheat-importing 
nations together to coordinate the market to ensure supply and prices.
141
 The agreement 
took the form of a long-term multilateral futures contract between importers and 
exporters with the former promising to buy, and the later to sell fixed quantities of wheat 
in each year of the agreement’s life. IWA exporting countries included the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, which, combined, accounted for more than 75 per cent of world 
wheat exports at the time.
142
 The agreement helped to ensure significant stability in terms 
of world wheat prices and production between 1949 and 1970.
143
   
 
Taken together, development prescriptions issued and entrenched through 
international legal instruments and institutions in the 1950s and 1960s served to 
exacerbate reliance on industrialised, specialised and increasingly unprofitable 
agricultural methods in countries in the Global South. At the same time, the same legal 
order operated to consolidate the power of industrialised nations in the North, particularly 
the US, over the trade in grain.
144
 Much of the TWAIL literature is concerned with how 
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Western nations were established as ‘exemplars of the future’,145 — and how ‘backward 
nations’ were persuaded to ‘modernise’ in a manner that replicated the institutional 
structures of ‘developed’ states while also occasioning the subordination of Southern 
populations to the needs of those states. However, other work, notably by Amy Traguer, 
would suggest that this leaves the violence of the legal category of the developmental 
‘state’ itself underweighted.146 Newly empowered by international law, unelected but 
now sovereign elites were able to exercise unprecedented power over lands defined by 
the arbitrarily drawn borders of the colonists. The ability of people to determine their 
economic existence and to meaningfully exercise food sovereignty — to put this in the 
terms of contemporary discourse — was subordinated to the sovereignty of the nation-
state.  
 
 
ii. Economic imperialism, law, and the state 
 
A radical shift in thinking on the most appropriate institutional and legal 
frameworks for achieving economic development was brought about in the 1980s. As per 
the mandates of the neoliberal policy agenda, it was argued that the (developmental) state 
should refrain from ‘interfering’ with the economy. In effect, it should self-dismantle, 
and focus on ‘getting prices right’ by promoting fiscal discipline, removing distortions 
created by state intervention, and promoting liberalised trade with as few barriers to entry 
and exit as possible. Owing to the radical free market prescriptions that ensued, and to the 
manner in which these economic prescriptions were imposed on countries in the Global 
South, critics have likened this second iteration of development doctrine to a new form of 
imperialism — economics imperialism. As Susan George, Joseph Stiglitz, and Naomi 
Klein have all explored, a series of radical free market reforms were first put into practice 
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via ‘experiments’ in Southern economies, most notably in South America.147 As 
discussed at the end of Chapter Two, many of the policies were also implemented on 
home soil, in both the US and in the UK. However, extreme tactics including the 
financing of military coups and capitalising on wars and natural disasters were used to 
impose ‘economic shock therapy’ on other countries worldwide, as per the dictates of the 
‘Washington Consensus’ — as this free market doctrine became known. Making markets 
‘free’ involved rigorous and forcible interventions on the part of the US and, to a lesser 
extent, the UK governments, only this time into the economic and social affairs of other 
countries. Globally disseminating and maintaining a new consensus regarding desirable 
economic policy became a central vehicle through which countries in the North sought to 
sustain power and influence beyond their territories — in the countries of the Global 
South. It is true that this was also the case in the earlier period, given that development 
doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s was also premised on ‘science’ of economic growth. 
However, during the post-war period of what is often termed ‘embedded liberalism’, 
emerging states were still able to direct economic policy toward the realisation of social 
ends. As George, Stiglitz and Klein have all demonstrated, in the 1980s, the rise of a 
newly hegemonic free market doctrine severely circumscribed what limited room for 
manoeuvre governments in developing countries had left.  
 
Before proceeding with an analysis of how this impacted on agriculture, food 
security and price volatility in the Global South, it is necessary to reinforce two points. 
Firstly, economics became imperial in a number of other aspects at this juncture. As Ben 
Fine has explored, economics began ‘colonizing other disciplines’148 at this time.149 
Alternative economic perspectives were increasingly ostracised as a result of the 
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ascendency of neoclassical economics.
150
 Importantly, however, the dominance of 
neoclassical views of economics was not confined to a disciplinary take-over. The spread 
of economic tools of analysis to understand and analyse broader phenomena on a 
conceptual level was translated into policies and administrative practices have sought to 
restructure society to suit the needs of the market. Promoting market efficiency became 
the overriding objective. Second, under this new economic paradigm, the attention of the 
international economic institutions shifted from the establishment of an administrative 
state to the core institutions of private law.
151
  
 
a. Agricultural liberalisation 
 
Dependence on oil and the widespread reliance on foreign capital to fund 
industrialisation left many countries that had followed earlier iterations of development 
doctrine vulnerable to changes in international commodity and financial markets.
152
 This 
was leveraged by the BWIs into strict conditions on the loans which it began extending to 
these countries, ostensibly to rescue them from this predicament. The philosophy behind 
‘structural adjustment’ involved ‘putting exporters first, liberalising imports, privatisation 
and fiscal reform’.153 Typically, the package of reforms introduced under structural 
adjustment consisted of trade liberalisation, the privatisation of industry and public 
services, deregulation, curtailment of government expenditures, elimination of barriers to 
direct foreign investment, financial liberalisation, and enforcement of private property 
rights.
154
 By the mid-1980s, two-thirds of African countries and nearly three-quarters of 
Latin American countries had agreed to implement structural adjustment programs.
155
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The IMF and World Bank also made agricultural liberalisation a condition of loans.
156
 
In order to maximize the revenues available to service the foreign debt, developing 
countries were instructed to expand agricultural commodity exports.
157
 They were further 
instructed to devalue their currencies in order to make their exports more competitive. 
However, as many countries in the South were urged into a similar strategy at the same 
time, this resulted in oversupply of exports in which they were specialising — cash crops 
and tropical commodities.
158
 As George explains, this economic strategy ultimately 
depressed the export earnings of developing countries by glutting world markets with 
competing export commodities from multiple debtor nations.
159
 At the same time, 
subsidised products from the Global North continued to flood developing country 
markets at prices far below the local price of production, devastating rural livelihoods, 
depressing domestic food production, and accelerating migration to urban areas.
160
 A 
multi-country analysis of the effects of structural adjustment policies carried out in 2001 
found that the aggressive shift to export production diverted land from food crops to cash 
crops and also inflicted serious environmental and ecological damage by accelerating the 
expansion of industrial agriculture.
161
  
 
Importantly, the benefits of export growth were found to have gone primarily to 
multinational corporations to the detriment of domestic producers.
162
 Small-scale farmers 
were particularly affected due to the removal of production subsidies and forced reliance 
on more expensive forms of private credit.
163
 Government-controlled marketing boards 
that had acted as intermediaries between small farmers and multinational companies 
during the 1950s and 1960s were disbanded. Also discouraged and progressively 
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dismantled were national grain reserves.
164
 This left individual farmers with limited 
bargaining power to negotiate with large agribusiness, and resulted in declining terms of 
trade.
165
 This disassembly was justified by the positioning of ‘market technologies’ — 
commodity futures and derivatives — as an improved tool for price (and risk) 
regulation.
166
 However, many small farmers were unable to afford the minimum 
transaction required on futures markets — the minimum value for a contract for coffee in 
2002 being $18,000.
167
 Divested of their former means of assistance and protection, many 
small farmers were left without protection in their dealings with large agribusiness firms, 
and were forced to compete unassisted in increasingly volatile international markets.  
 
Financial liberalisation opened up the economies of developing countries to 
destabilising flows of international capital. These changes also divested governments of 
the ability to control the price of food domestically. A coercive relationship with the 
BWIs led to an increasingly coercive relationship with global commodity markets. As 
George has argued, ‘[a] nation loses its freedom of decision when it gears its production 
to exports whose prices it does not control in exchange for imports of the vital foods 
whose prices it does not control either’.168 Concentration of market power and 
corporatisation in agriculture also gathered speed with the lifting of capital controls. 
Agricultural firms enlarged by merging and creating strategic partnerships with other 
companies in other countries and sectors — agribusiness, chemical and biotechnologies. 
This was critical to the emergence of what some are calling a ‘Third Food Regime’ — 
differentiated from the post-war global food order by a dominant role for global 
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corporations profiting from agri-food chains.
169
 Significantly, these changes created a 
critical new source of vulnerability by exposing both the agricultural investments of small 
farmers and the broader economies of low-income countries in the South to the practices 
of financial speculators. The ability of countries to pursue alternative economic agendas 
to those advised by the BWIs has come to be substantially impeded by both speculative 
attacks on the currencies of ‘renegade’ nations and by the threat of capital ‘flight’. As 
both Isaac and Frank have explored, the policy prescriptions of the BWIs with respect to 
managing exchange rates have been a ‘virtual invitation to speculators’170 who have made 
vast profits out of mounting attacks on the currencies of countries whose political 
agendas have strayed from development orthodoxy.
171
 With regard to capital flight, as 
Epstein summarises, ‘[l]egislatures and citizens who want to buck the trend and achieve 
goals of high employment, egalitarian development and sustainable growth are paralysed 
by the threat that any policy which lowers the rate of profit will cause capital to be moved 
to more profitable environs, thereby reducing investment and lowering the community’s 
standard of living’.172 
 
More broadly, as Orford emphasises, structural adjustment programmes impacted 
radically the ability of debt-burdened states to make social policy. Decisions about wage 
levels for workers, education policy, health policy, social security provision, provision of 
services, constitutional reform and levels of unemployment were all affected by the need 
to meet the demands of the BWIs.
173
 Coercive policies of structural adjustment imposed 
by international economic institutions have thus been a critical factor in the now 
lamented ‘absence’ of social safety nets, ‘lack’ of investment in agriculture, and ‘poor 
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track record’ in agricultural production routinely laid at the feet of domestic governments 
and corrupt elites. While all of this was replaced by alternative legal arrangements 
facilitating market-based solutions such as private insurance schemes, as analysts at 
Oxfam have underlined, where private traders have moved in to replace the state, they 
have sometimes done so on highly unfavourable terms for poor farmers. In many 
instances, this left farmers more food insecure, and populations more reliant on 
unpredictable international aid flows.
174
 Many of the policies imposed on governments 
throughout the South via the coercive lending practices of the BWIs were then cemented 
under rules of free trade agreements (FTAs) and the articles of agreement of the WTO.
175
  
 
b. The Agreement on Agriculture and the demise of the ICAs 
 
In a similar vein to the debate over PSNR, efforts of developing countries to 
change the past inequities of the global trading order via engagement with international 
trade law have been consistently frustrated by the operations of the trade regime. In reply 
to the complaints of developing countries, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations between 1986 and 1994, 
purported to mitigate inequities in international agricultural trade by gradually 
dismantling agricultural subsidies and tariffs in the Northern economies. However, 
ambiguities in the agreement’s key provisions enabled developed countries to maintain 
high levels of agricultural protectionism. Notably, whilst the AoA’s market access 
provisions required WTO members to convert quantitative restrictions and other non-
tariff barriers into tariffs, and to reduce these over time, the absence of specific guidelines 
on how to do so meant that the majority of developed countries engaged in ‘dirty 
tariffication’ — the adoption of tariffs far more trade restrictive than the non-tariff 
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barriers they replaced.
176
 The highest tariffs were for sugar, tobacco, meat, milk products, 
cereals and, to a lesser degree, fruits and vegetables — precisely the products of 
particular interest to developing countries.
177
 The agreement also allowed countries that 
subsidised at the time to keep doing so, subject to certain reduction obligations, while 
prohibiting the introduction of new subsidies. These measures effectively granted 
exclusive rights to subsidise to those wealthy states in the North already doing so, 
entrenching existing levels of market distortion.
178
 Thus, as Gonzales concludes, the 
Agreement institutionalised the unfair competitive advantage held by developed-country 
producers.
179
 A 1999 study by the FAO on the impact of the AoA in sixteen developing 
countries found that the Agreement resulted in an increase in food imports and an 
accompanying decline in food production.
180
  
 
The shift over the past decade away from the ad hoc-ery of the GATT to the 
pursuit of what Sylvia Ostry has called ‘detailed legalisms’181 is often celebrated as a 
triumph — a move away from the discordant and elitist politics of GATT towards a more 
inclusive legal framework bringing certainty, predictability, and greater equity to 
international trade law.
182
 However, the harmonisation agreements negotiated under the 
auspices of the WTO has prejudiced developing countries by preventing them from 
enacting social policies to improve their economic position globally. The reach of 
international influence over domestic policy has been extended by the designation 
policies that impact on trade indirectly as ‘behind the border’ measures equating to ‘trade 
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distortions’. As scholars including Rorden183 and Lang184 have explored, over time, a 
more radical free market agenda has been institutionalised at the WTO, and has been 
enforced and reinforced by a compulsory judicialised dispute-settlement regime. The 
vision of free trade inhering at the outset of the GATT — a vision that saw fully 
liberalised trade as wholly unadvisable — has been replaced by a radical free trade 
agenda that has delegitimised the idea that governments can and should conduct 
economic policy in the pursuit of collective political projects.
185
 While agriculture and 
food security continue to be highly politicised topics, resulting in the prolonged deadlock 
of negotiations at the Doha Development Round,
186
 the free trade agenda continues to be 
advanced through other regional arrangements relating to ‘behind the border’ measures, 
such as the Transatlantic Trade Partnership between the US and the EU, currently under 
negotiation. The potential impact on developing countries is as yet poorly understood; 
however, there are fears that hard-won preferential access schemes from which some 
developing countries have benefited might be undermined by the agreement.
187
  
 
As well as the normalisation of a once-radical liberalisation agenda, the 
proliferation of ‘free market’ thinking has served to naturalise conceptions of agricultural 
price instability. The rise of the free trade agenda further led to the collapse of many of 
the ICAs. The last wheat agreement was approved in 1967 and lasted only three years.
188
 
After the failure of these international agreements, the markets for these commodities 
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exhibited highly levels of price volatility.
189
 Following the collapse of the IWA, and the 
dramatic price spike in 1972-74, prices became dominated by US and European 
agriculture policies.
190
 In the twenty years since, volatility in the prices of agricultural 
staples has intensified.
191
 Importantly, the depreciation of the US dollar during 2007-08, 
combined with the fact that many currencies are pegged to the US dollar and that grain 
prices on international commodity markets are denominated in US dollars, are all seen to 
have contributed to the acute impact of the spikes on developing countries during the 
global food crisis.
192
  
 
 
iii. (International) law and the global food system 
 
As with any market, law is constitutive of the international market in food 
commodities. On both the domestic and international planes, critical elements of 
economic exchange — capital, labour, credit, money, liquidity — are creatures of law.193 
Legal rights, principles, institutions, documents, regulations, customs and actors are 
integral to the operation of the trade in any food stuff. Yet, as this analysis has sought to 
impress, it is not just the international market in food commodities that has been created 
and enabled through law; so too has the global food system. The characteristics of that 
system — in which the production of food is industrialised and specialised, and trade in 
food is globalised, monopolised and financialised — have everything to do with law. 
Extending from the colonial period and furthered under the banner of economic 
development, laws, both domestic and international, have been deeply implicated in 
driving a shift from a farming system controlled by local peasants based on resources 
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produced on the farm to one dependent on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery 
manufactured by multinational corporations headquartered in the developed world.
194
 The 
muscular monetarism and the ‘expert’ knowledge practices of the BWIs could not have 
been put into practice were it not for facilitative legal regimes carrying them to fruition.  
 
Of vital significance, however, is the point that law has not just been an instrument 
to translate colonial policies or economic ideologies into practice. Law has exerted its 
own influence into the mix. Legal forms and legal regimes have a life of their own. 
Norms of property, contract and nation-state structure particular agencies and empower 
people and governments to particular ends; imparted legal consciousness conditions how 
economics is practised and shapes the space for politics. Since the period of European 
colonialism, legal norms of property and contract have been utilised to facilitate modes of 
market transaction that result in the replacement of existing social ties with new market 
relationships. This has created new vulnerabilities, making more and more people newly 
dependent on the market for the means of survival. Rights of private ownership, the 
power to exclude others from land and resources, and the ability to engage in contractual 
relationships in which the interests of the contracting parties are paramount anticipate and 
produce a certain type of individualistic agency that is progressively naturalised. Over 
time, people have increasingly come to relate to one another, to the natural world, and to 
the production of food as homines economici — as self-interested, calculative market 
agents. This has left a lasting legacy. In fact, Southern investors and companies are now 
challenging their Northern rivals in the competition for control of the global food system. 
As the FAO has emphasised, levels of FDI are not as high as typically portrayed. In most 
countries, domestic investors acquire more agricultural land than foreign ones.
195
 The 
expansion of agro-food corporations from emerging states confirms private agro-power is 
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also becoming polycentric.
196
 Brazilian-based firms JBS and Brazil Foods, which rank at 
the top of global market share for meat and grains, are consolidating their positions 
through direct acquisitions of agro-food interests in the North.
197
  
 
As David Kennedy has underlined, law is the link binding centres and peripheries 
to one another and structuring their interaction.
198
 The ability of populations in the Global 
South to exercise meaningful control over the politics of food, over access to food, and 
over the price of food, has been substantially impeded as a result of a complex interaction 
between different legal regimes — notably those for trade and for investment. Law 
enables parties to transact far and wide, across vast distances, with people whom they 
will never know in person. It also facilitates the expansion of types of market enterprise. 
The much maligned power of large commercial agribusiness companies are made 
possible only through law. Webs of contractual relationships allow these enterprises to 
expand both vertically and horizontally into new markets — growing wheat, harvesting 
wheat, selling wheat, manufacturing bread, sourcing and refining fuel, modifying and 
patenting seeds, and selling agricultural insurance. ‘Global value chains’, as they are 
commonly designated, are only possible by virtue of property and contract law and 
thanks to other facilitative legal regimes such as bankruptcy law, company law, tax laws 
and creative tax lawyers, employment law, and law regulating the use of payments 
systems. 
 
As well as linking economies in the North and South, law — and perhaps public 
international law above all — has functioned to simultaneously enable and disguise neo-
colonial practices of interference with the economies and societies of countries in the 
Global South. It has been ‘the vernacular through which power and wealth justify their 
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exercise and shroud their authority’.199 As I will discuss below, NGOs, activists, 
journalists, human rights lawyers and other members of civil society remain inspired by 
the promise of international law — the promise of an inclusive, egalitarian, universal 
world order — and continue to issue their demands to tackle hunger in its terms. They 
remain largely insensitive to the fact that food insecurity and food price volatility are not 
natural phenomena to which law only responds — that they are, to a significant extent, 
the outcome of a proliferation of legal rules and regulations governing economic 
interactions among states and between states and their citizens. Taken together,  
particularly since the 1980s, what much of this law — general principles of public 
international law, particular regimes on international trade and investment law, and 
domestic legal concepts and norms — has done is to inhibit the kind of politics in which 
markets might play a subordinate role to the needs of human beings to access food. It has, 
in the characterisation of Wendy Brown, ‘undone the demos’200 — dismantling 
meaningful opportunities for people to shape their lives, cultures, social practices and 
food systems in accordance with their wants.  
 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that the prescriptions of the 
BWIs and the operations of international legal regimes on trade and investment have 
served to the detriment of countries in the Global South. Overwhelmingly, however, 
these interventions are seen to be a function of policy — development policy, economic 
policy, trade policy. While it is acknowledged that many of these interventions have been 
iterated under the auspices of international law, this does not dissuade would-be 
reformists from a belief in the transformative potential of rewritten rules. International 
lawyers, scholars, human rights activists and a broad array of critics of the dictates of 
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development doctrine continue to position law as the solution to malfunctioning markets 
and inequities in the global food system. International law is also being positioned as the 
solution to new challenges that are regarded as a threat to food security in the post-crisis 
context, such as the ‘race for land acquisition and food production’,201 commonly denoted 
the ‘global land grab’.202 Managing these flows of investment and curbing excessive 
levels of FDI is continually positioned as a critical new challenge for the international 
community to respond to, as evidenced in the HLTF’s Comprehensive Framework for 
Action.
203
 Another such challenge is the lack of investment in agriculture — perhaps the 
most oft-cited, and most under-interrogated, underlying ‘cause’ of the recent food 
crisis.
204
  
 
International legal solutions to these challenges for food security come in four 
main guises: the proliferation of soft-law principles and guidelines, such as principles to 
promote responsible investment in agriculture;
205
 a call for the harmonisation of 
international trade law with human rights obligations;
206
 the promotion of the rule of law 
as a means by which domestic laws in developing countries can be strengthened; and the 
empowering of the food insecure via the fulfilment of a human right to adequate food. 
My aim in this chapter has been to shift the overwhelming focus on law as a solution to 
the global food crisis and the longer-standing ‘challenge’ of food insecurity. As I have 
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sought to demonstrate, law — not just development policy and institutional practice — is 
also part of the problem when it comes to the struggles of the food insecure. Overall, my 
critique of extant approaches to tackling hunger through law is precisely the point that 
these legal solutions fail to adequately consider the significance of the constitutive role of 
law in enabling the functioning of the global food system. I will now offer a few final 
reflections on what this might mean for the regulatory strategies of NGOs and for the 
widespread drive for the legal empowerment of vulnerable groups.   
 
With regard to the proliferation of soft-law regulatory guidelines and principles 
seeking to make markets more responsive to the needs of the hungry, the immediate 
critique is that they lack any binding force. Upon closer scrutiny, many of these texts 
display a marked ambivalence concerning precisely how investors can acquire land 
‘responsibly’. Recommendations such as those of the HLTF are fraught with tensions. 
For example, governments are instructed to balance the provision of social safety nets for 
vulnerable groups with the ‘efficient use of resources’.207 They are enjoined to ‘reduce 
constraints to an enabling environment that encourages private sector growth’,208 and to 
promote increased agricultural trade and more open trading environments.
209
 They are 
also repeatedly advised that ‘more liberalized international markets contribute to global 
food and nutrition security’.210 Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, these market 
‘solutions’ are precisely the measures that have hitherto operated to the disadvantage of 
food insecure people in developing countries. Comparable dynamics inhere in the 
response to calls for the realignment of trade law to promote food security. WTO officials 
are now working alongside experts from the FAO, WFP, and World Bank in inter-agency 
panels advising the G8 and G20 on policies to address food price volatility and improve 
agricultural market information.
211
 However, Margulis’s search of WTO records relating 
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to the period between 2008 and 2010 suggests that the Global Food Crisis did not feature 
in the organisation’s regular inter-state work.212 Only one record exists of a discussion 
among states on that subject: a 2009 presentation by a group of Least Developed 
Countries at the meeting of a minor WTO sub-committee.
213
 Overall, he concludes, there 
appears to have been little attempt within the WTO to go beyond the pro-liberalisation, 
pro-trade integration discourse when it comes to global hunger and malnutrition. Along 
similar lines, the G20 recently declared that ‘a more stable, predictable, distortion-free, 
open and transparent trading system, including as regards agriculture, has a critical role to 
play to promote food security’.214 The neoclassical economic logic implicit in this 
framing is that trade liberalisation reduces market volatility and spurs economic 
development.
215
 
 
The drive to liberalise markets in spite of the detrimental impact that such an 
approach has had on developing country populations continue to inform strategies 
advanced by the international community to tackle hunger. That being said, since the 
1990s, critical scholars have been debating the emergence of a new paradigm in law and 
development which some have suggested could be ‘a more chastened form of 
neoliberalism’.216 While markets remain the main mechanism for production and 
distribution of resources within societies,
217
 it is widely recognised — particularly since 
the global financial crisis — that markets can fail. The ‘post-Washington consensus’, as it 
is sometimes called, has inspired shift from radical calls for deregulation to one of 
‘appropriate regulation’.218 In line with this trend, the World Bank,219 along with groups 
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such as the World Justice Project, has been actively promoting ‘rule of law reform’ since 
the 1990s. It has been argued that reforming domestic legal systems, strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary, supporting civil society, and implementing human rights 
laws are all vital tools for ensuring ‘equitable’ economic growth. As the Bank underlined 
in 2003, ‘without the rule of law, economic growth and poverty reduction can be neither 
sustainable nor equitable’.220 The potential that such reforms — notably the strengthening 
of private property rights — might hold in terms of bettering the lives of the vulnerable 
has been further explored by a number of legal academics.
221
 Closer scrutiny of these 
postulated solutions, however, reveals that the ‘post’ Washington consensus has not yet 
moved beyond a drive towards market liberalisation. Nor, it would seem, has the 
tendency to prioritise the needs of financial investors above those of the food insecure 
been displaced. In fact, critiques of this particular legal ‘solution’ to challenges such as 
hunger and poverty go well beyond charges of inefficacy and extend further than tensions 
within their purported objectives. In a now substantial body of literature from critical 
academics, it has been argued that rule of law reform is the new guise of a familiar 
prescription on how ‘less civilised’ countries should conduct policy.222  
 
Scholars including Humphreys,
223
 Krever,
224
 Newton,
225
 Pahuja,
226
 and Trubek 
and Santos,
227
 have all argued that the imperialism of economics has given way to the 
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‘rule of law’ as the primary vehicle for the dissemination of ‘development’ prescriptions. 
In the place of conditionality, or sometimes supplementing it, Humphreys argues, rule of 
law ‘indicators’228 are being operationalised to promote ‘the deliberate re-engineering, at 
a legal-structural level, of the economic, political and social basics of countries 
throughout the world’.229 It is important to stress the ‘re’ of Humphreys’s 
characterisation. All of the economic reforms instilled into developing countries under 
the dictates of development doctrine have been contingent upon the engineering of 
suitable legal regimes to carry them to fruition. Yet, there is something novel about the 
openness with which law is now being called upon to create the ideal social conditions 
for markets. Precisely via a call for more regulation, it would seem, governments and 
societies worldwide are to be policed by law in the interests of the market. Based on how 
such interventions have manifested in the past, far from being a solution the international 
promotion of the rule of law may further entrench the very market entitlements that 
impede the poor and the hungry from accessing sufficient food. 
 
Last but not least, the human right to adequate food has a prominent place in 
discussions of hunger and food security. During his time as Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter drew attention to key failings of the global food 
system inherited from the 20
th
 century. His work has identified many of the factors 
conditioning food insecurity and price volatility that I have outlined in this chapter. The 
recommendations that he has made regarding the need to invest in sustainable agriculture, 
to diversify economies in agriculturally dependent countries, to establish social protection 
schemes, and to democratise food systems, are consistent with the demands of groups 
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such as La Via Campesina advocating for food sovereignty.
230
 The work of De Schutter, 
and of the broader human rights community, has done much to specify the particular 
needs of the hungry and to offer them a powerful vocabulary for articulating their claims 
for a more equitable global food system. The formalisation of human rights as legal 
entitlements is regarded by many in the human rights community as a key facet of their 
power. Yet, as a number of critical analysts have argued there are significant limitations 
to this power. While the substantive content of particular rights is elaborated in the work 
of rapporteurs and national and international courts and tribunals, this cannot overcome 
the indeterminacy of human rights. For Koskenniemi, human rights, ‘like any legal 
vocabulary, is intrinsically open-ended; what gets read into it (or out of it) is a matter of 
subtle interpretative strategy’.231 Duncan Kennedy adds that ‘rights provide only a 
langue, used to produce an infinite variety of particular arguments and particular regimes 
of positive law, as parole’.232 More often than not, what results is an interpretation of the 
content of the right that favours the party most able to defend and enforce its interests. As 
China Miéville, surmises, drawing on Marx, ‘[b]etween equal rights, force decides’.233  
 
An extensive body of scholarship continues to be elaborated debating the merits of 
attempting to utilise human rights law to achieve social — and economic — justice. I 
have not yet engaged sufficiently with this work to advance a comprehensive critique of 
why I remain sceptical about the potential for human rights law to fulfil the expectations 
many place on it. In this thesis, I will confine my caution against the widespread faith in 
the advancement of human rights law as a solution to hunger to two points only. Firstly, a 
lot of the work on human rights tends to assume the market system as the primary means 
for accessing food. As Makau Mutua — along with many others — has argued, the 
human rights movement is ‘at its core, and in many of its details, liberal and 
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European’.234 It is, he contends, ‘indebted to a certain model of liberal political (and 
market) democracy’.235 There is no overt prescription for a market economy in 
international human rights law. However, the rights protected under that framework and 
the values it promotes, such as individual freedom and choice, would appear to 
presuppose one. The legal regime upon which modern market structures are based — 
private property rights, contractual entitlements, and criminal and tort laws that penalise 
interference with those rights — has been demonstrated by Amartya Sen to be adept at 
producing hunger and famine ‘with a vengeance’.236 Far from providing a radical tool for 
change, then, under international human rights law, people are expected to fight for their 
rights within the very same systems and structures that have entrenched their 
vulnerability. Secondly, many of the current efforts to strengthen the human right to 
adequate food are largely being carried out in the absence of a convincing explanation of 
how this will empower the food insecure while existing entitlements that prohibit access 
to land and to resources, and that conspire against the affordability of food, remain in 
place.  Is it possible to strengthen economic access to food for these populations without 
weakening the entitlements of others — multinational companies, financial speculators? 
Can improvements to infrastructure, agricultural production techniques, social protections 
and education translate into food security when the price of basic staples can double in a 
day, drop a month later, and out-price the World Food Programme? Can a right to 
adequate food ‘trump’ a contract for the sale of 100 tonnes of wheat to make a profitable 
price an affordable one? As long as these questions continue to go unaddressed, further 
elaboration of the law seeking to ground a human right to adequate food may be of little 
practical use for the hungry. For these reasons, at least, I find the faith placed in human 
rights law as a solution to hunger to be misplaced. 
 
 
                                                          
234
 Mutua, Makau, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2008, p. 3.  
235
 Ibid. 
236
 Sen, A., Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, p. 4. 
270 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate that narratives that locate 
responsibility for the suffering caused by the 2007-08 global food crisis in the failure of 
domestic governments distract from the role that international regimes of governance 
have played in this context. Importantly, I have argued that law and not just policy and 
institutional practice has actively contributed to the production of food insecurity and 
grain price volatility. Public international law, the international trade and investment 
regimes, and domestic legal restructuring, have all contributed to the construction of a 
global food system that profoundly disadvantages Southern populations in their ability to 
command access to food. Yet approaches to the problem of hunger continue, as with 
responses to the phenomenon of food commodity speculation, to represent law as 
exclusively remedial. The constitutive role of law in enabling market operations and 
entrenching inequalities between North and South remains widely neglected.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The global crises in food and finance in 2007-08 have prompted calls for the use 
of regulation to tackle an array of socially damaging market trends. More broadly, law is 
being posited as the solution to problems as diverse as a lack of transparency in financial 
markets, financial ‘over-complexity’, inequities in the international trading system, land-
grabbing, and a lack of credit for small farmers. Of particular significance for my 
research, NGOs and campaigners concerned about the impact of food commodity 
speculation on grain prices have gravitated towards regulation as a tool to constrain 
speculative trading practices. Equally, the acute impact of the grain spikes on the food 
insecure — people residing predominantly in low-income countries in the Global South 
— has inspired renewed efforts by the international community to use law to adjust 
markets to the needs of vulnerable populations.  
 
The overall question that I have sought to explore in this thesis is whether this 
focus on regulatory solutions is an adequate strategy when the role of law and the state in 
constituting markets is taken into account. My conclusion is that there are serious 
impediments to the ambitions of those enjoining governments to use regulation as 
envisaged. The ability of the state to regulate the market in the interests of the food 
insecure, and in the interests of society in general, is likely to be impeded by the 
proliferation of a body of constitutive law that is working to the opposite effect — laws 
that are actively working against social interests to promote the efficient operation of 
272 
market mechanisms. As my investigation into the linkages between financial speculation, 
global hunger and law has helped to illustrate, laws entrenching the market and 
facilitating speculative behaviours appear to be progressively ‘economizing the social’,1 
to use the characterisation of Wendy Brown. I will finish my analysis by arguing this 
point.  
 
In Part I, I will provide an overview of the main arguments that I have elaborated 
throughout the chapters of my thesis. In Part II I will address some of the tensions 
between the constitutive law of the market and the regulatory ambitions of NGOs and 
campaigners. In Part III I will focus in on some of the constitutive law of the market and 
consider what this law might be effectuating in society. In Part IV I will present my final 
argument as to why regulation may not be an adequate strategy for tackling food 
commodity speculation and meeting the ‘challenge’, as it is characterised, of food 
insecurity.  
 
 
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
i. World Hunger and the Global Food Crisis 
 
In Chapter One I sought to engage with the thinking underlying contemporary 
approaches to tackling hunger. I concluded that dominant strategies centred on achieving 
food security and fulfilling the right to adequate food suffered from a critical limitation. 
Although these approaches manifest as a comprehensive set of tools to address the 
problem of hunger, this work is being carried out in the absence of a convincing 
diagnosis of what is animating the ‘food insecurity’ in the first instance. Taking steps to 
remedy this, I suggested that one of the main causes of hunger for people in the 21
st
 
century is the global food system itself. I argued that this industrialised, specialised, 
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monopolised market structure in which poor countries’ consumers are forced to compete 
with richer ones for access to food has to be understood as a producer of hunger and 
poverty for a significant proportion of the world’s population. The events of the global 
food crisis, wherein spikes in the prices of staple foods were transmitted globally and 
impacted most acutely on vulnerable groups, testified to this fact. Importantly, however, 
the particular form of the global food crisis occasioned a previously unthinkable prospect. 
Claims that financial traders engaged in practices of food commodity speculation were 
responsible for the price volatility suggested that a new obstacle had arisen, further 
undermining access to food by the food insecure. No longer solely the expression — or 
product — of a commodified global food order, the grain spikes of 2007-08 and 2010-11 
intimated that the price of food had become a commodity in its own right.  
 
ii. Food Commodity Speculation 
 
In Chapter Two I explored debates that have emerged out of claims that the 
practice of food commodity speculation ‘caused’ the global food crisis. I noted that, 
while NGOs and campaigners have amassed a compelling body of evidence on the 
existence of a causal link between grain price volatility and speculative practices, this 
evidence has been refuted by economists arguing that such a causal connection is 
impossible. Engaging with the common claim of campaigners that pricing dynamics in 
commodity markets have been altered through ‘financialisation’, I turned to history to 
explore the processes whereby commodity futures contracts were transformed into an 
asset in their own right. I then drew on evidence from contemporary market practice and 
other theories of value to critique the foundational assumptions of market behaviour that 
inform dominant economic thinking on commodity price formation. I concluded that 
neoclassical economic theory is fundamentally unable to account for the possibility that 
processes of financialisation could have altered the mode in which actors transact in 
markets. 
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Moving on to consider the significance of speculation from a broader framework 
of explanation, I argued that the shift to a financialised economy brought about under the 
neoliberal policy agenda had affected a fundamental shift in mode of capital 
accumulation. This conspired to make speculating on commodities in contravention of 
so-called ‘fundamental’ values the economically rational thing to do. Performed over 
time into a market logic of speculation, market actors are being formatted into a mode of 
trading that is increasingly dissociated from the underlying productive economy. The 
drive to keep finding ways to ‘profit without producing’ also serves to inspire efforts to 
develop new financial products and to evade regulations. These, I suggested, were some 
of the hallmarks of a speculative market logic that is differentiated from the longer-
standing logic of homo economicus not by the object of market transactions — profit-
making being common to both — but by the preferred mode of realising profit — in the 
case of markets, through ‘speculative multiplications’.2  
 
 
iii. Regulation 
 
Chapter Three provided an analysis of the market reforms in the US and in Europe 
that are attempting to give effect to the G20 commitment to develop new regulations for 
the OTC derivatives market. I focused my analysis on those provisions that NGOs hope 
will restrain ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in commodity derivatives. Comparing the 
two regimes, I assessed the likelihood that regulatory provisions could shield food prices 
from speculative interference. After explaining a number of challenges that have arisen 
with the efforts to implement the reforms, I concluded that the provisions offered slim 
hope for the project of tackling food commodity speculation. Upon closer inspection, the 
regulations were revealed to be largely constructed on an understanding of financial 
market dynamics informed by neoclassical economic theory. Position limits — the key 
measure that campaigners have fought to ensure is not weakened by industry opposition 
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— treat speculatively-conditioned food price volatility as a function of market monopoly. 
As I argued in Chapter Two, this is not the most persuasive explanation of the market 
movements. In a second set of arguments I concluded that the regulations were also 
limited as they introduced old rules to new markets, fundamentally failing to take into 
account the large constituency of interests and the drive to maintain financial pathways to 
profit — a function of speculative market logic — that would conspire in their evasion. 
Extending my analysis beyond the extant reforms into a broader critique of financial 
regulation, I intimated critical limitations to regulation as an apparatus of reform in the 
current political climate.  
 
 
iv. ‘OTC’, ‘Financial’ Innovation, and Food Commodity Speculation 
 
In Chapter Four I sought to move away from the almost universal tendency within 
the discourse on food commodity speculation to conceptualise law as the solution to 
socially harmful behaviour in this context. Practices of food commodity speculation are 
widely portrayed as taking place in a realm beyond regulatory reach — in a ‘legal black 
hole’ or ‘regulatory void’. First challenging the notion that derivative instruments were 
developed spontaneously as a response to ‘forces’ of liberalisation, I challenged this 
prevalent portrayal, tracing the origins of the OTC market to a legal fiction known as off-
shore finance. I then suggested that the label ‘OTC’ might function in a similar vein. This 
appellation generates an impression of the OTC market as an unregulated, private, global 
market that operates beyond the regulatory capacities of the state. While there is much 
about these markets that would corroborate this account, upon closer scrutiny, the 
operations of, and, indeed, the very existence of these markets was revealed to be 
critically dependent on legal vindication by public laws and legal institutions of the state. 
I then ventured to suggest what the utility of this legal fiction might be. I argued that the 
label ‘OTC’ serves to distance governments from the socially damaging activities taking 
place with the OTC market. The legal fiction of OTC also performs the myth of the self-
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regulating market and, in doing so, conspires in the presentation of speculative economic 
behaviour as natural and necessary — as something that can best be managed with a light 
regulatory touch. In a third suggestion, I argued that the label ‘OTC’ conditions a false 
sense of these markets as something novel — something arising out of a constellation of 
novel technological ‘forces’ and opportunistic subjectivities — and not something that 
informed by longer-standing logics of capitalism.  
 
 In the final sections of the chapter, I sought to develop a better understanding of 
what some of the often overlooked constitutive law in the OTC arena actually does. 
Challenging the characterisation of derivative instruments as ‘financial’ technologies, I 
drew attention to some of the earlier and, I argued, more critical legal innovations that 
have enabled the trade in these financial products to develop. The dissociative state which 
is a hallmark of speculative logic was shown to have been partially conditioned by legal 
innovations. Private property rights, contractual rights, and their recalibration has been 
influential in conditioning a subjectivity in which the exercise of those rights is 
increasingly detached from a sense of the other interests affected by their exercise.  I then 
pointed to a range of further legal innovations that have served to enable a more 
speculative trade in these contracts. Far from merely enabling a pre-formed speculative 
agency, contractual standardisation, options structures, collateral and techniques of 
rehypothecation have to be understood as partly conditioning that agency. Finally, I 
argued that both economic and legal theory enable speculative agency inasmuch as they 
conceptualise derivatives transactions as taking place between two individual agents. 
This fundamentally fails to account for the pricing signal communicated to broader 
society.  
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v. The ‘Global’ Food Crisis, the Global Food System, and (International) Law 
 
With Chapter Five the focus shifted to the constitutive role of law in facilitating 
the operations of the global food system. I began by exploring the highly localised and 
differentiated impact of what was portrayed as a ‘global’ food crisis. Contesting prevalent 
perceptions of the relationship between law, food insecurity, and food price volatility, I 
probed the significance of law for these phenomena affecting food. Beginning with the 
period of European colonialism, I argued that law was a critical tool in restructuring 
colonised societies in accordance with the civilising mission of 19
th
-century public 
international law. These interventions laid the foundations for the elaboration of the 
global food system, giving rise to new vulnerabilities and restrictions that impacted on 
the ability of populations to access adequate food. I then explained the critical 
contribution of public international law in enabling the perpetuation of neo-colonial 
practices of economic ‘development’. Since the period of decolonisation, I argued, 
legally sanctioned interventions in the domestic economies of countries in the Global 
South have further prejudiced access to food and exacerbated conditions of price 
volatility in international commodity markets. Significantly, however, the role of law in 
this context goes beyond that of a mere instrument, as it is typically understood in critical 
literature on international development. Legal regimes, both domestic and international, 
have created new linkages between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’, they have empowered 
monopolistic agribusiness companies, and they have helped to condition self-interested 
calculative market agencies. All of this has created a wealth of market entitlements that 
actively impede the ability of poorer populations to access sufficient food. Moving on to 
scrutinise the international legal solutions purporting to respond to food insecurity in the 
post-crisis context, I highlighted a number of problematic tensions informing these 
strategies, particularly the ongoing drive towards a liberalised global economic order. I 
further noted the arguments of other critical scholars who have been arguing that it is 
precisely through this rhetoric of the need for more law that undue influence over the 
economies in the Global South is being sustained. I concluded by suggesting that the 
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widespread faith in human rights law as a means of tackling hunger might be misguided, 
owing to a failure to explain how the strengthening of these entitlements at law can 
overcome the exclusionary effect of other legal rights — of the very same market 
entitlements that are entrenched by virtue of other legal regimes. 
 
 
 
II. THE OTHER LAW 
 
In this thesis, I have questioned contemporary preoccupations with legal solutions 
to the global food crisis and food insecurity, focusing instead on the constitutive role of 
law in giving rise to these phenomena.  I will now seek to put these two differing 
discourses concerning the role of law in markets into conversation with each other. I will 
further reflect on the significance of what the operations of the constitutive law in the 
market imply for the ambition to curb ‘excessive’ speculation and to use law to tackle 
food insecurity and food price volatility.   
 
 
i. Constitutive law and the market 
 
The first question to address in this analysis is what is meant by the ‘constitutive’ 
law within the market. Constituting something is commonly understood to mean 
instituting, establishing, or enacting it.
3
 To argue that something is constitutive of 
something else suggests that the constitutive component is elemental to the thing being 
constituted; that it is essential to the nature, or the character of that thing. In simple terms, 
then, the constitutive law in the market is the law that enables the market to exist. This, of 
course, leads into the much debated question of what is a market. Julia Black provides an 
excellent overview of competing economic and sociological perspectives on this question 
                                                          
3
 “Constitutive,” http://www.thefreedictionary.com/constitutive Last accessed 31
st
 July 2015. 
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in her article, “Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets”.4 I will not rehearse 
these debates here. Sticking with the classic economic definition, which understands 
markets as mechanisms of exchange between competing buyers and sellers resulting in 
the efficient allocation of scarce resources,
5
 the constitutive law of the market is the law 
that enables people to engage in market exchange. It is the law that enables them to buy 
and sell commodities, or to carry out financial transactions, such as speculating in 
markets for food commodities. As concerns in what this law consists of and where it is to 
be found, much of this constitutive market law can be found in the terms in legal 
contracts. These terms, as Black argues, ‘will be the terms, for the most part, on which 
markets operate’.6 However, as Michel Foucault has underlined, the laws constituting the 
market extend far beyond individual contracts setting terms for instant market 
transactions. Economic life, he emphasises, ‘takes place within a juridical framework 
which fixes the regime of property, contracts, patents, bankruptcy, the status of 
professional associations and commercial societies, the currency, and banking, none of 
which are given by nature…but are the contingent creations of legislation’.7  
 
A number of important points extend from Foucault’s reminder. The first is that 
the scheme of laws giving rise to any given market is broad and takes a variety of forms. 
The conditions of possibility for markets are created via the interactions between a 
plurality of different legal regimes, institutions and agencies. A second point is that, 
although much of the constitutive law of the market is conceptualised as private law, this 
private law is created and vindicated by the state. As discussed earlier, in the context of 
the market for OTC derivatives, private legal regimes can only operate with the support 
of public institutions. Third, in order for new markets like the OTC market to emerge, 
this requires the ‘redefinition of the juridical institution and of the necessary rules of right 
                                                          
4
 Black, Julia, “Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the Cognitive Framework 
from the Economic to the Social,” LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 24 (2013). 
5
 Ibid, p. 5. 
6
 Ibid, p. 21. 
7
 Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, Senellart Michel (Ed.), 
trans. Graham Burchell, New York: Picador, 2004, p. 161. 
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in a society…the redefinition, broadly speaking, of law’.8 Before a new market can 
emerge, a facilitative body of market law must be developed to enable its operations. 
Thus, the existence, form, functioning, and development of any market are the product of 
consistent interventions by the state and its legal institutions. 
   
The argument that markets are constituted by law is by no means a novel one. It 
has been suggested by Karl Polanyi,
9
 expanded on by Max Weber,
10
 and explored further 
by the Legal Realists,
11
 by institutional sociologists,
12
 and by theorists from Science and 
Technology Studies.
13
  There is an emerging body of contemporary scholarship that is 
probing more deeply into the significance of law in facilitating market transactions from 
numerous perspectives. This includes a revived interest in the notion of ‘economic 
constitutionalism’,14 an emerging body of work on the constitutive law necessary for the 
operations of ‘global’ and ‘virtual’ markets,15 and scholarship on the legal theory of 
finance.
16
 As Julia Black has noted, ‘[t]here is absolutely no novelty to an institutionalist 
(though there is to an economist) in claiming that markets are constituted by the state, 
including law and the legal system’.17 And what holds for institutionalists presumably 
also holds for lawyers. It is curious, then, that in much legal writing from public law 
perspectives that touches on markets, almost no mention is made to the role of law in 
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enabling market operations. Furthermore, while many private lawyers and legal 
academics are experts in and, indeed, are the very agents extending and recalibrating 
‘rules of right’ to develop new market instruments, they often appear indifferent to how 
their actions relate to the state and its legal institutions. 
 
Importantly, while for some the constitutive role of law in the market is old news, 
conceptions of newer financial markets, such as the OTC derivatives market, evidence 
greater nescience in this regard. Modern global markets, particularly financial markets, 
are imagined to operate autonomously, to exist beyond the jurisdictional reach of states, 
and to be capable of ‘self-regulation’. This perception is garnered, not only by the 
arguments of neoclassical-inspired economists and the veneration of their claims under 
the neoliberal policy agenda, but also, and perhaps counterintuitively, by the arguments 
of neoliberalism’s critics. Opponents of the neoliberal political programme and its potent 
manifestation in the ‘Washington Consensus’ have railed against deregulation, 
privatisation, and liberalisation — the ‘hollowing out’ of the nation state 18 —  all of 
which is said to have left society to the machinations of a ‘chronically unstable, 
contradictory and crisis-ridden’ capitalism.19 What they have failed to mention, however, 
is that ‘deregulation’ is nothing of the sort. It involves a shift from centralised regulatory 
mechanisms to institutions of private law — institutions that remain crucially dependent 
on the state for their operation. The vital point that law, markets, economy, and politics 
are mutually constitutive, that they comprise a ‘singular figure in which economic 
processes and institutional frameworks call on each other, support each other, modify and 
shape each other in ceaseless reciprocity’,20 appears to have been drowned out in the 
clamour for more regulation.  
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ii. Already regulated 
 
At this juncture I wish to expand on the distinction between regulatory law and 
constitutive law in the market. As discussed in Chapter Three, regulation typically 
involves governing by restriction. It seeks to effect amendments or adjustments to what is 
already there. The market is taken as a given. Regulatory law for the market typically 
seeks to change how people act in markets; to create permissions and prohibitions; to 
offer incentives; to say what can be done, when, by whom, and according to what rules. 
There is, then, an important contrast with constitutive law, in that constitutive law brings 
what is there into being. Constitutive law is not confined to specifying how markets 
transactions are to be transacted — it is a prerequisite to the very possibility of a market 
transaction. Yet, and the crucial significance of this has to be impressed, the constitutive 
law in the market also serves a regulatory function. The constitutive law also informs 
how people act within markets, creates permissions and prohibitions, and offers 
incentives and disincentives for behaviour. Finally, constitutive law mandates what can 
be done, when, by whom, and according to what framework of rules and expectations.  
 
The significance of this for NGOs and other campaigners is that the market 
‘phenomena’ that they are seeking to remedy through the application of law are, to a 
significant extent, themselves products of law. Speculative trading practices, a lack of 
access to food, food price volatility, financial complexity, land-grabbing, and, more 
broadly, hunger and poverty are conditioned by legal regimes that are already in place 
and that have been put in place and sustained by governments. This, at least in my 
estimation, is what Amartya Sen demonstrates through his analysis of ‘entitlements’, as 
discussed in Chapter One. Famines and longer-term food deprivation are not naturally 
occurring events or states. They are the outcomes of a legal order in which land can be 
privately owned and people excluded from using it, in which food is first and foremost a 
commodity to be bought and sold, and in which rights of private ownership and 
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contractual rights to trade can all be exercised without consideration for the need of 
human beings for food for their survival. The same applies to practices of food 
commodity speculation and its impact on grain price volatility. By determining what can 
be done, when, by whom, and according to what rules in financial markets, law creates a 
permissive space for speculative practices. These behaviours are allowed and even 
encouraged to proliferate. Over time, what results from this ‘economic-institutional 
ensemble’21 is a market logic of speculation. All of this suggests that developing 
additional regulatory regimes might not be necessary if adjustments were made to some 
of the constitutive law enabling market operations in the first instance. Rather than 
focusing on the powers of centralised regulatory agencies, an alternative approach could 
be to focus on the powers of dispersed regulatory agents already operational within the 
market — powers endowed by the constitutive law in the market.  
 
Another insight gleaned from focusing on the constitutive role of law in the market 
is a more enlivened sense of the limitations of regulation as a solution to problematic 
aspects of markets. What seems to result from superimposing new regulations on the 
market structure without contemplating the significance of the legal regimes already in 
place is the displacement of problematic market behaviours. Regulatory categorisations 
often appear arbitrary and quickly become outdated; substantial resources are poured into 
projects that result in games of regulatory cat and mouse. Equally, attempts to make 
markets fairer by facilitating access for poor countries and consumers often manifest in a 
modicum of corrective action and a largely untouched status quo. Inequitable market 
foundations and structures, and deeper organising logics that prompt regulatory evasion, 
speculative behaviour, and exploitative practices of accumulation remain in place and at 
work. Attempting to devise tools and techniques to socialise this institution further 
entrenches market arrangements as the only available means for facilitating the 
production and consumption of food. Regulation also helps legitimise inequitable market 
structures by fostering the notion of a ‘win-win’ solution. It creates the illusion that it is 
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possible to simultaneously maintain profitable financial markets and to protect society 
from profit-seeking speculative behaviours; that we can retain the benefits of a liberalised 
trade in agricultural commodities and insulate the food insecure from price volatility; that 
respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to adequate food can be achieved all the 
while upholding existing private property rights and contractual claims over land and 
productive resources. A focus on regulatory solutions elides the possibility that realising 
both sets of such goals may be unachievable; that these goals might, in fact, be in tension 
with one another. 
 
 
III. WHAT THE OTHER LAW DOES 
 
Gathering together some of the insights developed in Chapters Four and Five, I 
will now look more closely at how the constitutive law that enables the market actively 
contributes to food insecurity and food price volatility, and how it facilitates speculative 
behaviours. More broadly, I will now consider how this body of law might be impacting 
on society. I will then further elaborate on why I see this as likely to undermine efforts to 
respond to problematic trends within markets with regulatory solutions.  
 
The dynamics that I discuss below are based on my analysis of markets for 
commodity derivatives and for underlying food commodity markets. However, some of 
the following observations may also ring true for law’s operation in markets more 
generally. That being said, markets are multi-faced, complex institutions and can be 
markedly influenced by local cultures and customs. While my arguments may intimate 
some general tendencies in the dynamic between legal norms, market functions, social 
relations, and human behaviours, I do not claim that they have universal validity. My aim 
here is to register what the constitutive law in the market could be creating within society, 
how that impacts on the needs of the hungry, and how, in turn, this could affect 
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regulatory aspirations. I offer these suggestions as a springboard for further research into 
these dynamics. 
 
 
i. Market entitlements 
 
In The Great Transformation,
22
 Polanyi placed great emphasis on the role of the 
state in instituting new market relationships and in creating a centralised economy. It was 
Weber who argued for the inherent dependency of the rise of the capitalist economy on 
‘formal rational law’ — the form of law characteristic of Western modernity.23 As my 
discussion in Chapter Five further underlined in the context of European colonialism, 
over time, legal norms of property and contract facilitate modes of market transaction that 
result in the replacement of existing social ties with new market relationships. What 
Polanyi and Weber further helped to demonstrate is that although markets are not 
naturally occurring social forms, over time, the constitutive body of law facilitating 
market operations can make them appear as such. Law can function to obscure the 
arbitrary and violent means by which rights were originally distributed and assigned in 
society. Background norms of property and contract become social norms; society no 
longer remembers or sees the force or political wrangling used to establish private 
property rights over land or resources, or to create a new generation of rights over 
commodities as financial assets. Increasingly, markets are seen to operate as sites of  
freedom in which human beings follow their natural inclinations to pursue profit in their 
own self-interest.  
 
Beyond merely enabling commodity markets to function, the legal structures that 
create the market also create market entitlements that actively prevent many poorer 
groups within society from accessing sufficient food. Those who have lost out in the push 
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for an industrial revolution, or in the march towards ‘civilisation’ and modernity, 
continue to lose out as a result of the legal rights that entrench the distribution of 
resources forged through these ‘advances’. No matter what the social stakes, property 
rights that exclude other people from accessing land and resources are respected, 
protected, and fulfilled by governments and by courts. The exercise of property rights and 
contractual rights is rarely subject to question, even when they are elaborated into more 
‘exotic’ financial instruments. Forwards contracts, exchange-traded futures contracts, 
OTC derivatives, and the plethora of financial instruments enabling securitisation and 
collateralisation have all been elaborated by lawyers adapting and extending these basic 
legal building blocks. Significantly, while many such financial products are seen to be of 
dubious social merit, these developments appear possessed of a kind of legal fortitude 
that enables them to weather social disapproval. Perhaps because they have their basis in 
some of law’s most unquestioned and long-established institutions, derivatives seem to be 
treated with deference by the judiciary and by the legislature. Certainly, there has been no 
great objection or even close interrogation of the legal forms giving rise to novel financial 
products since the claim of the financial services industry to be able to use them to 
manage risk took hold. Through their proliferation, these new legal forms can be seen to 
be governing more and more aspects of social life — agricultural production, access to 
credit, the value of a country’s currency, oil prices, food prices, etc. In spite of the 
monumental significance that they have had in altering modes of accumulation and in the 
rise of financial complexity, the legal schemes enabling these paradigmatic shifts have 
been subject to remarkably little critical scrutiny.  
 
Market entitlements constitute critical barriers to prospects of regulatory reforms 
that could address food commodity speculation, or improve the lives of the food insecure. 
It is no longer possible to ban derivatives, to question the exercise of rights of ownership 
over resources or contractual rights over financial assets, or to put the needs of the hungry 
above the rights of investors. To do so would be considered tyranny — a trespass on 
individual liberty — as these rights are now seen to be part of the natural order of things. 
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Other modes of regulating access to land, resources and food that present alternatives to 
‘free’ markets and pricing mechanisms seem unrealisable. The possibility of fixing a 
‘just’ price for wheat24 — either through social legislation or an instrument such an 
international commodity agreement — seems unworkable, impossible even. The 
constitutive law of the market affects a kind of imaginative lock-in — an implicit 
constraint on reformist ambitions. 
 
 
ii. Market subjectivities 
 
Overwhelmingly, private legal regimes are seen to be merely facilitating the pre-
formed economic ambitions of ‘economic man’. However, as Lang and others have 
argued, law has to be understood as part of a broader set of structuring mechanisms that 
help to constitute homo economicus and his operative rationality.
25
 In this thesis, I have 
suggested that legal norms of property and contract, and the kinds of social relationships 
that they structure, have to be understood to be anticipating and producing this kind of 
market subjectivity. Assuming and empowering this subjectivity via facilitative legal 
norms and regimes would appear to bring it to life and entrench it as a mode of being. 
Increasingly, a calculative self-interested mode of engagement with others is what is 
expected of human beings — both when transacting in markets and, increasingly, in other 
aspects of social life. 
 
Importantly, market subjectivities partially conditioned through law appear to be 
sensitive to changes in that law. As well as interposing a new layer of entitlement 
between food and human beings seeking to gain access to it, legal innovations are also 
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responsible for the reconditioning of market subjectivities. Through what might be 
designated as ‘legal plasticity’ — the adaption and innovation of basic institutions of 
property and contract — one might even say a form of neuroplasticity is occasioned. 
Neuroplasticity refers to changes in neural pathways and synapses due to changes in 
behaviour, environment, neural processes, thinking, and emotions — as well as to 
changes resulting from bodily traumas.
26
 Legal instruments enabling market actors to 
transact speculatively, thereby altering the environments, imperatives, and experience of 
transacting in financial markets have a corresponding impact on the mental processes of 
those transacting. Alongside the new pathways to financial profit, also forged through 
legal innovations have been new market subjectivities that are impressed with the need to 
keep those pathways open, or, in the event of their closure, to develop new ones. Another 
significant and constantly shifting hurdle, then, for regulators to surmount. 
 
iii. Market expansion 
 
As well as endowing certain market actors with entitlements, the constitutive law 
in the market also allows markets to expand. Prior to the development of the legal 
regimes necessary to processes of commodification and market exchange, people tended 
to obtain resources necessary to their survival through relationships of proximity and 
trust. Law was critical to the restructuring of social relations through which large-scale 
market operations and such a thing as a state economy became possible. Today, law 
makes possible the existence of markets for food and financial assets that span the globe. 
As well as enabling markets to expand geographically, the creative elaboration of private 
rights into new contractual structures spans new temporalities (futures contracts), 
expands participation by enrolling new types of actors in the market via the elaboration of 
new contractual structures (commodity index funds), and can help to lower transaction 
costs and make trading more efficient (commodity options). Law is also a prerequisite to 
the expansion of types of market enterprise. Large commercial operations staffed by 
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hundreds of people working in disparate fields across numerous continents are made 
possible only through law. 
 
In creating these new inter-linkages, however, law is also helping to condition new 
forms of dislocation and dissociation. As legal regimes enabling market transactions are 
progressively elaborated, people are alienated not only from their land and from the fruits 
of their labour but also from a sense of what their market transactions produce. 
Consumers purchasing a loaf of bread in a supermarket are often wholly ignorant of the 
circumstances in which the wheat it contains was grown and harvested — where it was 
produced, who produced it, whether the producers were paid a fair wage, and whether 
that wage enables the producers to feed themselves. Such consumers are not likely to be 
reflecting on the fact that, by purchasing that bread, they are exercising demand for grain 
that might — taken together with the purchases of their fellow shoppers at Tesco — 
ultimately result in making the grain unaffordable for poor consumers in Ethiopia or 
Bangladesh if markets are ‘tight’. Equally, Chinese investors negotiating a contract for 
the purchase of farmland in Africa from an office in Beijing are not required to look 
beyond the acceptability of those contractual terms to anyone other than themselves and 
the government lawyers and officials with whom they are negotiating. As the laws 
enabling market transactions are standardised and the trade of a given commodity 
routinised, what can result is the kind of radically dissociative market trading evident in 
practices of food commodity speculation. Not only are the parties to such contracts 
dissociated from the interests of others extending from the food commodities that they 
are buying and selling, they are detached from a sense that what they are trading is food 
at all.  
 
Crucially, legal institutions appear insensitive to the market power that is being 
created through the making and interlinking of markets. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
linking the economies of the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ has enrolled those with less 
market power into a highly disadvantageous dynamic with market actors with greater 
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power. It has created the means by which the weak can (continue to) be exploited by the 
strong, intensifying the inequities in their relationship. Yet, all that is visible in the eyes 
of the law is a web of contractual relationships between ‘equals’ — nation states; 
consenting contractual partners. Furthermore, with the development of new contractual 
structures that create interlinkages between commodity markets and financial markets — 
between the financialised economy and the productive one — new forms of market 
power have emerged, influencing food prices in novel ways. While it is understood that 
the interests of poorer consumers are prejudiced by those of richer ones as a result of such 
connections, the precise nature of this process remains poorly understood. As the debate 
concerning the causal significance of food commodity speculation in the grain spikes in 
2007-08 and 2010-11 would attest, there is a great need to question still-dominant 
thinking on how commodity prices are formed in contemporary markets. The influence 
that derivative instruments can exert on processes of value formation is still being 
investigated. This leads regulators into a familiar trap —that of knowing what they do, 
and even knowing why they do what they do, but not knowing what what they do does. 
The problems inherent in regulating complex markets without interrogating the 
constituents of that complexity have been demonstrated throughout this thesis. What 
largely transpires is regulatory evasion, and yet more financial and legal complexity.   
 
 
iv. Market myths 
 
As the characteristics of homo economicus have been progressively naturalised, 
private legal regimes are increasingly seen to be merely facilitative of this pre-existing 
market rationality. Thus, another market myth emerges — the myth of the self-regulating 
market. As a result of an enabling body of law that allows individuals to contract 
bilaterally, instantaneously, and outside of established exchanges, markets have emerged 
that are widely understood to operate independently of law and the state. As explored in 
Chapter Four, law is integral to the existence and functioning of the OTC market, whilst 
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simultaneously enabling it to appear as ‘self-regulating’. The label ‘OTC’ operates as a 
legal fiction — a statement iterated in partial awareness of its untruth that, over time, 
creates the perception that this market really is a global private market unregulated by the 
state. The apparent insensitivity of economists and lawyers to the fact that they are 
engaged in the production of a legal fiction would testify to the power of the 
mystifications created by such legal regimes.  
 
Governments and all manner of public agencies and actors benefit from this 
distanciation which absolves them of responsibility for the undesirable social 
consequences of activities within such markets. Financial speculators are cast as an 
anomaly — lone rangers or mavericks taking the ordinary mode of market behaviour to 
an unhealthy extreme. They are outcasts operating in a ‘lawless’ arena to which the state 
and law are called to respond. More precisely, to draw on Fleur Johns’s recent 
scholarship, they are consigned to exogeneity, a non-legal zone that seems to surpass 
legal grasp or comprehension.
27
 These ‘unruly’ behaviours are seen to take place in the 
‘myth of the dangerous dark’,28 to quote Susan Marks. Lawyers are gainfully employed 
in perpetuating this myth from both sides — many operating inside the ‘dark’ markets, 
others charging in with their regulatory ‘light’. Private lawyers write new contracts to 
enable a type of market transaction; regulators respond, crafting regulations and 
principles to constrain certain financial behaviours and govern markets for the social 
good. But then more lawyers begin work on the instruments to circumvent the regulations 
— ‘block futures’ to take the functionality of OTC derivatives, or new legal structures to 
enable subsidiarisation, or to relocate activity to another jurisdiction. While ‘OTC’ may 
be a myth, from a lawyer’s perspective, it is a profitable one.   
 
The constitutive law of the marketplace lends itself to the reproduction of false 
separations: between offshore and onshore; between regulated futures markets and OTC 
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derivative markets; between public and private spheres; between domestic and 
international planes; and between political and economic issues. This occurs because the 
constitutive law in the market is seen as being neutral — as merely facilitating the desires 
of those transacting. It is positioned in opposition to the interventionist ‘public’, in spite 
of its reliance on public institutions for its form, function, and efficacy. All of these 
mythical separations inspire elaborate efforts to defend society from predatory financial 
practices, to ponder the future directions of ‘globalisation’, to lament the subjugation of 
social life to the demands of profit, and to claim helplessness in the face of monumental 
market powers like Cargill, or incidents of speculative ‘frenzy’. It allows events such as 
the global food crisis and the global financial crisis to be studied in minute detail, but 
studied separately. In spite of all of the political choices, the economic assumptions, the 
legislation, the treaties, the contracts, the legal innovations, the rehypothecations, the 
entitled actions and the profitable extractions involved, the law creating the myth of the 
self-regulating market somehow eviscerates responsibility for what this law begets in 
society. It is as if the activities of financial traders operating in the OTC arena were only 
the result of their own self-serving choices, and not the consequence of other choices — 
political ones. The same applies for the domestic governments so frequently found at 
fault for failing to protect the food insecure. It is interesting to note that, while 
responsibility for socially prejudicial practices in the OTC arena is disavowed by 
gesturing to a global realm beyond regulatory reach, responsibility for the acute 
vulnerability of Southern populations to commodity price volatility is foisted on the 
governments of the countries concerned. In both cases, the same governments who have 
been active in the creation of these markets, and in elaborating the legal regimes that 
facilitate their operations, are miraculously in the clear. In terms of the implications for 
regulatory ambitions, those ambitions have, hitherto, been largely misdirected. NGOs, 
campaigners and the media have become embroiled in the condemnation of greedy 
speculators and a project of defending regulations from attempts by the financial services 
industry to water them down — even battling in court to do so. Yet, all of this legal 
drama functions to distract from the pervasive normality of speculative practices, and 
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from the fact that the OTC market and its operations have always been firmly within 
governmental grasp. 
 
Taken together, then, what does the constitutive law of the market effectuate 
within society and how might this operate, as I have sought to demonstrate, to impede 
efforts to regulate markets for the betterment of society? I will now suggest that what 
much of this constitutive law effects is what Brown and Foucault each identify as the 
regulation of society by the market.
29
 
 
 
 
IV. FOOD COMMODITY SPECULATION, HUNGER, AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: 
WHITHER REGULATION 
 
Economising the social, or regulating society by the market, means economics 
imperialism. It means regulating society based on what is good for markets and not what 
is good for people. It means prioritising market and transactional efficiency and 
conducting cost-benefit analysis so that economic values concerning how to optimally 
deal with scarce resources come before social values — concerns about fairness, justice, 
quality of life, friendship, and love. The realisation of profit becomes a model of social 
relations, so that the individual’s relationship with himself, with time, with those around 
him, and with the group, is conducted on this basis.
30
 People become, as Brown argues, 
always and everywhere homo economicus.
31
  
 
The regulation of society commensurate with market interests has been ongoing 
since the 19
th
 century — since ‘The Great Transformation’. Through legal regimes 
facilitating market transaction, human beings have gradually been structured into a mode 
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30
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31
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of self-interested, calculative engagement with those around them. However, the 
restructuring of society to complement the efficient operation of markets has been 
significantly intensified and accelerated since the 1980s, under the neoliberal policy 
agenda. As Feher, Foucault and Brown all argue, centralised governance of the market in 
the interests of society is replaced by a new mode of neoliberal governance — a 
governing rationality — that ‘transmogrifies every human domain and endeavour, along 
with humans themselves, according to a specific image of the economic’.32 Under 
neoliberalism, individual liberty is seen to be paramount and can only be achieved in the 
context of ‘free markets’. However, the project of ‘freeing’ markets has involved 
consistent interventions by the state to elaborate legal regimes for markets that function 
as alternatives to centralised regulation. Processes of liberalisation and deregulation did 
not involve the removal of law; rather its reconfiguration. The removal of centralised 
capital controls would have been impossible without the availability of a private law 
alternative: financial derivatives to protect industry from new forms of financial risk. 
Banks and other financial institutions were only permitted to ‘self-regulate’ — i.e. to be 
afforded the chance to operate under less scrutiny from centralised agencies — due to the 
use of all manner of financial instruments to collateralise and securitise loans, calculate 
outstanding obligations, and hedge against speculative transactions. A political vision of 
what is best for society — a vision underpinned by a set of economic assumptions about 
how people will behave in markets — has been transposed into a mode of market 
governance elaborated from some of law’s most basic institutions, property rights and 
contract law, into a private regime of regulation that governs in the interests of the 
market. Overt government regulation of the economy has been transposed into an array of 
largely contractual private law mechanisms and techniques, which are used as tools of 
public governance. As Brown underlines, the state is, for its part, being ‘privatized, 
enfolded, and animated by market rationality in all of its own functions’.33 
 
                                                          
32
 Brown, Wendy, Undoing the demos, p. 10. 
33
 Ibid, p. 40. 
295 
This crystallisation of a constitutive body of legal rules to give effect to 
prescriptions of market freedom has been extended to the broader global economy. Trade 
liberalisation and the free movement of capital are effectively constitutionalised in the 
WTO’s Articles of Agreement and judicialised via the decisions of its dispute settlement 
procedure. They are also enshrined in regional trade agreements, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, legislated as one of the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU, and 
further entrenched via the protection of the rights of foreign investors by the international 
investment regime. What appears to be emerging is a neoliberal economic constitution in 
which market rights and freedoms are protected from any form of encroachment or 
interference by the state. In contrast with the stated aims of advocates of ‘economic 
constitutionalism’, 34 market rights, rather than social rights, it would appear, are 
increasingly entrenched as inviolable entitlements that are immunised from governmental 
power. As the domain of the market expands and market entitlement are crystallised, 
non-market forms are being crowded out. Human beings are tangled in a web of legal 
relations that facilitate markets and debilitate other ways of being. Fewer people than 
ever have access to ‘the commons’, and fewer people too have the possibility of growing 
their own food. As Saskia Sassen argues in her book, Expulsions, law is a vital 
constitutive element in producing what she describes as ‘elementary extractions’ and 
social ‘expulsions’.35 In countries both rich and poor, she argues, people are being forced 
out of society, and their lives regulated according to market imperatives.
36
 Yet, alongside 
this highly destructive impact, these legal regimes also have a creative dimension. An 
economic agency assumed by economic theory, empowered by law, and elaborated into 
new financial products not only creates new markets, it produces new market mindsets 
that seek to evade regulation, that keep finding profitable pathways to profit, to further 
commoditise and financialise the natural world and human relationships.  
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Here then, in the legal empowerment of an imagined homo economicus and the 
restructuring of his environment in line with a vision of ‘free’ markets, is where an 
important part of the explanation for the grain spikes in 2007-08 and 2010-11 can be 
located. Equally, the ongoing difficulties of the food insecure have also been further 
entrenched by this mode of governing society according to market imperatives. These 
developments have provoked widespread concern. Yet, the primary mode of responding 
has been the elaboration of regulations that leave many of the market entitlements, 
liberalised market conditions, and market subjectivities of the pre-crisis order intact. 
Neoclassical economic theory has been questioned, but many of its operative assumptions 
continue to inform regulatory strategies. The need to address ‘excessive’ volumes of 
financial speculation has been repeatedly iterated, but the factors giving rise to 
speculative market logic remain under-interrogated. Doubts have been cast on the 
likelihood that liberalised commodity markets can function to suit the needs of the food 
insecure, yet the drive to liberalise markets is intact and at work.  
 
Regulation purports to protect society from the excesses of the market and to 
improve the situation of the food insecure but fails to touch or even to acknowledge the 
role that other legal regimes are playing in giving expression to market excess, and in 
actively excluding and prejudicing the poor and hungry. For these reasons, in my view, 
regulation is not an adequate strategy for tackling the phenomenon of food commodity 
speculation or addressing long-standing inequities in (market) access to food. As the 
domain of the market continues to expand, all the while enabled by laws that many treat 
as inconsequential or invisible, it is increasingly unclear whose society, and what kind of 
society, are left for regulation to protect. 
 
 
______________________________________
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